

Bombay, New Bombay and Metropolitan Region . Growth Process and Planning Lessons

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PREFACE

A study of the present nature is quite often a product of the joint efforts of many individuals and institutions and, while it appears in my name, I would like to categorically state that from the conceptualization to completion stage, it has drawn considerable support and sustenance from others. I cannot possibly repay this debt adequately. Omitting only those who must remain anonymous, I am, as the only possible step, specifying the nature and extent of this help.

This study grew out of a continuing dialogue between me and Professors Dev Raj (late), Victor S. D'Souza, Dhirendra Narain, A.R. Desai, D.D. Narula, M.J.K. Thavraj, P.N. Misra, Atul Sarma, Radhakrishna, Waheeduddin Khan and Ashvin Parikh. If there is some substance, and content in the present study, perhaps it is due to the ideas given by these friends from the profession.

Initially, this study was to have been funded by the Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India through the National Institute of Urban Affairs, New Delhi. The premature death of Professor Dev Raj made me approach the Indian Council of Social Science Research for financial support. The Council not only quickly processed and sanctioned the requested funds but also agreed to enhance them when I expanded the scope of the study mid-stream. I am grateful to the Council, and its dynamic Member-Secretary, Professor D.D. Narula for facilitating prosecution of this study.

Being a process, policy and impact analysis study all rolled into one, the collection of sensitive data from the Government of Maharashtra, CIDCO, BMRDA, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, Bombay Port Trust, and the Planning Commission, New Delhi was such a demanding task that but for very consequential help of a large number of resource persons and my two senior level project colleagues it would have been impossible to marshall evidence for the analysis of motives. A larger number of such colleagues unfortunately cannot be specified and I am sure that they would understand my difficulties.

Among those who gave me their valuable time, information and hard data, I would like to gratefully mention L.C. Gupta, Managing Director, CIDCO, M.Y. Thackray, Ardendu Bhattacharya, K.N. Patel, D.G. Parab, S.B. Gogte, A. Mhaisalkar, and R. Rajwade, (all CIDCO), M.S. Gore, S.M.Y. Shastri, J.B. D'Souza, Ramesh Jhamtani, Ashvin Parikh, K.K. Khatau, M.K. Chowdhry, Robin Ghosh, and H.D. Koperdekar.

Responding to requests of friends from the academic fraternity, I had to share part of this report, in somewhat semi-finished shape, in various seminars and conferences (Verma : 1981, A, B). These exchanges helped me considerably in recasting the same material while finalizing this report. I am grateful to the Editors of Nagarlok, Journal of Institute of Public Administration,

Lucknow University and State and Society for publishing segments and permitting me to use them, in somewhat modified form, in the present report.

This study was completed while I was at the Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow. Its faculty, headed by Professor T.S. Papola, provided me the opportunity to discuss conceptual, and methodological problems faced, and I would like to particularly record my gratitude for the help given by Professor T.S. Papola and Hiranmay Dhar. Various drafts of the report were typed by Subhashis Mukherjee and P.J. Devassykutty and A.P. Pandey arranged production of the report.

This report has benefited from the varied inputs provided by the above mentioned friends and institutions. However, I am alone responsible for the opinions expressed, conclusions drawn, and the inadequacies which obviously remain.

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H.S. VERMA

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED

AHP	Accelerated Housing Programme
APM	Agricultural Produce Market
APMC	Agricultural Produce Market Complex
BBRRA	Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Act
BBRRB	Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board
BEST	Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking
BMC	Bombay Metropolitan City
BMR	Bombay Metropolitan Region
BMRDA	Bombay Metropolitan Regional Development Authority
BMRPB	Bombay Metropolitan Regional Planning Board
BMTC	Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd.
BPT	Bombay Port Trust
BSES	Bombay Suburban Electric Supply Undertaking
CA	Chief Architect
CBD	Central Business District
CIDCO	City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.
CWPRS	Central Water and Power Research Station
DDA	Delhi Development Authority
DPW	Director of Planning and Works
EDA	Early Development Area
FSI	Floor Space Index
Ha.	Hectare
HUDCO	Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd.
IDA	International Development Association
IT	Improvement Trust
MAFCO	Maharashtra Agricultural Products and Fertilizer Promotion Corporation Ltd.
MAPMA	Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Market Act

MCGB	Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay
MD	Managing Director
MIDC	Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.
MHADA	Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act
MHB	Maharashtra Housing Board
MHRB	Maharashtra Housing Repairs Board
MULC	Maharashtra Urban Land Ceiling Act
MRT	Mass Rapid Transport
MRTPA	Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act
MSEB	Maharashtra State Electricity Board
MSRTC	Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Ltd.
MST	Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India
NSP	Nhava-Sheva Port
NTDA	New Town Development Authority
ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Commission
PE	Project Engineer
P & T	Post and Telegraph Department
PWP	Peasants' and Workers' Party
SICOM	State Industrial Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.
STPA	Special Town Planning Authority
SRA	Slum Renewal Areas
TA	Technical Advisor
TF	Task Force
TECS	Tata Economic Consultancy Services
URA	Urban Renewal Areas
WG	Working Group

CHAPTER 1

Theme, Objectives and Procedure

CHAPTER 1

Theme, Objectives and Procedure

Studies of urbanisation in India can broadly be grouped into two major categories. The first one generally depicts differential urban conditions in juxtaposition with the changes which have occurred in the demographic, socio-economic-politico structures of the cities. Their central area of enquiry is to quantify, using a wide array of disciplinary and methodological approaches and quite often imposing data base, the norm-based requirements of a wide spectrum of city services and compare them with patterns available in an effort to identify the gaps. Quite naturally, they also end up in prescribing specific solutions.¹ I would like to call the second category process studies which, by their very nature, are historical in approach and location - specific and attempt to analyse the growth and transformation of cities in graphic, cause - effect details.² The process studies might lack enormous quantitative data base but provide very insightful analysis of the interaction of the city-based and societal processes and thus, sketch the relationship of urbanization, as a process, with even larger processes such as colonialization, imperialism, industrialization, development and underdevelopment. Only a handful studies have seen the light of the day from the second category.

1 Asian Development Bank (1980), Bose (1973), Doebel, et al (1979), Dunkerley, et al (1978), Jacobson and Ved Prakash (1974), Kundu (1980), Kundu and Raza (1981), Ved Prakash (1969, 1977, 1981), Turner (1962), and World Bank (1972, 1975) provide useful listing of these studies.

2 Studies of Bhattacharya (1979), Gillion (1968), Hjortshoj (1979), Munshi (1978, in progress), Sivaramakrishnan (1977, 1978), and Spodek (1965, 1969, 1974) belong to this category.

The most significant difference between the two categories lies in their ideological basis. The first category generally tends to place the entire blame of the acute urban problems of migration, population growth, inadequate provision of city servicing infrastructure and financial resources and prescribes over-simplified and, quite often, not very practical solutions. The second category is more circumspect and always tries to link, in its cause - effect analysis, the local with the regional, sub-national, national, and global processes and issues.

For some time now a new stream which claims to combine the characteristics of the above two categories, has begun to appear on the horizon.³ Most researchers from this group are concentrating on what they call impact or policy analysis generally attempting to highlight the output resulting as a consequence of urban development policies and programmes pursued. The methodological sophistication of these studies makes them preserve of a selected few even among the academicians : unless simplified drastically they are not of much use to the political decision makers and administrators. There is consequently a need of process studies not only to help explain the empirical realities in the urban settlements but also to provide specific input in the formulation of policies and programmes. This study of Bombay and New Bombay is a modest attempt of this genre.

Choice of Bombay and New Bombay

There were several reasons why I preferred to conduct this study

3 Chatterjee (1981), Fakolade and Coblenz (1981), Nijkamp (1979, 1980, 1981, A), Nijkamp and Rietveld (1981, A), and Stough and Puglese (1981) belong to this new group.

in Bombay and New Bombay. First, Bombay was among the three presidency towns which were developed almost from a scratch by the British and its growth process was inevitably linked with the national and global processes of colonialization, industrialization, development and underdevelopment. Second, the city had continued to grow unabated since 200 B.C. crossing almost all stages in a city's growth envisaged by urban planning theorists.⁴ Third, periodic efforts have been made to plan, restructure and relocate its physical, economic, and political structure and these efforts are still continuing in the form of several independent as well as inter-linked projects. Fourth, the city plays an important role in the Indian and international political economy. Fifth, quite impressive historical material on the process and methodology of its growth was easily available.⁵

Objectives

Originally, when this study was conceived in 1978 its objective was to trace the crystallization of New Bombay idea, execution of New Bombay project and determine whether the historic experiment of use of land as a resource for developing a two million strong city of New Bombay had succeeded. If it had not, as was the general

4 For an interesting discussion on the stages involved in the city's life, see, for example, Mumford (1945 : 284-92) and Taylor (1945 : 229-30 and 1949 : 44-56; 76-77, 405). Mumford indicates six stages : 1. Eopolis, 2. Polis, 3. Metropolis, 4. Megapolis, 5. Tyrannapolis, and 6. Nekropolis. The seven stages indentified by Taylor are : 1. Infantile, 2. Juvenile, 3. Adolscent, 4. Early Mature, 5. Mature, 6. Late Mature, and 7. Senile.

5 See, for instance, Bhattacharya (1979), Edwardes (1902), Harris (1978), Kopardekar (1977), and Rajagopalan (1962) among others.

personal assessment of urban planners inside CIDCO,⁶ the NTDA planning and executing the project since its inception, and outside professionals in the field of urban planning, whether the process of operationalization of the idea by CIDCO was faulty or there were inherent contradictions in the conceptual and methodological approach of using land as a resource or both. At that stage, I had not envisaged to examine the historical process and methodology of Bombay's growth, nor the overview of several restructuring and relocation projects such as Bombay Development Plan 1964, Bandra-Kurla, and the Nhava-Sheva Port.

When I commenced the screening of enormous material available on Greater Bombay, it gradually became apparent that analysis of the New Bombay experiment in total isolation with what had preceded it in the earlier period in Greater Bombay and what had followed as the experiment got underway, would, at best, yield an incomplete picture and possibly a misleading conclusion. Since I was prosecuting a process study, I opted to expand the scope of the study to cover the events preceding and following the initiation of New Bombay experiment.

After modification of its scope, this study had the following specific objectives :

1. To trace the logic, methodology, and class basis of Bombay's growth, New Bombay's birth and the design to convert the BMR into a Bombay Metropolitan City.

6 Personal discussions revealed that these had taken two forms : one, where the planners had written their assessment in their personal capacities and shared it with the outside scholarly community; second, where they had proposed, in direct opposition to the official position taken by CIDCO's policies and approaches, alternate solutions within the available forums inside CIDCO. Gogte (1977), for example, belongs to the first category; Parab (1977, 1978), and Mhaisalkar (1978) to the second one.

2. To analyse the organizational design and structure employed for developing New Bombay.
3. To examine the process of development of New Bombay vis-a-vis the twin goals of siphoning off development from Greater Bombay and relocating growth of tertiary sector from Greater Bombay.
4. To draw lessons in planning and developing new cities and restructuring old ones including use of land as a resource, based on Bombay and New Bombay experience.

Scope, Coverage and Methodology

The starting point of the study is 200 B.C. when the present day city of Greater Bombay was but a group of fishing islands : its end point is December, 1981 by which time the Report of the High Power Steering Group on Slums and Dilapidated Buildings in Greater Bombay (Ajit Kerkar : Chairman) had appeared and the revision of Bombay's 1964 Development Plan had nearly reached its final stage. Its major emphasis is on the period 1971 - 1981 during which New Bombay project has taken birth, form and substance. Quite predictably, therefore, the analysis provides details of the causes of its birth, the organizational analysis of CIDCO and its activities, the details of organizations and projects having a direct or indirect bearing on the fate of New Bombay project.

Methodologically, I had left the data collection tools largely unstructured. There were reasons to do so. First, I was making forays into areas conventionally considered 'sensitive' and, to that extent, not negotiable through conventional research techniques. Second, I was not only attempting to tease out hard, quantitative, quite often classified, data but also the motives of the key actors involved in each major decision episode.⁷ Third, I was trying to

⁷ Goldman (1978) demonstrates the ideological basis and empirical advantages of doing so.

check the basis, authenticity, and validity of some of the data put on record. The principal technique employed was of resource person location, in-depth and in - confidence discussion of issues, motives, followed by somewhat formalized approach to ask for and obtain published/unpublished records. Having been in the Bombay metropolitan area earlier on was generally an advantage : where it was not, data were obtained through temporarily engaged resource persons. The entire data - quantitative and qualitative - used in this study were cross-checked from interconnected sources. This necessitated a country-wide chase of important participants in the decision processes concerning Bombay and New Bombay who had moved away from the scene.

Arrangement of Analytical Material

This study is organised in six chapters. The general state of urbanization studies in India, objectives, coverage and methodology employed are very briefly indicated in the first chapter. The logic, class basis, and methodology of Bombay, New Bombay and BMR's growth is historically traced in the second chapter. This analysis examines the transformation of a group of fishing islands, in several distinct stages, into the present city of Greater Bombay, the floating and fructification of New Bombay idea and still later of the BMC. The ideological, politico-legal context of CIDCO, its goals, objectives, roles, activities and structural arrangements maintained while giving shape to New Bombay plans as NTDA during the tenures of different Managing Directors are delineated in the third chapter.

As would be seen later, those who visualized and sketched the counter-magnet idea specified two major tasks for CIDCO, and New Bombay project. These were to siphon off development from Bombay to New Bombay and to relocate activities concentrated in southern most tip of Greater Bombay. Chapters four and five respectively describe the process, nature of operationalization of both these tasks by CIDCO, and other agencies. Chapter four overviews the process of development of New Bombay during the period 1970-1981 in an effort to determine the nature and extent of success achieved. This analysis covers the topography and land use in New Bombay area before its notification for development, land uses proposed in the 1973 Draft Development Plan and its subsequent modifications, character and concept of New Bombay, nodal and areal development sequence, and land acquisition and rehabilitation of the project affected population, marketing of land, housing, and other items, and development of a revolving fund and financially self-sustained growth of New Bombay. Chapter five examines the post-1971 efforts to relocate and restructure Bombay and BMR. The specific projects examined are Bombay Development Plan and its revision in 1980-81, BMRDA's programmes in the BMR, the Kerkar Group's attempt to integrate BMR into a single city in the grab of a solution of housing problem in Greater Bombay, the Nhava-Sheva Port project, and relocation projects undertaken by CIDCO in New Bombay.

The final chapter sums up the Indian, Bombay and New Bombay urban development policies and experiences, identifies the inherent contradictions involved and lists the emergent lessons for urban development in India in future.

CHAPTER 2

Logic, Class Basis and Methodology of Greater Bombay's
Growth and Expansion

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Logic, Class Basis and Methodology of Greater Bombay's Growth and Expansion

The transformation of seven separate fishing islands in the Arabian Sea lying unconcerned with the events in its immediate neighbourhood of Konkan in about 200 B.C. to the present city of Greater Bombay encompassing in its ambit the whole of filled in city island, the adjoining salsette consisting of two different sub-urban zones (an inner one extending upto Andheri in the north-west and Mulund in the north-east and an outer one extending upto Dahisar and Thane in the same directions), an annexed industrial-residential Thane, and the spillover zone extending upto Titwala and Badsapur along the Central Railway and Pen along the Goa Highway has roughly taken 2200 years.¹ Diagnostic and prescriptive attempts have termed this transformation as haphazard growth.² This chapter would historically examine whether the developmental history of Bombay bears this out. The analysis would be subdivided into three sections : the first would interpret the logic and methodology of Bombay's growth until the publication of the first Development Plan in 1964; the second would examine the genesis and birth of New Bombay in 1970; and the third would link it up with the attempts to convert the BMR into BMC in 1981.

1 Actually, the week-end-hide-away zone stretching upto Khandala, Lonavla, Panchgani and Mahabaleshwar too should be considered part of this structure.

2 There is extensive literature on this theme. However, see, in particular, Rajagopalan (1962 : V-VI), Harris (1973 : 9-10), Report on the Development Plan for Greater Bombay, 1964, (1964 : X-XXXII) and Report of the High Power Steering Group on Slums and Dilapidated Houses (1981 : Chapter I).

Logic and Methodology of Greater Bombay's Growth

Greater Bombay's history begins around 200 B.C. and its present identity, physical and functional structure represent a planned effort roughly extending 2200 years. Instead of constructing the complete history of the city in all its details, I have opted to confine my analysis of the pattern of important events in Bombay's history to identify the logic and methodology of its growth.

Table 2.1 compiles important historical events connected with the growth of the city between 200 B.C. and 1981 A.D.

Table 2.1

Important Events in Bombay's History, Their Purposes and Consequences : 200 B.C. - 1981 A.D.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
200 BC	Presence of Western coast (including Mysore, Berar and Deccan) in the Maurya empire.
178 BC	Passage of Thane coast to Shatakarnis and enrichment of direct sea trade with Egypt and Persia.
190 BC	Following trade relations, political conquest of Konkan by the Parthians of Persia and founding of Kshatrapa dynasty's rule in Konkan; rise of Kalyan and Chaul to the rank of regular marts.
400 AD	Rule of Rashtrakutas in the north Konkan; trade with Ceylon and Persian gulf through Kalyan.
615	Chaulakya rule in Konkan.
637	Refuge by several bands of Persians on Thane coast following conquest of Persia by the Arabs; plundering of Thane coast by Arabs through several raids.
810 - 1260	Emergence and rule of 20 kings of Silhara dynasty; construction of high road, and several temples; Puri as their capital and Sanjan, Thane, Sopara, Chaul, Lonad, and Uran places of note.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1280	Rise of Yadavas of Devgiri, establishment of headquarters at Karnala and Bassein.
1294	Allauddin Khilzi of Delhi conquers Ramdev of Devgiri and makes him tributary; flight of Bhimdev, son of Ramdev, to Mahim.
1300	Colonisation of Mahim by Bhimdev, building of temples and palaces.
1371	Occupation of Mahim and the salsette by Mubarak Shah.
1430	Passage of West coast (Gujarat to Mahim) to the Gujarat Sultans.
1478	Growth of Sultans, annexation of domain to include Daman, Agashi, Sopara, Bassein, Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Bombay and Panvel; development of Thane and Mahim as ports.
1497	Vasco da Gama appears on the Coromondal coast, Portuguese forage raids on Dabol and Mahim; ceding of Mumbadevi by the Sultan of Ahmedabad to the Portuguese.
1517	Bombardment of Mahim by the Portuguese.
1535 - 1660	Portuguese control of the Bombay islands and nearby mainland areas after a number of battles; treaty with the Sultan of Gujarat ceding Bassein Fort with its territory, island and salsette to the Portuguese; the entry of British at Surat, establishment of castle.
1664	<u>Gifting of Bombay islands by the Portuguese to the English in dowry (remaining areas continuing with the Portuguese); appearance on the scene of Capt. Cooke and East India Company; decision to build a town for the trading class; disputes on rights of land; Co-Directors decide to purchase all lands and shift fishermen and create accommodation for its houses.</u>
1674	Meeting of all landed proprietors called by the Governor Aungiers to settle land disputes; settlement by agreement with the occupants to get possession on payment; building of settlement for English settlers with administrative offices near Customs Bunder.
1675	Conversion of old court of judicature at the south east of present Cooperage into a hospital to protect the health of British immigrants.
1696	Market for selling fruits, vegetables, flowers set up at Fort.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1664 - 1700	Intermittent wars between the Moghuls, Sidis and Portuguese to gain control of each others' territories.
1717	Raising of Fort walls with three gates (Appollo at the south, Churchgate at the west and Bazar gate at the north) with the port and castle in the centre; <u>reservation of southern portion for the English and northern for the native population.</u> All roads led from the castle outwards through gates. Indiscriminate building activity within Fort north in the absence of any building control.
1733	Relocation of Cooperage hospital to Marine Yard.
1739	Unless permitted banning of building activity within 100 yards of town walls; building activity needed a license; beginning of Esplanade expanding 800 yards of open space around Fort; filling up of area in Fort and spillover of settlement beyond Fort.
1748	Construction of a dry dock.
1750	Movement of the Governor to Parel to make permanent residence at Jesuit property; movement of European settlers toward Mazagaon and Mahim; overcrowding of Fort north; fast development of areas beyond Fort; laying of road from Churchgate to Sonapur.
1769	Meat and fowl sheds added to the Fort market.
1771	Elimination of Marathas, Sidis and Portuguese; unchallenged control of the harbour islands and the salsette by the British.
1776	Establishment of Mohmed market at Sheikh Memon street.
1787	Appointment of a <u>Committee to investigate encroachments within Fort</u> and extent to which buildings were prejudicial to public health; recommended, as a preventive measure, a <u>restriction on heights of buildings</u> , wider streets and several other suggestions relating to encroachments and cleanliness; suggestions shelved on the grounds of practical expediency.
1800	Hospital for the native troops at Esplanade and a convalescent home at Old Women's Island, Colaba.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1803	Great fire within Fort area; Committee appointed to advise on rebuilding of the town; provided an opportunity for rebuilding this part of the town; advised natives to settle in Mandvi area, open land with straight and cross roads without any planning; <u>poorer sections moved first; the rich resisted</u> and opposed the Fort Plan. Fort was, therefore, rebuilt on existing foundations with wider roads built on surrendered lands. Conversion of Governor's horse stable into a mutton and vegetable market.
1804	Proclamation requiring clearance of a further area of 800 yards from Fort walls as engineers' limit for defence purposes; <u>accommodation of affected people on government owned land</u> in Khara Talao, Kumarwada, Kamathipura, central part of Khetwadi (between main and back roads), eastern Bhuleshwar, and western Kumharwada; open land, so new buildings bad. Muslims, sea faring, put near port; Hindus in Kumharwada and Kamathipura; <u>land lease without control on land use</u> ; unplanned buildings grew in Girgaum, Thakurdwar, Faneswadi, Mazagaon, Mahim, Poibadevi; reclamation of salt batti (Foras) land by town sweepings; use of Foras and Toka (private cultivated) lands for unrestricted building activity without reference to government; much damage done.
1809	Destruction of Mohmed market in a fire and its reconstruction and renaming as Duncan market. A sort of hospital set up for the natives.
1824	Closure of Marine Yard hospital in favour of a new hospital at Hornby Road for the use of both the European civilians and garrison population.
1830	Opening up of the ghats by road and the cotton supply routes conceding persistent demand of the business class.
1834	Opening of several private dispensaries on persistent public demand.
1836	Formation of Committee of Native Dispensary to bring home to the public full medical benefits.
1837	Fruit and vegetable market established at Erskine Road; appointment by the Court of Petty Sessions (governing the city in that period) of a clerk of markets to supervise sale of all commodities.
1838	Construction of Colaba causeway linking last remaining island.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1842	Construction of drainage and new outfall at Hornby Vellard.
1845	<u>Water deficiency</u> problem raised; Graham and Leith Committee recommends acquisition of some private wells for public use; government asks Chief Engineer to report on improvement of water supply; construction of reservoirs in sandstone strata suggested; non-acceptance by government; emphasis on avoidance of water wastages; further study of proposals.
1846	Capt. Turner's proposal of interception water project at Malabhar Hill not accepted; Capt. Crawford suggests first scheme of Vehar lake; later submits a second one.
1841-48	Political conquest of the Deccan accomplished by the British.
1850	Third Vehar scheme by Capt. Crawford and its improvement by Lt. Delisle.
1851	First textile mill established in the city.
1852	Conybeare plan of tapping water bearing strata not approved; government revived and approved Vehar scheme.
1853	G.I.P. Rail link upto Thane opened.
	Conception and consideration of various schemes of drainage and sewage; experiments on tidal variations to determine the effect of sewage disposal; non-approval of eastern and western foreshores and area near Lighthouse due to nearness to contonement as sites for sewage outfalls.
1856	Vehar scheme of water supply undertaken.
1860	Completion of Vehar scheme and receipt of water by tapes. Closure of Hornby hospital and use of Artillery barracks in Fort George as hospital as a temporary measure.
1861	Appointment of a Committee to examine the land fortification; recommends removal of the walls and profitable use of the area so released; <u>building activity within Esplanade sought to be controlled in respect of character, style, and architecture.</u> <u>Establishment of the Bombay Municipality under the Municipal Act 1861; introduction of section 194 in the act to require owners/occupants of markets to pave them to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.</u>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1862	Appointment of the <u>Rampart Removal Committee</u> ; proposed (a) a definite plan for laying roads, water supply, and drainage; (b) the use of available space for building and location of sites for public buildings. Establishment of Bombay Gas Company.
1863	Extension of G.I.P. Railway through the ghats to provide all weather trading connections with the mainland. Widening of Colaba causeway.
1864	Connection of Bombay with the B.B. & C.I. Railway.
1865	Building of Crawford market by Municipal Commissioner Crawford. Appointment of <u>Esplanade Fee Committee</u> to develop a road system; laid several roads in the Fort area. Appointment of <u>Burial Commission</u> to investigate complaints of nuisance caused by burial grounds; recommended re-siting at Matunga (including the Parsi towers of silence); not implemented due to huge cost; only area near Antop Hill at Matunga was earmarked for cemeteries while existing burial grounds were walled and allowed to continue. Establishment of Bombay Municipal Corporation under an act to govern the city.
1861-65	Speculative craze; increased wealth led to construction of major buildings (the P.O., Secretariat, Convocation Hall and Library of the University, High Court, Telegraph Department, J.J. School of Arts, Sassoon Institute), establishment of financial and shipping companies; ambitious Back Bay Reclamation scheme (originally designed to carry B.B. & C.I. Railway to Colaba to serve Cotton Green), construction of buildings; reclamation carried out extending from Customs House to Sewri along Modi Bay through Elphinstone, Mazagaon, Tank Bunder, and Frere schemes.
1866	Building of J.J. Hospital through a major donation at Parel.
1866-67	Construction of Carnac, Elphinstone, and Masjid bridges and laying of five major roads.
1867	Shifting of European cemetery from Sonapur to Sewri. Establishment of Bandra slaughter house.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1868	Opening of weekly mail service with foreign countries. Need for a second source of water (apart from Vehar) felt. Aitken submits Shewla (25 m.g.), Kanhere (8 m.g.) Tulsi (14 m.g.) and Powai (2 m.g.) costing Rs.140, 41.5, 40, and 35.5 lakhs respectively; only Tulsi approved.
	Gutting in fire of a private market at Bhuleshwar and building of a municipal market at the site; establishment of Phule market and private markets at Janjikar Street, Rampart Row, and Tank Bunder.
1870	Closing of Colaba cemetery.
1872	Commencement of Tulsi water supply scheme.
1873	Constitution of the BPT to manage dock area from Colaba to Mazagaon.
1874	Sanction of government grant to J.N. Wadia Dispensary at Mahim, completion of Gokuldar Tejpal Native Hospital to serve those away from the J.J. Hospital; opening of N. Petit Charitable Dispensary.
1875	Construction of wet Sassoon dock.
1877	Commissioning of municipal Peddar market at Mazagaon.
1878	Introduction of section 241 in the Municipal Corporation Act to discourage new private markets, and control the existing ones.
1879	Tulsi scheme of water supply (14 m.g.) completed; more demand for water.
1880	Construction of Princess Dock.
1884	Construction of night soil depots along the main channel to wash it in the sea.
1885	Establishment of a temporary hospital for the women at Khetwadi by the Bombay Committee of the Medical Fund.
1886	Jaffer Suleman Dispensary for out-patients opens near Crawford market; closure of Khetwadi Hospital with the opening of P.H. Cama Hospital.
	Execution of Tansa water supply scheme (18.8 m.g.).

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1888	Completion of Victoria Docks. Incorporation in the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act Bill amendments to the Municipal Act 1861 in respect of markets and slaughter houses empowering it to govern establishment, maintenance and working of markets.
1890	B.E. Albless Obsteric Hospital opened in the Cama Hospital premises; Acworth Leper Asyleum at Matunga built. Powai water supply scheme completed; water not of as good quality as others, needs filter treatment.
1891	Moreweather dry dock built. Location of an infectious disease hospital at Grant Road at the outbreak of epidemic; closure after it is over.
1892	Extension of building control, exercised in Esplanade, to Marine Lines and Chowpatty. Water made available from Tansa scheme. Replacement of obsteric ward from J.J. Hospital by Motilibai Wadia Hospital; reopening of infectious disease hospital at Arthur Road; building of Ackworth Leprosy Home at Wadala.
1894	Establishment of municipal sheep market at Delisle Road (shifted later).
1895	Establishment of composite Colaba market at Lala Nigam Road.
1896	Great plague hits; establishment of the IT to (i) lay new roads, (ii) improve crowded localities, (iii) reclaim further lands, and (iv) provide accommodation for police; the insanitary conditions prevailing brought to the fore; mass exodus apart from heavy loss of life; commenced schemes : 1. <u>Complete clearance</u> of areas suggested to it and selected by it; <u>en bloc clearance</u> of areas (Nagpada, Mandvi, Kilwada, Naoroji Hill, Kholbhatwadi, Bhatwadi); six congested areas provided arterial/roads; <u>heavy financial commitment</u> for developing the outlying parts of the city (Nagpada, Sewri, Worli, Koliwada) made it impossible to implement; 2. <u>Road Schemes</u> primarily to facilitate and maintain north south thoroughfare for speedy transport; areas like Malabar Hill, Princess Street opened through major roads; 3. <u>Reclamation of low areas</u> under Dadar, Matunga, Sewri, Wadala, Sion schemes for accommodating the poor; prohibitive cost made this beyond the reach of poor; 4. <u>Accommodation schemes</u> : (a) for persons affected by several schemes, (b) for police. These are single room tenements; a few changes for the mill employees. <u>Much of reclaimed land</u> made over to the Bombay Development Department for industrial workers.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1903	Proposal of J.N. Tata and also others to reclaim 1500 acres of Mahim woods; not approved by the Government.
1904	Reclamation of a portion of harbour side of Colaba by the Military.
1907	Establishment of Tata Iron & Steel Company.
	Issue of Government questionnaire seeking opinion on the development schemes. Issues : 1. <u>Segregation of areas according to income</u> , 2. coordinating and improving different channels of communication, and 3. mode of travel suitable for displaced population. Replies favoured respective interests.
1909	Formulation of <u>city development policy for next twenty years</u> and its intention to introduce Town Planning Act similar to the Acts prevailing in England and Germany to place a limitation on the land-lords in respect of built up area, heights and construction and to <u>bring them in conformity with the alignment of roads proposed in the scheme</u> ; <u>Recommendations</u> : 1. Western shores should provide accommodation to the wealthy class. <u>Since Mahim was too distant and Worli was fouled by sewage disposal schemes Backbay Reclamation only solution</u> ; 2. Transfer of right to reclaim from IT to the government through legislation; 3. No earmarking of areas for the middle class but areas vacated by wealthy class were to be available for this purpose; 4. Development of northern areas for those who could afford; 5. Accommodation of labour near their factories; 6. Improvement of road system by the IT and BPT; 7. Rejection of proposals to terminate B.B. & C.I. Railway (present Western) at Grant Road and G.I.P. Railway (present Central) at V.T. (via Parel) on the ground that it would cause congestion and prevent expansion of railways.
1910	Drafting of building bye-laws to regulate building structures in the city.
	Establishment of Tata Hydro Electric Supply Company Ltd.
1912	Tansa duplication scheme taken up as water scarcity felt.
1913	Government decision to review the progress made (in the city development) by the IT and determine necessity of changes in the priorities; appointment of representative <u>Development Committee</u> to report on 1. Shifting of some institutions (University, High Court), 2. whether reclamation was only alternative for expansion, 3. should reclamation be large scheme to be implemented in parts or small scheme to be expanded later?, approached develop-

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	ment of Bombay under the following heads : 1. What is the existing trend of development in respect of (a) industry and a definite policy for its control; (b) commerce and the resultant demand for office accommodation; (c) residential accommodation and how the development of town be best served under the last two? 2. What are the pressing needs of the Bombay area in respect of sanitation, light and air? 3. Future development of institutions of educational, scientific, public or medical character? 4. What are the best methods to achieve the desired result consistent with the growth of the city? and 5. What additional means of communication would be necessary as a consequence?
	Recommended :
1.	All offensive trade and other factories and large industries should be restricted in future to the north-eastern corner of the island and salsette.
2.	North-East of Fort area was congested with large commercial offices. An improvement scheme was suggested for Fort north.
3.	Improvement of Love Grove pumping station (sewage) to enable Worli Sea face available for residential development for the richer class. With improvement in communication the middle class could settle in the suburban areas or IT schemes in the north.
4.	Slum conditions due to absence of stricter building bye-laws. Shifting of railway workshops from the central parts of the city and housing for employees by mill owners could help avoid slum conditions.
5.	No shifting of public and semi-public institutions. Residential development area available by the shift of Cotton Green (from Colaba to Sewri); additional reclamation of 100 acres at Colaba opposite Oval to accommodate the several proposed institutions (Council Hall, College of Commerce, Elphinstone Middle School, Law School, and Extension to Government Secretariat. This started the second phase of Back Bay reclamation).
5914	
6.	Additional line between salsette and Grant Road necessary; railway line upto Colaba necessary to serve the reclaimed areas. Sinking of railway line below ground to avoid smoke nuisance; if this was not possible, terminus at Churchgate; many proposals of tramway bus services extending them upto Worli in the West and Dadar and King's Circle in the centre (but not materialised).

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	<p>7. Shifting of military installations and use of freed land for civic purposes.</p> <p>8. Coordination between different statutory bodies for a more integrated approach for the development of Bombay.</p> <p><u>Government did not give effect to the recommendations as it got busy with the First World War.</u></p> <p>Mackinson Plan for the development of Mahim proposing clearance of the woods, filling up of marshy land and laying out of roads connecting it with areas lying in its south, east, north and west.</p>
1914	Completion of Alexandra wet dock and Hughes dry dock.
1915	<p>Formation of Advisory Committee by the Government to report on the specific schemes on which the government support could be received.</p> <p>Tansa duplication scheme completed. Total supply of water on its completion 35 m.g.</p> <p>Passage of Bombay Town Planning Act; not applicable to the city of Bombay (since it was mainly for areas being newly developed) but could be extended to the city on an application to the government by the Municipal Corporation. Mahim area applicable but not applied due to local opposition.</p> <p>Establishment of a slaughter house at Arthur road.</p>
1916	Establishment of Andhra Valley Power Supply Company Ltd. by the Tata Group to generate power at Bhivpuri.
1917	A syndicate of prominent businessmen (Sassoon, Bharucha, Fazalbhoy, Thackersey, Samaldas) formed to form a company to undertake reclamation work; the Government did not approve working of private companies in this field.
1918	Establishment of Directorate of Industries replacing the Industrial Advisory Committee, created 'favourable' climate for industrial development in Bombay.
1919	<p>Tata Power Company Ltd., established to bring power from Bhera.</p> <p>Municipal Corporation offers to supply chemically treated water from Powai to the suburbs, then functioning as independent towns; the government to build servicing reservoir and lay distribution system; Tansa completion scheme increases water supply from 40 to 90 m.g. No shortage of water for next 20 years.</p>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	<u>Non-implementation of most development schemes of the government, IT, BPT, Municipal Corporation due to pre-occupation with war.</u>
1920	Replacement of Directorate of Industries with the Development Directorate; charged with the task of executing industrial schemes at Trombay (3243 acres), Kurla-Kerol (1613), Kapti Tail Water scheme, Kalyan-Ambernath (1289 acres) and supply and distribution of electric power. Establishment of Nair Hospital.
1922	Construction of a refrigeration and cold storage building at Phule market. Rushing through legal formalities and start of Back Bay Reclamation scheme covering an area of 1144 acres between Colaba and Parsi Gymkhana at Marine Lines; divided into eight blocks; reservation of 145 acres for parks and playgrounds, 100 acres for public buildings, 27 acres for educational purposes and 28 acres for other recreational use, the work of execution given to the Development Directorate of the IT; leakage in the sea wall; cost tripling; loss in revenue due to trade depression; decline in profits from the scheme; trenchant criticism.
1926	Appointment of <u>Mears Committee</u> to investigate Back Bay Reclamation Project work; recommended different methods of reclamation for different blocks and filling up of the reclaimed land upto uniform level; further reclamation proposals for Back Bay and Walkeshwar withheld. <u>Dissolution of the IT due to financial strain;</u> handing over of bulk of its work to the Municipal Corporation under an act. Establishment of K.E.M. Hospital as a memorial to King Edward VII at a cost of Rs.53 lakhs; attachment of Goverdhandas Sunderdas Medical College to it later.
1927	Opening of municipal market at Chowpatty.
1929	Purchase of land, its development on the lines of the IT and laying of Shivaji Park at Dadar by the Municipal Corporation.
1930	Construction of municipal market at Chembur.
1933	Establishment of Nair Dental College.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1938	Report of the <u>Industrial Housing Commission</u> recommending a <u>ban on location of industry in the city except in the north-east and south-eastern salsette; not given effect.</u>
1939	Building of Gold Mohur Castle Wholesale Municipal Market at Byculla.
1940	Publication of <u>Barlow Report</u> endorsing the recommendations of the Industrial Housing Commission; <u>nothing much done by the government.</u>
1941	Establishment of the Tata Memorial Cancer Hospital.
1942	Building of municipal market at Worli.
1943	Shortage of water experienced at the Navy, EPT, Defence Services, and the industries engaged in war productions; floating population also made heavy demands; heavy pressure water supply hours reduced from eight to six.
1944	Second World War caused <u>straining of municipal finances; postponement of execution of development works till after the war; crediting of such accrued money to a separately and statutorily created Post-War Reconstruction Fund.</u>
1945	<u>Post-War Committee</u> to advise the government on the policy for industrial development particularly (1) question of expansion of existing industries, (2) establishment of new industries, and (3) determination of the extent of government participation in industrial production. Pressure of population on the sewage system, surcharge of sewers and silting.
1946	Transfer of Nair Hospital and Dental College and Topiwala Medical College to the Corporation; acquisition of Military Hospital at Dharavi to make it Lokmanya Tilak Hospital.
1947	<u>Reconstitution of Post-War Committee</u> into seven sub-committees dealing with (i) metal and engineering, (ii) chemical, (iii) food and forest, (iv) textiles, (v) miscellaneous, (vi) cottage and small scale industries, and (vii) a special Committee to consider location of industries; recommended location of metal and engineering units in Kalyan-Ambernath, chemical, rayon, and woolen units in Trombay, Kalyan-Ambernath, and food and beverages in the city itself. <u>Amendment of Post-War Reconstruction Fund Act 1944 to divert the fund to other pressing needs than originally intended; non-availability of funds for development work.</u>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	Appointment of <u>Post-War Development Committee</u> consisting of Albert Mayer and V.N. Modak and comprising three panels dealing with (1) development of suburbs and town planning, (2) housing, and (3) traffic. Recommended : (i) <u>exile of heavy industries beyond Thane creek</u> , (ii) <u>dispersal of light industry to the salsette</u> , (iii) <u>inclusion of large area within the urban limits of Bombay for providing space for expansion and dispersal of the city</u> , (iv) an outline of a Master Plan for control on development of the city indicating the manner in which the city, suburbs and the satellite towns (i.e. Thane, Bessein, Uran) should be planned, (v) a second shopping centre at Dadar, (vi) commissioning of an underground rail system.
	Rapid industrialisation and growth of the suburbs; hours of water high pressure supply further reduced; storage capacity of Tansa increased further; failure of monsoon; emergency measures included use of pumps to get water supplies.
	Acquisition of the assets and operations of the Bombay Electric Supply and Tramway Company (BES & T) under a deed of concession by the Corporation.
1948	Approval of the recommendations of the Post-War Development Committee by the Corporation and onward submission to the State Government for approval. The plan did not have any legal force, however.
	Establishment of municipal wholesale plantain market at Byculla.
	Proposal of relief sewage schemes, new pumping stations, new sewer lines in the middle part of the city and increase in pumping capacities.
1949	Passage of the Bombay Building Works Restrictions Act and introduction of <u>restrictions on industrial location on the island</u> .
1950	Extension of Corporation boundaries to include 68 sq. miles areas consisting of five municipalities of (i) Bandra, (which also included Santacruz); (ii) Parle-Andheri; (iii) Juhu in the west; and (iv) Kurla; and (v) Ghatkopar in the east and village Panchayat of Chembur plus 34 revenue villages from Bombay suburban and Thane District Board. Corporation became MCGB.
1951	Amendment of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act; introduction of zoning to discourage new plants on the island and to direct them to prescribed areas in the northern and north-eastern suburbs.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1954	<p>The passage of Bombay Town Planning Act to remove the limitations of 1915 Act; <u>non-enforcement immediately</u>; empowered the Corporation to prepare Master Plans, define land uses and operate development controls.</p> <p>Establishment of municipal market at Dongri, pork market at Marine Lines.</p> <p>Replacement of tram services by buses begins.</p>
1956	<p>Establishment of Khar municipal market.</p> <p>Vaitarna water supply scheme connecting Vaitarna and Tansa rivers and laying up of pipeline from Tansa to Bombay.</p> <p>Passage of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rent Act to prevent frequent and unreasonable enhancement of rents by the proprietors.</p> <p>Bringing of all T.B. Hospitals of the Corporation (Ramesh Premchand, Maratha, Turner) to Sewri.</p>
1957	<p>Application of Bombay Town Planning Act to Mandvi area, destroyed in the dock explosions of 1944, despite vehement protests from the residents.</p> <p>Extension of administrative and jurisdictional limits of Corporation in the west upto Dahisar and in the east upto Mulund and making the total area of the Corporation 169 square miles.</p>
1958	<p>Appointment by the state government of the <u>Study Group on Greater Bombay</u> under the Chairmanship of S.G. Barve to examine (i) the underground railway proposal (given earlier by Mayer and Modak plan), (ii) development of suburbs, (iii) decentralization of industry, and (iv) housing. The group appointed five panels.</p> <p>MCGB decides (Resolution No.409 dated 7th July 1958) to prepare a fresh Development Plan for Greater Bombay.</p>
1959	<p>Barve Group Report recommends : 1. <u>ban on all industrial units on the island</u> except where they processed imported raw materials or exported finished goods; 2. permission to small industrial units on the island where they provided services to the existing factories and on the condition that they were located in industrial zones; 3. creation of 20 industrial estates on the island, 25 in the suburbs and 10 additional suburban estates to take 'non-conforming' industries from the city; 4. development of the area on the other side of the harbour <u>with a township to take industry dispersed from the city</u>. The township</p>

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	would, in turn, not only draw away from the island of Bombay <u>overflow of industrial units and industrial colonies but also enable the city to develop in an orderly manner</u> ; 5. building of a bridge over the Thane creek to assist the above project; 6. endorsed underground railway proposal along with other measures to relieve congestion of Fort area (including a new commercial centre at Bandra-Kurla, and relocation of the main government offices on the island); 7. massive housing programme; 8. unified municipal administration to govern the city and a development authority that would include all public agencies (i.e. railways, BPT, state and central agencies) concerned with the city.
	Acceptance by the Corporation of the Barve Group recommendations for preparing its Development Plan; acceptance by the state government some of its recommendations such as the creek bridge, industrial estates, Bandra-Kurla.
	Municipalisation of Garamkhada private market at Lalbaugh, building of municipal market at Elphinstone Road, and composite market at King's Circle.
1960	Government takes over Tata Memorial Cancer Hospital
1961	A new seven storeyed building built for J.J. Hospital
1962	Municipal markets at Takia Ward (Kurla), Mulund and Borivili.
	Stepping up of discontinuation of trams as a consequence of ILO Study Team and pressing into service of trolley buses, fleet augmentation, depot construction recommended through major loans.
	Establishment of MIDC to <u>assist industrial development in the state by developing industrial estates</u> , and laying infrastructure (i.e. roads, water, power, drainage, railway sidings); creation of 10 estates in the Bombay metropolitan region, and Kandivli (280 acres) Marol (278 acres) and Bhandup (145 acres) industrial estates in the city.
	Submission of the Development Plan for Greater Bombay proposing a total investment of Rs.700 crore (1964 prices) to be spent in next 20 years; recommended (1) gradual reorganisation of its existing structure; (2) <u>establishment and enforcement of zoning</u> ; (3) <u>dispersal of population to the suburban areas, decentralisation of the industry, and commerce from the city</u> (six business districts, many industrial estates); (4) massive housing; (5) sites for social services, public utilities; and (6) reclamation of 27 kms. of low lying reclaimable land. Financing through (a) loans, (b) grants-in-aid and subsidies from state

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	and central agencies, and (c) development tax and betterment levy. Specific proposals for augmentation of water, power supply, sewage and drainage, road, rail, transport, educational, medical services; endorsement of the recommendation of the Wilbur Smith Traffic Consultants' proposals involving separate expenditure of Rs.95.92 crores.
	Staggered and <u>selective acceptance of the Plan by the State Government</u> mainly because of pressure from the business class and its reluctance to allow the MCGB to levy development tax and betterment levy.
1965	Third extension of boundaries of the Corporation to include some additional areas in the city.
	Appointment of the <u>Gadgil Committee</u> to enquire into the prospects for the regional plans for Bombay-Panvel and Poona metropolitan regions.
	Establishment of SICOM to administer and publicize an extended package of incentives (than the one done by the MIDC) including arrangement of loans, assistance in project appraisal for industrial dispersal. No incentives for areas around Greater Bombay (including Thana, Belapur and Taloja which were established and promoted in the first instance by the MIDC) but willing to arrange loans. MIDC expenditure on promotion is three times that of SICOM.
1966	Report of the Gadgil Committee felt that : 1. <u>control of business investment was the means to control employment</u> and this was means to prevent growth or reduce the size; 2. additional costs of locating economic activity in Greater Bombay far outweighed any advantages; recommended : 1. <u>ban of location of industrial activity in the city</u> , 2. no new office development in the Fort area, 3. location of new offices in the Bandra-Kurla area, 4. regional plan to curb continuous urban sprawl and extension of city, concentration of population in new <u>towns</u> separated from each other by green belt and multi-nucleated growth of the Bombay metropolitan region, 5. need of regional planning legislation enabling creation of Regional Metropolitan Boards. <u>Selective acceptance of recommendations by State Government</u> .
1967	Passage of MRTPA 1966 and constitution of BMPRB. Organisation of the MARG symposium and other seminars pressing for acceptance of twin city proposal.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
	Lobbying before the BMRPB by the twin city enthusiasts; its decision to debate previous proposals for development of Greater Bombay; change in the initial view of the BMRPB to conclude that, 1. all previous proposals were only <u>palliatives</u> , 2. Greater Bombay's domination needed to be diluted, 3. only one counter-magnet near enough can do it, 4. area just opposite the harbour was the place because of existing nucleus of industries, proposed port of Nhava-Sheva, capacity to stimulate entire region, 5. cost advantages.
1969	Passage of Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Act to repair unsafe dilapidated buildings in the city.
1970	Report of the BMRPB for the BMR recommending, among others, setting up of a 'metro-centre' on the main land to relieve pressure from Greater Bombay.
	State government accepts the recommendation to set up a metro centre, designates 95 villages from Thane, Panvel and Uran Tehsils as 'New Bombay', and notifies privately owned land for acquisition.
	CIDCO is formed, as a subsidiary of SICOM and registered under the Companies Act.
1971	CIDCO is designated as the NTDA for the New Bombay Project.
	Passage of Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, Redevelopment) Act.
1973	Approval of the Bombay Metropolitan Regional Plan by the state government.
	Publication of New Bombay Draft Development Plan by CIDCO for public comments, suggestions and objections; and submission to the state government for approval.
1975	Passage of BMRDA Act, to plan and regulate development of the region; constitution of the BMRDA.
	Finalization of the New Bombay Development Plan after meeting objections; and re-submission to state government.
1976	Passage of MULC Act and MHAD Act (the latter merging the BBRA in it).
1977	Joint discussion by the representatives of the textile mills, and urban planners to consider the problems involved in shifting the industry out of the city and the decision of the state government to allow the industry to continue in Bombay undisturbed.

Year	Event(s), Their Purpose(s) and Consequence(s)
1980	Appointment of Moghe and Awale Committee to consider the problem of slums and dilapidated houses.
1981	Appointment of High Power Steering Group headed by Ajit Kerkar on the problems of slums and dilapidated houses; recommends : 1. <u>natural growth of Bombay</u> and conversion of BMR into BMC; 2. 12 year plan with Rs.6390 crore investment plan for long-term housing programme for the poor living in the slums and decaying buildings; 3. development of Nasik, Tarapur, and Roha as satellite towns; 4. establishment of an apex body for provision of uniform infrastructure, social services, and communications in the BMC; 5. <u>planning of renewal and rebuilding of decaying areas of the city and providing housing for poor and those who could afford;</u> and 6. use (through a fee on issue of No Objection Certificates under the MULC Act) and sale of government land to execute the plan.


Sources : Edwardes (1902); Rajagopalan (1962 : Chapter I); Development Plan for Greater Bombay (1964 : XXIII - XXXI); CIDCO (1973); Report of the High Power Group on Slums and Dilapidated Buildings (1981 : Chapter I), and Annual Reports of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, SICOM, and CIDCO Ltd., Bombay.

Emphasis contributed.

The following conclusions emerge from Table 2.1 :

1. In physical terms, present day Greater Bombay is what its developers, at different points of time, have made it, albeit in terms of their periodic and pressing requirements. Since most part of the city is reclaimed on a planned basis, its physical growth sequence very closely approximates with the political and economic events which took place affecting the main driving force controlling and directing the life and limb of the city at different points of time. In the earliest period, the place was nothing beyond the base of the fishermen, the centre of trade and

MAP 2.1



politics at that time lying in the coastal Konkan (Map 2.1). At the end of intermittent change of hands, the islands finally passed on to the Portuguese who gave them as a dowry to the British. The British planned and made it a city of and for the traders. Significantly enough, historically the city has grown from the southern end and not from the side of the mainland with which it has forged physical links in a real sense only now. Apart from reclamation, periodic outer physical expansion has almost always involved some physical realignment in the southern part. These extensions and expansions have been determined by the conflicting needs of an alien power, the comprador industry and commerce and the native poor in the British period and the business class, and middle and working classes in the post-Independence period.

The task of developing the city physically has changed hands periodically. In the very beginning, it was with the British themselves working as the government. It was passed on to the Municipality around 1861 and to the IT in 1896. Thereafter a large number of additional agencies appeared on the scene as the city and various system managing institutions (i.e. the BPT, the two Railways, airport, other agencies) grew and started making and executing independent physical development decisions without necessarily integrating them with the overall concept and functions of the city. The State government itself remained in the wings retaining the right to intervene but seldom exercising the central cementing and integrating function in the city's development work. The dissolution of the IT in 1926 and transfer of its functions to the Corporation did not help the

matters in any significant way in as much as the Corporation did not have overriding powers to regulate and control the pattern of development brought about by a plethora of agencies. As the size and complexities of single problems being faced increased in the city, specialized single and even multi-function agencies (i.e. BBRRB, MHB, CIDCO, BMRDA, etc.) were added in the post-Independence period. Thus, whereas generation of structural problems was cumulative, articulation and solution management was segmented and overall management of the city was the sole responsibility of an institution not endowed with commensurate powers.

2. Physical development of the city, location and siting of different component elements governing city's growth (manufacturing, servicing, and office sectors) and adjustment of differential growth of city's component elements deciding ratios of population to housing and other services, work trips to traffic capacities, capacities of the utilities to their actual load, and so on have always been governed by several pronounced biases. First, the alien rulers, the native rich and wealthy were given a preferential residential location in the western shore areas (Malabar Hills, Peddar Road, Foreshore Road, Cumbulla Hills, Juhu-Vile Parle Scheme, etc.) which still continues. Second, the location of refuse and other disposal systems (sewage, drainage, burial, etc.) were, as far as possible, kept away from the rich areas. Third, in laying of circulation network the entire city's needs were first subordinated to the requirements of the rich and wealthy. Still later, needs of other sections were sporadically attended to with grudging allocation of attention and resources. Fourth, in the actual sequence of provision of the essential civic, social and other services, the ones needed more by the business class

same first. Fifth, whereas the requirements were worked out on the per-capita basis assuming no differentials in their availability and use, the actual distribution network and usage technology and pattern made unequal availability favour the rich. Sixth, the quantum of services needed almost always lagged behind significantly than the one actually provided. Seventh, the drawl of inputs showed the pattern from the immediate neighbourhood to distant areas (i.e. water, power, other inputs, etc.) with the result that the expansion of the city not only increased the quantum of demand but also the distance of their supplies involving laying out of lengthy and costly supply lines. As the time passed, every such expansion in the capacities of supplies was not only going beyond the capacities of the Corporation; jumping even the capacities of the State government it was becoming dependent upon the stiff-conditioned loans from international agencies. The supplying periphery also suffered as a consequence. Eight, whereas the MCGB was statutorily obliged to provide only some of the services from the total package needed by an emerging elitist-oriented city, the State was coming forward to provide only a few of the remaining. The business and the elitist class, therefore, built a number of servicing institutions quite a few of which acquired an exclusive character.³ These institutions were not of much use to the mass of Bombay's population although many of these were (and are) wellknown names.

3 In building most of these institutions, it enjoyed all the concessions given to non-profit charitable organizations by the State government. It is not exactly in public knowledge that exclusive organizations such as the Bombay Gymkhana, Wellington, and Chembur Golf Clubs got their land on a lease of 99 years on a nominal rent of rupee one per year.

3. Despite the fact that the meticulous British played a major role in shaping the structure of the city, it comes as a surprise that not a single overall conceptual town planning exercise was carried out for the city until the year 1909. And yet, the fact remains that a large number of committees addressed themselves to periodic predilections and shifting areas of concern over the state of the city. Even these periodic responses were also rather forced ones, precipitated generally by one calamity/emergency or another. The pattern of response which emerges is that of selective problem articulation and still greater selective orientation in attempting their solutions. Most often the solution pushed involved reducing the quantum or quality or both of the available service/facility to the citizens. The two wars and the period immediately thereafter mark crucial watersheds which indicate the lengths to which city's needs could be neglected. Yet, it would be entirely incorrect to conclude that no planning was involved in the city's development. On the other hand, it was not planning of the city as a whole and for the entire population as these exercises generally went but planning of parts and for certain classes of its citizenry. This type of planning involved overlooking and ignoring the problems which affected the common man : it consisted of finding excuses for deferring their solutions (i.e. not properly studied, no funds, etc.). It also involved finding justifications, real and imaginary, to push through solutions in the name of poor to benefit the rich (i.e. talking of shifting the trade and industry and actually shifting the poorer segments of population). It is remarkable that none of the later day committees have addressed themselves to the development of the parallel black economy and parallel systems which

have caused, among other things, (a) steep increase in economic crimes, (b) emergence of smuggling as a major profession with its own procurement, distribution, markets, payment system, (c) the growing magnitude of unauthorized activity in almost every field, (d) the prominence of black money-white-conversion industries (i.e. films, building construction, estate, tourism, hotels and restaurants, etc.), (e) the commercialization of the misery and sufferings of the millions, (f) the development of Mafia systems (i.e. the underworld, the fanatic groupings, the goonda unions, etc.) to eliminate the clout of citizen groups, and working class organizations, (g) the huge clandestine funding of ruling apparatus promoting illegal and unauthorized projects, (h) enormous unlisted and unorganised living, manufacturing and trading establishments, and (i) the more pronounced penetration and assertion of the capitalist class in the affairs of the state. Precisely because these parallel systems run the show in the city and the people controlling them are better off than the crushing problems of the common citizen remain unattended.

4. The methodology of Greater Bombay's growth had been evolved, perfected and patented before the publication of the Development Plan for Greater Bombay in 1964. This methodology was systematic and indicated a design : it involved (a) laying the routes for industrial spillover in the immediate fringe zones through provision of infrastructure by several agencies of the State government (i.e. Department of Industries, the MIDC, and even the SICOM), (b) first leaving the areas to the ingenuity and greed of the private developers milking bone-dry their commercial potential with the MCGB generally inheriting only the giagentic size of

problems and liabilities later, and (c) periodic extension of the limits of the Corporation to administratively formalize the economic annexation. The logic of this methodology forced expansion and dispersion of the city and not the economic activity as many of the Development Committees and Study Groups recommended. The business class argued that Bombay was a city of the businessmen and should remain that way. Surprisingly enough, the State government always seem to have accepted this reasoning.

II

Bombay Development Plan (1964) and New Bombay's Birth

The publication of the Development Plan for Greater Bombay disturbed an otherwise smooth working equilibrium for the business class. Its opposition to the Plan stemmed from the following considerations:

1. It was putting an end to the growth - spillover - annexation - growth - schema which had enabled them to pocket all the gains with the municipal and other public agencies on the one hand and the general public on the other bearing all the 'pains' involved. Above all, while the horizontal spread in the suburbs and beyond and vertical growth in the island part of the city (more particularly the southern most tip and western parts) continued displacing, and destabilizing the residences, employment, and changing the relationship of residence to work, they themselves and their economic activities remained stayed put. In fact, by the very nature of their stabilization and undisturbed existence they expanded their activities without necessarily expanding in a

physical sense. By recommending decentralization of industry and commerce from the city to the suburbs and beyond and from non-conforming to conforming zones, it was not only going to disturb their harmonized, peaceful existence but also increase their capital costs in establishing themselves at a different site all over again. Whereas office sector growth in the Back Bay area was continuing it was not possible to expand other activities significantly any further without making huge investments. The city had already spread itself all over, upto the Bassein creek in north west and Thane creek in the north east. Further exploitation of the growth - spillover - annexation schema required crossing of the Thane and Bassein creeks and moving on to the mainland. And it had to be done quite quickly.

2. The business class had treated the recommendations of previous Committees and Groups with scant respect and flouted them with contemptuous ease. The Development Plan was, however, no routine Committee to be cast aside and overlooked. Under the Bombay Town Planning Act, it acquired legally enforceable clout once it was approved by the State government. The MCGB had already approved it and unless it was convincingly flogged the State government might end up in approving all that it was proposing.

3. Supporters of both the dominant streams of the business class (the Assocham and the FICCI) in Bombay always preferred to deal with the top echelons of the ruling party, with which they maintained very close links through pursuit of a number of strategies.⁴

4 For insightful and often chilling examination of these, see, for example, Mathai (1977), Birla (1966), Kochanek (1977), Venkatesubbiah (1977), and Verma (1979, in press).

After the dissolution of the IT in 1926 the Corporation had also been entrusted the task of development apart from performing the statutory duties of municipal governance. Although the state of Bombay first and Maharashtra later had almost uninterrupted stint of rule of Congress party since Independence, no single party had enjoyed a clear majority in the Corporation till then. Patronage-vending through the Corporation's corridors was a pretty tortuous route, one not to the liking of the business class. The Development Plan was going to be implemented under the overall guidance of elected city fathers and supervised by 'petty officials' of the Corporation.

4. The Development Plan proposals were bare aggregations of different itemized demands : certainly they lacked conceptual clarity and integration. Yet, if they were conceded to be the pressing immediate needs of Bombay, as was likely to happen, scarce financial resources of the State government would be allocated to them. It would then become a harder task to persuade the government to find additional funds for laying infrastructure for the business class. And when the business class invested mostly funds of others in starting and running their economic units, it was surely not expected to cough up money for development work.

Strategy Used in Tarpedoing Development Plan

Once the business class had decided to tarpedoe the Development Plan, it was faced with two immediate tasks : first, in the short-run, approval of all of its proposals had to be somehow delayed if not altogether stopped, and second, another alternative had to be offered to the State government in such a fashion as to secure its approval. To achieve the first purpose, the following two-step strategy was used :

1. To bring pressure on the Maharashtra Chief Minister, V.P. Naik to hold back a decision on the approval of all the provisions of the Development Plan. It was precisely for this reason alone, insist insiders, that the dubious device of ward by ward approval of the Development Plan was taken up. This process of approval was completed only in 1967.

2. To attack the Development Plan in terms of its objectives, comprehensiveness, and appropriateness.

Maharashtra (and Bombay) Chief Ministers had shown a tendency to become willing game of Bombay's business class and prior to V.P. Naik, Morarji Desai and Y.B. Chavan had been no exceptions. Naik was an improvement on all others in terms of his alignment with the business class and was persuaded fairly easily. To pursue the second step, an informal group representing urban planners, business, trade, and manufacturing interests and having very close links with important politicians and civil servants was formed. Between the publication of the Development Plan in 1964 and acceptance of the New Bombay idea by the BMRPB in 1969, this group organised a high pressure campaign against the Development Plan through discussions, seminars, conferences, media build-up and intense lobbying in a very determined manner. Apart from newspaper reportage and oral corroboration from some of the participants in such events, some published proceedings of its activities are also available (MARG : 1967; Maharashtra Economic Development Council : 1970; and Bombay Civic Trust : 1979).

The initial thrust of this campaign was to exploit the self-admitted limitations and contradictions of the Development Plan. Professing to 'reorganize the existing structure' on the one hand,

and 'dispersal of the city's population to the suburban areas and decentralization of the industries and commerce' on the other, it was also simultaneously hoping 'to prevent large scale dislocation and undue hardship to people' (Government of Maharashtra : 1964 : XIX-XX). It admitted that 'complete solutions to all Bombay's problems lie much further ahead than can be envisaged in any one plan' and that the plan was attempting 'only part solutions' (Ibid : XXII). Further it provided the clinching rationale for its opponents by stating that : (a) it covers only the area within the jurisdiction of the MCGB; (b) with a comprehensive control on development in Greater Bombay there would be a tendency for haphazard development on the periphery outside Greater Bombay where local taxation would also not perhaps be high; (c) opening of Greater Bombay with the commissioning of Thane creek bridge and proposed Uran bridge would bring still more areas on the mainland nearer the commercial centre; (d) commissioning of alternate port (at Nhava-Sheva); (e) there was need for regional plan for the area around and including Greater Bombay dealing with major problems connected with communications and use of land from the stand point of the region as a whole than from that of separate districts that would constitute the region (Ibid : XXII).⁵ Another handy argument provided by the Development Plan was its proposal to levy development tax and betterment levy to raise part of the resources for its implementation (Ibid : 172). There was an outcry from the citizens against this any way. Additional fuel was added to this opposition by very clever exploitation of the

5 Predictably, some of this verbiage was used by the Maharashtra Government in appointing the Gadgil Committee in 1965.

total financial size of the Plan. Its opponents made it look as though its entire outlay of Rs.700 crores was needed in one go.⁶

This strategy culminated in the decision of the Maharashtra Government appointing the Gadgil Committee to consider Bombay's problems in the regional context. However, the second objective of the business class still remained. The second stage of the strategy of the business class involved evolving an alternative, concrete framework on which the attention could then be got focussed. This job was undertaken by the trio of Charles Correa, Pravina Mehta and Shirish Patel (1967 : 28-56) through a joint article (called MARG piece hereafter) which gave concrete shape to the alternative being sought to be projected by the business class before the Maharashtra Government.⁷ This piece deserves a closer scrutiny for several reasons :

1. At a single place it establishes the fact that the idea of New Bombay on the mainland across the harbour and opposite Greater Bombay was developed as an alternative to the Development Plan. In the debate which ensued on the relative merits of the Development Plan and the counter-magnet on the mainland, the other important issue of developing several satellite towns near Greater Bombay, referred to earlier by Barve Group was really not given its due consideration.
2. It provides fascinating evidence of groundless reasoning justifying the case of New Bombay. Subsequent events have exposed the hollowness of these arguments.

⁶ The Plan could not be faulted on this point, however, since it made it very clear (Government of Maharashtra : 1964 : 171-2) that a large portion of the expenditure, included under the Plan, was being incurred by the Corporation even in its normal development schedule. Even if the Plan was not there, some of these would have to be incurred in any event. Subsequent history bears this out.

⁷ Significantly enough, this was published with the financial assistance of the Tata Electric Companies and Tata-Ebasco Consulting Engineering Services. Tatas were also to loan the services of one of its Directors to CIDCO Ltd. for more than two years during the period 1972-73 and still later absorb quite a few middle-level ex-CIDCO executives in their various companies.


3. It gives a step by step conceptual delineation of the vision of New Bombay in which the process part, indicating how one step initiated by the agency developing the counter-magnet would lead to a particular consequence, was kept systematically vague and entirely built on pious expectations. No convincing reasons were offered.
4. The document could be treated as some kind of a bench-mark frame, from which it was possible to identify the alterations made in the basic vision and structure of New Bombay idea later on. In retrospect, it was then possible to gauge their significance in terms of consequences and motives.
5. The document was written by a trio which later came to occupy crucial decision-making positions in CIDCO, induction of private sector executives in CIDCO, the formulation of the New Bombay Plan and its modifications, award of contracts to these business groups and their surrogates and control by private interests of a public organisation.

The New Bombay thesis built in this document, starts with the argument that the future urban growth should necessarily create entirely new structural pattern (p.30); that existing towns and industries, the nuclei of new towns and industries would act as magnets to attract the population (p.31); and that to stop the flow of migrants to existing cities, counter-magnets are needed (p.31). Discussion of the alternatives was, like a lawyers' brief, limited to only two : (a) to accept the existing centre of activity; or (b) create alternative centres of activity to serve as counter-magnet to draw the pressure away (p.33). The first was ruled out : the second was preferred for detailed analysis. Creation of a number of small satellite towns as a technique of redistribution of Greater Bombay's pressures was not favoured on the ground that (a) smaller ones would not serve that purpose,⁸ (b) they had to be sufficiently near, and (c) cost of several towns (of 10 lakh population) would be exorbitant (p.36).

8 That it was not so has been accepted by the BMRDA and it is actually working on a number of such plans in the entire BMR.

MAP 2-2

BOMBAY AND NEW BOMAY IN JUXTAPOSITION



The case of New Bombay on the mainland, directly opposite Bombay and of equal prestige and importance, was propped up on the hope that it would develop into as large as the older city; its very large size would provide the equilibrium necessary between old and new development (p.86). It was also argued that if growth still continued the new city could be further ringed later by new satellite towns located close enough so that its presence stimulated their growth (p.36). This was beautifully worked out argument. New Bombay was the solution for Greater Bombay and satellite towns were not. When New Bombay became as big as Greater Bombay and faced similar problems, satellite towns would look after its problem.

Among other things, New Bombay was expected to stimulate growth in the entire region and act as a focal point for the development of satellite towns. How this would be so was not indicated. The idea was quite daft since in the first place Greater Bombay had not done so and, in fact, the piece itself argued of a conscious policy to ring them in case New Bombay faced Greater Bombay's problems. The main argument in favour of New Bombay was that it would exploit the magnetic pull of Greater Bombay because it was visually connected with Greater Bombay (Map 2.2). No difference appeared to have been made between 'visual' and 'physical' connections. And this meant a lot in terms of circulatory problems involved.

After building a none too convincing case for New Bombay on solid grounds, the piece came to rely on existential justification for New Bombay. It argued that most of the decisions have already been taken by forces operating on this city. Significantly enough, it

did not mention the sequentially contradictory roles played by state promotional agencies such as the MIDC and the SICOM in very conciously increasing centralization first in industrial estates in northern Bombay, then in and around Thane, still later in the entire Thane-Belapur belt and then "attempting" to disperse them. Whereas the State government and all its agencies worked in a closely coordinated and concerted manner in siting and locating industrial units near Greater Bombay since the early fifties once there was not much scope left in the metropolis itself (Harris : 1978; Kopardekar : 1977 : 25-37), the document stated that they were all working in an unrelated manner (p.41).

The discussion of the financial outlays involved in the implementation of Development Plan proposed by the MCGB and the New Bombay idea was slanted and partisan. First, while the details of the former, then available, were given under itemized heads, the same were not worked out for the latter. Second, it was argued that the development costs for either location would be practically identical (p.48). This was something unbelievable since it is almost axiomatic that development costs at newer locations for same sized tasks are always significantly higher. Apart from the heavy investment of about Rs.600 crores to be made by various state and central agencies, CIDCO alone is estimated to spend about Rs.1200 crores on nodal and city structure development in New Bombay.⁹ Third, only some of the additional costs involved in the latter case were indicated : there were some glaring omissions concealing the cost disadvantages of New Bombay's peculiar terrain, topography and climate. The Panvel creek bridge, constructed by CIDCO, alone has costed roughly Rs.2

⁹ Figures arrived after discussions with its officials.

crores. One has to wait to learn the staggering revised estimates of the damming of the Panvel creek as and when it is done. The trio can't possibly plead ignorance since the piece itself gave fairly useful information about the New Bombay site and maps which later came to be formalized by the State government and the CIDCO. Fourth, it appears that even the selective additional costs given were gross under-estimates.¹⁰ Fifth, the cost of land acquisition under the Development Plan, put varyingly at 20 per cent to a quarter, was considered to be very high. It was expected to be 'much less' across the creek. Quite obviously, the propertied class in Greater Bombay was left to be untouched and not to be inconvenienced whereas the poor peasants and fishermen in New Bombay were cheaply dispensable. These calculations were, however, given a decisive blow by the organised resistance of the PWP in New Bombay later. Compensation already paid by CIDCO for 6398.07 ha. of land acquired is Rs.6.39 crores and the total private land in the project area that remains to be acquired would alone cost about Rs.63 crores.

Having made a case for New Bombay on technical, and financial grounds, the document then systematically turns its critical attention on the Development Plan, the Wilbur Smith Report and other proposals which emanated from other sources. It felt that (i) the Development Plan would certainly do nothing toward future growth of Greater Bombay; (ii) the series of proposals would merely stretch the existing north-south pattern even further (p.49);

¹⁰ Prices have increased but not in the proportions as emerge from the comparison of MARG piece and present day costs. To give but one example, the Kurla-Karjat rail link then put at Rs.28 crores is now estimated to cost Rs.75.74 crores only upto Belapur.

(iii) the plan tended to escalate land values in the southern part of Greater Bombay even higher; (iv) population growth of Greater Bombay would continue; (v) it relied on density control which was difficult to achieve; and (vi) the proposal of second business centre at Mahim (known later as the Bandra-Kurla scheme) was not feasible because not much area was really available, and at best it could be only a secondary centre not really relieving the pressure on the one in the southern tip, and it would aggravate pressure on the north-south traffic flows (p.49). What the piece seemed to ignore was whether future growth of Greater Bombay was really a desirable planning goal? or whether a planning agency, while planning to ease existing problems of a metropolis, should, at the same time, also plan for further growth? Would its further growth not create additional problems? The Development Plan proposals might have stretched the north-south pattern. However, the essential issue at stake was not of pattern maintenance or structural change. The issue at stake was relieving of the felt pressures on the life and limb of Greater Bombay which the proposals in conjunction with the Wilbur Smith Plan was surely attempting to solve. The escalation in land values of the southern part of Bombay island was being caused by the acute centralization of central functions there and not necessarily by the growth of the city. There was hardly any guarantee that population of Greater Bombay would cease to grow even if New Bombay was started. As it happened, Greater Bombay's population has continued to leap-frog in spite of New Bombay.

The document was harsh on the Wilbur Smith and metro rail proposals and, apart from bus and tube-railway, argued the case of monorail and fast ferry boats (p.53). It appeared that it was more concerned with the transport requirements of the stage where new and old Bombay were fully developed and was not very bothered about the current and interim traffic congestion. According to their own vision, the development of New Bombay was going to take considerable time. In the meanwhile, were the planners to give Greater Bombay's circulatory problems an amused go by? There was hardly any choice but to implement them as is being done slowly now.

The Crucial Role of the MARG Piece

Having obtained a concrete alternative framework in the form of twin-city proposal of the MARG piece, the business class went whole hog after the Development Plan. In a series of seminars, symposia, conferences, media build-up, they built a tremendous visibility value of the proposition. However, the MARG piece played most crucial role before the BMRPB, where the initial thinking was anything but favouring the twin-city proposal.¹¹ In a significant move, the twin-city lobbyists took issue with a number of previous proposals on Greater Bombay (including the Development Plan) emphasizing all the time that (a) all previous proposals were but only 'palliatives'; (b) Greater Bombay's solutions needed a break from the past; (c) breaking the domination of Greater Bombay and building a counter-magnet near enough was the only way to draw the pressure away from the city;

11 Based on discussions with some of the key participants in the BMRPB proceedings.

and (d) land could be used as a resource for financing the development of the twin-city saving the use of scarce state finances for such large scale urban development work. Eventually, the BMRPB was persuaded to recommend the twin-city proposal although when the report came out in 1969 there was also a mention of development of satellite towns. The Maharashtra government, which had dilly-dallied a decision on the solution to Greater Bombay's problems, promptly accepted the twin-city proposal of the BMRPB leaving others to gather dust.¹²

Considerations Leading to Use of Land as Resource in New Bombay

Four major considerations eventually led the CIDCO Ltd. to use land as a recourse in developing New Bombay :

1. Having attacked the Development Plan before the appointment of the Gadgil Committee and subsequently before the BMRPB, the New Bombay enthusiasts had hardly any choice in proposing another plan of the same financial size for New Bombay and also hoping to get it approved by the state government. At least, the public stand had to be different. Use of land as a resource was, therefore, considered a better initial approval reason to be put before the state government.
2. CIDCO's inner core group consisting of J.B. D'Souza (Managing Director until 1974), Charles Correa (Chief Consulting Architect until 1974 and member of the Board of Directors thereafter), Shirish Patel (first Technical Advisor, then Director of Public Works and again Technical Advisor till 1974) had previous career

12 Acceptance of recommendations should not be taken to mean compulsory executive action also on them. Quite often the acceptance has remained on paper.

experiences which made them feel confident of making New Bombay a commercial proposition. Before taking over as the Managing Director of CIDCO Ltd., D'Souza had been, among other things, the General Manager of the BEST, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, and Industries Commissioner, Government of Maharashtra. In the late fifties, when it was becoming increasingly difficult to find space for locating additional industrial units in Greater Bombay and the Government of Maharashtra was not willing to allot large funds to develop industrial estates near Greater Bombay, it was he who built the Wagle Industrial Estate in Thane at a cost of Rs.5 lakhs. Initially, there were no buyers and some plots, disposed in the early phase, were sold at very cheap rates. However, as the time passed there was great demand for the latter lot of plots and these fetched quite attractive prices.¹³ Overall, the estate generated additional funds demonstrating in the process the self-sustaining capacity of such ventures and subsequently led to formation of the MIDC to undertake such assignments on the statewide scale. Charles Correa, the architect, had, among his many consultancy assignments, assisted the DDA in designing, developing and marketing many a commercial complex in Delhi and eventually help evolution of a very good financial reserve with the DDA. The DDA experiment had evoked a high critical acclaim from the CIDCO's Planning Team. Similarly, Shirish Patel, an engineering consultant and planner, had helped many an estate developer in Greater Bombay to turn an ugly patch of uneconomic land into a vestibule of goldmine. While

¹³ Based on in depth personal discussion with J.B. D'Souza on April 21, 1981 at Hyderabad.


shaping of policy inside CIDCO was in the hands of these people, its Planning Team, constituted to act as the 'think tank' and consisting of well known names in their respective fields, tended to reinforce their viewpoint on this issue.

3. A large industrial complex had grown in the Thane-Belapur area, forming part of New Bombay and sooner or later the port of Nhava-Sheva was going to be sanctioned by the Planning Commission. Some important central agencies were moving in the area. Whereas considerable amount of infrastructural facilities had already been built in the area by the MIDC, the major land users in future, according to one viewpoint, were expected to develop their chunks of lands and thus, share the development cost of the city. Major industrial groups (i.e. the Tata, Walchand, Mafatlal) having a larger stake in the area also exerted considerable pressure on the then Maharashtra Chief Minister, V.P. Naik giving indications that their employees were expected to buy a large number of housing units in New Bombay.

4. Comparative cost estimates of Development Plan and New Bombay were, as seen earlier, presented to the Maharashtra Government in such a fashion as to give an impression that New Bombay had tremendous advantages. The kingpin of this line of reasoning was expected cheap availability of land in New Bombay. The State government was, thus, persuaded to believe that all that was needed was a reasonable sized loan to the NTDA, CIDCO Ltd., which would be eventually returned back once the NTDA developed its own revolving fund using land as a resource. The BMR would stand to benefit tremendously because of development of both the cities without the utilization of a very large sum of scarce state resources.

MAP 2-3

BOMBAY METROPOLITAN REGION
 (PROPOSED AS BOMBAY METROPOLITAN CITY
 BY THE KERKAR GROUP)



III

Design to Convert BMR in to BMC

Analysis in subsequent chapters would dissect the professed and real objectives of New Bombay. For the present, it is pertinent to emphasize the fact that even after eleven years of its existence, New Bombay is nowhere near the professed aim of emerging as a counter-magnet to Greater Bombay. Instead of drawing the pressure away from the old city, the new one has been, in fact, adding to the nerve-wrecking problems of the old. However, as I have indicated earlier, the real objective of New Bombay idea was to cross the Thane creek and annex parts of the mainland. New Bombay has certainly provided a good enough excuse to the business class to take the next logical step of suggesting another idea incorporating the two cities to carry on the growth - spillover - annexation methodology (Map 2.3). With the application of the MULC Act 1976, the estate agents and building interests had been experiencing problems in getting enough land to carry on their wonderful business of flat size reduction, inflating cost of housing (and other type of accommodation) to astronomical proportions (both in white and black). Land was certainly available in huge enough chunks and, what is more, concentrated in only a few hands. Only it was frozen because of the MULC Act. A way had to be found out to get this and, if possible, other lands for the benefit of this segment of the business class.

Representatives of the business class discussed this problem with the fund raising circles of the ruling apparatus of the Maharashtra Government sometime in 1980 when the state was under President's

rule. The use of the ruse of offering a solution to problem of slums and dilapidated houses to get the concessions for the private building industry was then agreed upon. These discussions culminated in the setting up of a Committee under the Chairmanship of K.K. Moghe, which submitted its report shortly thereafter. An elected state government came into existence some time later which, picking up the threads, handled the issue through yet another Committee headed by Premchand Awale. These Committees suggested grant of additional FSI to the private building sector as an incentive for them to rehouse occupants of slums and dilapidated houses on lands so affected. A very sharp public reaction brought this operation to a temporary halt.¹⁴

Maharashtra Chief Minister, A.R. Antulay had, in the meanwhile, got launched on his campaign of helping the cause of the people of his district, constituency, tehsil, village and begun establishing his charitable trusts. The High Power Steering Group headed by Ajit Kerkar (a Director of Tata Industries) and consisting of I.M. Kadri (architect), Rashesh Mafatlal (industrialist) and also Dr. Shanti Patel was appointed about the same time.¹⁵

¹⁴ Based on discussions with the segments of the building industry in Bombay and the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee (I). Publicly acceptable partial corroboration of this account is also available from Kerkar Group Report (Chapter I, first four paragraphs).

¹⁵ These links have fairly useful advantages for both the sides. To give only one example, JRD Tata agrees to head a corporation to look after the planning and execution of proposed Uran bridge; Ajit Kerkar of the Tata Industries heads the Kerkar Group on slums and dilapidated houses; the trusts of Mr. Antulay get funds from the estate builders; Antulay Trusts invest Rs.50 lakhs in Tata Industries; Kerkar Group recommends decongestion of slums and dilapidated houses and availability of land to the building sharks; Tatas propose development of their Parel land for commercial purposes; Corporation objects; State government overrules enabling the Tatas to make only a few crores in the end.

Kerkar Group's recommendations are remarkable for their arbitrariness, total disregard to the issues addressed, and pursuit of ruthless policy of de-stabilisation of the dwellers in the slums and delapidated buildings in a brash attempt to help the private estate developers.¹⁶

The Kerkar Group Report was presented to the Maharashtra Government on 16th August 1981 and would have carried the day in normal circumstances. To give poetic justice to the hapless living in the slums and dilapidated houses in Bombay, Arun Shourie blew up the grissly game of the Antulay Trusts, including the membership of Ajit Kerkar in four of them. Mr. Antulay lost his Chief Ministership in the court battle which followed, and, therefore, the estate building sharks are waiting with baited breath for a fresh opportunity to push their programme through. In the meanwhile both Bombay and New Bombay are growing as they have been ordained to by the business class. As for the future, BMC is being looked forward to just as the Bombay Development Plan, which started this entire high stakes-no-holds barred battle is being revised substantially to be presented to the Maharashtra Government once again. The circle of events has taken the full turn and yet the logic of Bombay's growth remains what it has always been.

¹⁶ Even a colleague of Ajit Kerkar from the Tatas could not stomach them. For an interesting point of view, see Desai (1981 : 16). Somewhat detailed comments on the recommendations of the Kerkar Group are to be found in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3

Organisational Structure and Design for Developing
New Bombay

CHAPTER 3

Organisational Structure and Design for Developing New Bombay

Acceptance of the twin-city proposal of the BMRPB by the Maharashtra Government in 1970 and establishment of the CIDCO Ltd. to develop New Bombay area marked beginning of another crucial stage in the execution of the overall strategy of the business class. This chapter examines the ideological, politico-legal context of the choice of organisational form of CIDCO Ltd., the objectives set, role identified and activities pursued and the structural arrangements maintained inside the NTDA to achieve them at different points of time since its birth. The examination of the activities is more abstract here : subsequent chapters analyse them in greater detail.

I

Ideological, Politico-Legal Context of Organisational Form

Because of peculiar evolution of the organisational theory, organisational analysis quite often fails to place the organisations being diagnosed in their proper ideological, politico-legal-jurisdictional context.¹ As a result, organisational goals, objectives, activities, and roles are not seen in their proper perspective and the organisations themselves are erroneously expected to perform the functions they are ideologically not expected to and politico-legal jurisdiction-wise not competent

¹ For an insightful discussion, see, for instance, Goldman (1978), Raelin (1980), and Riggs (1967, 1969, A, 1975).

to perform. Some are indeed incorrectly placed as independent 'whole organisations' whereas in reality they are component sub-structures of a larger organisation set working inter-dependently as an inter-organisational federation. Much of the misconception about CIDCO's objectives, goals and activities can be traced back to lack of this theoretical clarity of organizational context.

The task of planning and developing a new city or parts of the old cities has traditionally come to be handled by the town development authorities in India either independently or in conjunction with the local government institutions. It is significant that CIDCO Ltd., an organisation floated to plan, develop and initially administer New Bombay, was set up, on March 18, 1970, as a subsidiary company of SICOM Ltd., as defined in Section D 4(I) of the Companies Act 1956.² It was wholly owned by the SICOM Ltd. (which itself was wholly owned by the State government) and controlled by the State government.³ It was to act as an agent of the state government for the development of New Bombay, and was, consequently, named as the NTDA for New Bombay first and STPA for several other areas under the provisions of MRTPA 1966.⁴ This choice of organisational form was no accident : on the contrary, it was an urgent ideological requirement for the business class which had pushed through the New Bombay

² Government Resolution No.IDL/5770/IND-I authorized its incorporation.

³ CIDCO ceased to be a subsidiary of the SICOM Ltd. with effect from 30th March 1976 and became a full fledged state owned company thereafter.

⁴ Annual Report 1970-71, SICOM Ltd., p.39.

idea and was anxious to ensure protection of its interests and flow of favourable decisions from CIDCO Ltd. If New Bombay were to be planned say by a conventional development authority or the Urban Planning Department of the State government, it would have been unquestionably a difficult task for them to influence day to day planning decisions as they came to do so in CIDCO Ltd. It was precisely for this purpose that a provision in the MRTPA, inserted earlier and providing for grant of funds by the State government to NTDA to develop a new town/city, was used to create CIDCO and then make it act as NTDA for New Bombay.⁵

CIDCO's placement in the proper organisational sets and inter-organisational federations enables the correct delineation of its role space and its dependence on other organisations from the confederating sets to fulfil its objectives. It figured in three organisational sets and federative set-ups. These sets deal with (a) industrialization; (b) urbanization; and (c) single and/or multi-function infrastructure laying agencies. The state and central governments were the source of their jurisdictional sustenance. The first organisational set consisted of the MIDC, SICOM and MAFCO. The sequence of births of organisations servicing the industrialization processes in Maharashtra is significant. The first to start work was the Directorate of Development of the IT followed by the Directorate of Industries. The

⁵ As seen earlier, Gadgil Committee's thinking was significantly changed through lobbying, and this provision was one among the many outside ideas accepted by it.

Directorate was followed by the MIDC in 1962 which created a number of industrial estates in Greater Bombay and its peripheries and fostered industrial location in the fringe zone of the city for the benefit of the business class and at public cost. The SICOM then appeared on the scene in 1965 in the name of inducing industrial dispersal but actually forming another step of the same chain. SICOM promoted industrial location only in a few developed centres in or near the major towns in Maharashtra and at least indirectly helped industrial concentration at already developed places through a series of decisions.⁶ CIDCO was SICOM fostered and was to work, interestingly enough, in areas where the business class facilitators (i.e. MIDC, SICOM) had done their bit earlier for industrial development and it was the envisaged role of CIDCO to put in its complementary share in terms of urban services keeping the needs, requirements and interests of the business class upper most in its thinking and action. This organisational chain did not end with CIDCO. It was followed by the MAFCO Ltd., another SICOM subsidiary, in 1972,⁷ and the BMRDA in 1975.⁸ This

6 As early as 1970-71 itself the SICOM Annual Report admitted that its strategy of concentrating on a few centres for promotion of industrial growth at a time may not be able to secure the evenness in incomes which is the ultimate objective of the policy of balanced development. SICOM Ltd., Annual Report 1970-71, p.5.

7 The organisational deception also continued. Established for promoting marketing and processing of agricultural products, increasing the income of agriculturists and developing agriculture in the regions unsuitable for industrial growth, the MAFCO established its major cold-storage and warehousing complex in New Bombay and concentrated on selling the products of government bacon factory and poultry dressing plant; both of Greater Bombay.

8 Sivaramakrishnan (1978 : 124-30) and Datta and Chakravarty (1979, 1981 : 16-21) bring out the motives and real objectives behind the establishment of the BMRDA.

organisation set would reach its finale if and when the Apex Body proposed by the Kerkar Group comes in to existence to administer the BMC.

It is significant that a majority of the member units of this federative organisational chain have statewide geographical and functional mandate. The MIDC, SICOM and MAFCO are directly concerned with specific aspects of industrial development : the CIDCO was established primarily for city planning, development and administration but was also expected to support statewide industrial location policies of the state government. It is, therefore, not without significance that city/town planning assignments to CIDCO came for such places where the units of this federative chain, servicing the business class, had earlier on done their work. CIDCO's policy options were, to that extent, some what pre-determined by the events which took place as a result of working of these organisations and, in some cases, were explicitly defined.

The second federative organisational set originally consisted of only two units i.e. the MCGB and the CIDCO Ltd. The BMRDA was added in 1975 and Apex Body of the BMC (proposed by the Kerkar Group) is to join the group as and when it comes into existence. Essentially, the MCGB is a territorial local government unit also handling development and development regulation work in Greater Bombay and the development plans of all other bodies dealing with other parts of BMR (New Bombay, BMC etc.) are to be synchronized and integrated with its plans. The BMRDA is the overall fede-

tive institution of urban planning and development in the BMR and, to that extent, is expected to regulate, and approve the development plans of both the MCGB and CIDCO Ltd. The State government is the final approving authority for all area development plans under the provisions of the MRTPA 1966. Jurisdictional powers-wise CIDCO is probably the least consequential organisation in this set.

The third organisational set consists of specific function/facility laying statutory organisations of the state and central governments. These include : MSRTC, MSEB, BPT (all Maharashtra Government) and the Railways, Post and Telegraphs, Airport Authority, ONGC and Defence Establishments (all Central Government). Each of these institutions enjoy specific territorial monopoly power to plan, develop and manage specific services and CIDCO needed their full cooperation and participation in the development of these facilities in New Bombay. On its own CIDCO was not empowered to undertake development of any of these in New Bombay.

Development plans of CIDCO emerging out of the inter-organisational interaction of institutions belonging to these three sets still had to get approval of the state and central governments and allocation of varied resources, not always only financial. At these stages, CIDCO became a competitor, for resource allocation purposes, with organisations and projects also from fields other than urban development.

Subordination of the urbanization and sub-urbanization processes to the needs and requirements of the business class and state supported industrial development on the capitalist path could be easily observed from the individual and collective working of these three organisational sets. In case of CIDCO this was evident in its peculiar organisational dualism. Its organisational form - a registered company under the Companies Act - was such which enabled the pursuit of private sector culture (public funds and private benefits) in a public sector organisation. For the world outside, CIDCO was a government owned and controlled company pursuing strictly legally defined 'agency' function of developing an area of about 120 square miles in the Uran, Panvel and Thane Tehsils as a new town to assist in resolving the problems of urban congestion in Bombay city⁹ and for which it was provided funds to carry on the task of planning and development of New Bombay on behalf of government and return any surpluses, generated from its sales.¹⁰ In return, it was to get a defined sum for its labours.¹¹ The going for the private sector was still better in case of CIDCO where the entire share capital was government owned and apart from the government appointed members to the Board of Governors, the shareholders as a mass of scattered voting entities did not exist. Surrogate control of thinking and planning mechanisms inside CIDCO was consequently an easier task once the State government was persuaded to pack CIDCO

9 G.R. No.IDL/5770/IND-I dated 18 March 1970.

10 G.R. No.GAD/CID-2072-U dated 24 January 1972.

11 It was kept at Rs.3 lakhs for the year 1971 and was to be increased each year by Rs.1 lakh subject to a maximum of Rs.5 lakhs for any year.

Board of Directors with people sympathetic to and aligned with the business class.

II

Goals and Objectives Set, Role Identified, and Activities Undertaken

Legally CIDCO was an undertaking of the Maharashtra government and its object was to undertake such assignments as were given to it by the government, or institutions controlled by it, from time to time. After its incorporation, CIDCO's first assignment was the New Bombay project. Therefore, one expected explicit statement of CIDCO's and New Bombay's objectives separately in the government and CIDCO documents. However, what was available instead was mixing up of the two in the Maharashtra Government's single statement on objectives of both CIDCO and New Bombay.

These were :

1. to reduce the growth of population in Greater Bombay by creating an attractive urban area on the mainland across the harbour which will (a) absorb immigrants who would otherwise come to Bombay; and (b) attract some of Bombay's present population.
2. to support state-wide industrial location policies which will lead eventually to an efficient and rational distribution of industries over the state and to a balanced development of urban centres in the hinterland.
3. to provide physical and social services which raise living standards and reduce disparities in the amenities available to the different sections of the population.
4. to provide an environment which permits the citizens in New Bombay to live fuller and richer lives free, in so far as this is possible, of the physical and social tensions which are associated with urban living.

5. to provide training and all possible facilities to the existing local population in the project area to enable them to adapt to the new urban setting and to participate fully and actively in the economic and social life of the new city (CIDCO : 1973 : 10).

In detailing the above set of objectives, CIDCO itself added the following additional ones to the original list :

1. Guiding location of only specified industries in New Bombay.
2. Development of New Bombay as a self-financing project.
3. Restructuring of the metropolitan growth by cutting back growth of industrial jobs (Ibid : 11-16).

The MARG piece had set three basic conditions for the realization of the New Bombay project. These were : (a) creation of state capital (in New Bombay), (b) movement of government offices, and (c) establishment of single planning and regulating agency whose directions would have to be followed by all organisations working in the area. When the State government accepted the proposal of the EMRPPB to establish New Bombay, it had given only an assurance on the above three conditions. All subsequent legal documents neatly skirted a commitment on them. Some of the goals themselves were also not mutually compatible and the role space required to translate them in terms of policies and activities on the one hand and resources on the other was very wide. As such, as the facts stood, CIDCO had no commensurate powers to successfully pursue the goals set by the State government. As the project reached concretized formulation stage, CIDCO and the State government began experiencing problems. In an attempt to chart out a wider industrial policy for the entire state of Maharashtra, CIDCO

commissioned and completed a major study.¹² The State government once again did not commit itself to accept the policy prescriptions flowing from its recommendations. Although the State government honoured the CIDCO stand on the issue of location of a large scale chemical complex of the Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Company in 1973, it dawned on both the CIDCO and the State government that quite a few of the original goals set were, at best, left unattended.¹³ Subsequently, both CIDCO and State government documents began the painful task of dilution of the original set of objectives with varying listings.¹⁴ The fifth objective, dealing with the project-affected people, was altogether deleted once CIDCO reached a political settlement with their leaders in 1979 enhancing the quantum of compensation for the land acquired (to Rs.15000 per ha.) and dispensing with the rehabilitation measures.

The Multi-Sector Report, revised in March 1981, however, drastically - and perhaps more realistically - recasted and redefined the objectives of New Bombay and CIDCO's role. In the changed thinking, the objectives of New Bombay now were to contribute to (i) deconcentration of south Bombay, (ii) reduction of the cost of supporting infrastructure which otherwise would entail if the present trend continued unabated, (iii) siphoning off industrial growth to the mainland especially in those branches which have

12 Significantly enough, this was done by the Tata Economic Consultancy Services.

13 Hindustan Organic Chemicals has been allowed to set up such a major unit near Panvel in 1981 confirming in the process the futility of such objectives.

14 A juxtaposition of the legal documents pertaining to the New Bombay project (the GRs, Annual Reports of the SICOM and CIDCO Ltd. and contractual documents, etc.) and the publicity material historically brings this out rather sharply.

proven to be advantageous in New Bombay (including port-based industries, service industries and industries based on the associated gas of Bombay High), (iv) provision of better infrastructure in New Bombay, and (v) dispensing with long distance commutation - and thereby costly investments in transport infrastructure - by better planning concept (CIDCO : 1981 : 1-2).

The CIDCO's role, similarly, underwent a sea-change. Its catalyst role was now limited to developing the base for attracting private investment opportunities¹⁵ as well as indicating the need for complementary public investments by other agencies.

From the lofty 'support of state-wise industrial location policy' and so on, it had now come down to 'promote and regulate the growth of industrial and commercial activities in New Bombay keeping in view the environmental, transport and communication requirements and the overall advantageous position' of New Bombay (Ibid : 1-2). The goal of self-sustained growth and development of a revolving fund too has been abandoned and financial assistance is being sought from state, national, and inter-national agencies on soft terms (Ibid : II-III).

Sequential activity profile of CIDCO Ltd. for the period 1970-80 is presented in Table 3.1. Nature of activities, their sweep, content and consequences provide better evidence of CIDCO's actions and help in separating the rhetoric from the stark facts. In retrospect, CIDCO's activity sequence can be placed in three historical phases :

15 Now CIDCO truly joins the organisational set servicing the business class in an open manner.

1. The incubation, birth and infancy : 1970-1973
2. Childhood, vagrancy and wilderness : 1973-1979
3. Adulthood : 1979 onwards.

Table 3.1

Sequential Activity Profile of CIDCO Ltd. : 1970-80

Financial Activity Undertaken and/or Continued Year
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1970-71	1. Incorporation of the company and other legal formalities; 2. Development of an organizational capability to plan and develop New Bombay; 3. Securing initial finances; 4. Initial development work in Early Development Area (EDA) Vashi; 5. Preliminaries and work on Panvel Creek bridge; and 6. Bandra-Kurla Plan.
1971-72	1. Reorganization of CIDCO into (a) Planning and Works Divisions into inter-disciplinary Task Forces with defined tasks; 2. Land acquisition in New Bombay; 3. Integrated Agricultural Produce Market (IAPM) for MAFCO Ltd. at Turbhe; and 4. Work on the Development Plan for New Bombay.
1972-73	1. Further work on Development Plan for New Bombay; 2. Bus service (between Bombay-Vashi-Thane); 3. Exploratory work on the Central Business District (CBD), Belapur; 4. Afforestation in New Bombay; 5. Hovermarine Service; 6. Litigation pertaining to land acquisition; and 7. New Aurangabad Project.
1973-74	1. Publication of Draft Development Plan for New Bombay; 2. Work on Tarapur township (on behalf of SICOM and to establish a residential complex to provide houses to the industrial labour employed in the MIDC industrial estate).
1974-75	1. Processing of Objections and Suggestions on the Development Plan for New Bombay; 2. Negotiations and actualisation of loans from HUDCO for New Bombay, Tarapur and New Aurangabad; and 3. Work on New Nasik as Special Town Planning Authority (under Section 40(1)(b) of MRTPA).

Financial Activity Undertaken and/or Continued
Year

- 1975-76 1. Revision and submission of revised Draft Development Plan for New Bombay to the State Government for sanction; 2. Finalization and publication of New Nasik, Bandra-Kurla, and New Nanded and revised proposals for additional area of New Aurangabad; 3. New Panvel Township; 4. Negotiations with ONGC regarding oil, gas terminal complex and development of infrastructure; 5. New bus route services; and 6. Work on New Nagpur.
- 1976-77 1. Reference of Revised New Bombay Draft Development Plan to the BMRDA for its comments; 2. Obtaining sanction of state government of New Nasik, New Nanded proposals; 3. Publication of New Nagpur proposals; 4. Settlement of claims on Bandra-Kurla with BMRDA (consequent to transfer of Bandra-Kurla scheme to BMRDA); and 5. Negotiation of land deals with ONGC shore facilities complex at Nhava and gas and oil terminal at Uran.
- 1977-78 1. Review of activities of CIDCO and realisation of need to accelerate the pace of development of New Bombay (through relocation of centres of economic activity); 2. Re-revision of Draft Development Plan for New Bombay to accommodate the unforeseen demands for lands (i.e. ONGC, Naval Complex, MSEB, and others) and obtaining approval of the state government.
- 1978-79 1. Modification and re-re-submission of New Bombay Draft Development Plan to state government; 2. Liaison work with state government on relocation of vegetable and fruit markets in Greater Bombay to New Bombay and litigation in the courts; 3. Negotiations with the Planning Commission and Ministry of Railways for extension of rail link from Mankhurd to Panvel (via Vashi and Belapur) and a goods siding at APM Turbhe and Warehousing complex at Kalamboli; and 4. Disposal of social infrastructure.
- 1979-80 1. APM Turbhe (onion and potato market for the APMC, truck terminal, etc.); 2. Negotiations with wholesale traders in several commodities for shifting to New Bombay; 3. Construction of CIDCO building at CBD Belapur; 4. CIDCO construction at New Panvel (to pep up New Panvel's growth); 5. Warehousing complex at Kalemboli work; 6. Development of Nhava-Sheva and allied township; 7. Negotiations with state and central governments on Mankhurd-Panvel rail link and a bridge conne-

Financial Activity Undertaken and/or Continued
Year

cting New Bombay with Greater Bombay; and 8. Establishment of subsidiary corporation named, Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation (to look after road transport in New Bombay and other parts of BMR).

- Note : 1. Continuation of old activities in subsequent years have not been generally listed.
2. Marketing activities, discussed separately later, are omitted.
3. Listing confined to important activities only.

Source : Annual Reports of the SICOM Ltd., Bombay and CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

CIDCO's activities during the first phase (1970-73) involved principally preparation of the New Bombay Development Plan, initial construction work in the EDA Vashi, some peripheral work in other nodes, and subsidiary activities of land acquisition, rehabilitation, and bus service, etc. In the early part of this phase, it was also given the task of preparing a Development Plan for Bandra-Kurla (in north-central Bombay). The New Aurangabad assignment came to it in the latter part. In terms of emphasis and attention given and resources allocated, activities related with the objective of relocation (from south to New Bombay) were treated as insignificant. The second phase (1973-1979) is marked by absolute loss of direction on the New Bombay front and dilution of its organisational capacity at several other places in an effort to attempt broadcast method of urban development with too little resources. That the New Bombay project had not really been

pushed hard enough was realized only in 1977-78 when a critical review of CIDCO's activities was undertaken for the first time. Goal and role modification followed during the third phase and showed itself in more concretized area delineation between CIDCO and other organisations figuring in three different organisational sets. Emphasis shifted from construction mainly catering to attract population, as attempted in the first two phases, to construction essentially linked with relocation projects. Simultaneously, marketing activity was pushed full throttle to generate sizeable internal surpluses to finance accelerated tempo of construction work. The stage is now set for 'market forces' to operate their set pattern in New Bombay.

III

Structural Arrangements Maintained

Organisations such as CIDCO are bye-products of the larger societal processes of development and under-development operative in their full complexities from time to time. As such, their structural arrangements are inevitably linked with the pace, intensity and sweep of changes occurring in the political arena. Being a company owned by the State government, CIDCO's super-structure consisting of the Board of Directors and Managing Directors has been changing with every change in the positions of Chief Ministers and/or Ministers of Urban Development in Maharashtra. During the period of analysis (1970-1980), Maharashtra had five Chief Ministers, V.P. Naik, S.B. Chavan, Vasantdada

Patil, Sharad Pawar and A.R. Antulay in that sequence.

Dr. Rafiq Zakaria, Prabhakar Kunte, Hashu Advani, and Prechand Awale have been the Ministers of Urban Development during the same period.

The changes in the superstructure of CIDCO Ltd. during this period are shown in Tables 3.2 - 3.5. The strength of CIDCO's Board of Directors, almost entirely consisting of IAS officials ceded to Maharashtra state, has varied between a low of five to a high of nine. The strength of the supporting staff has been leap-frogging from a specified 640 in 1972-73 to 2115 in 1979-80 (Table 3.2). A total of 36 Directors have been on CIDCO's Board. Their tenurial lengths have varied a great deal. Roughly half among them were members for just one year; three had two terms (of various durations). Among those who had some continuous association with the Board, nine served for two continuous years, four for three continuous years, one for four continuous years and four for five continuous years (Table 3.3). It emerges that most of the long tenures were in the initial period itself. The subsequent years have seen a continuous in and out-flow of Board members.

During the ten year period, CIDCO had nine Chairmen (there being no Chairman in one year). The longest to last was N.M. Wagle, who held the position for five continuous years between 1970-1974-75. None of the subsequent Chairmen have lasted more than one year (Table 3.4). Of the five, R.D. Bhandare and R.G. Kapse, appointed during the reigns of Vasantdada Patel and Sharad Pawar respectively, were politicians : the others were all civil servants.

Table 3.2

Strength of the CIDCO's Board of Governors, Staff and Teams
of Chairman and Managing Directors : 1970 - 1980

Financial Year	Number of Directors*	Staff Strength	Chairman	Managing Director(s)
1970-71	9	Not specified	N.M. Wagle	J.B. D'Souza
1971-72	7	Not specified	N.M. Wagle	J.B. D'Souza
1972-73	9	640	N.M. Wagle	J.B. D'Souza and P.C. Nayak
1973-74	9	851	N.M. Wagle	K. Sivaramkrishnan
1974-75	9	976	N.M. Wagle	P.G. Salvi
1975-76	6	1204	A.B. Kerkar	B.C. Kariapa
1976-77	7	1245	R.D. Bhandare	B.S. Dhavle
1977-78	5	1623	No Chairman	B.S. Dhavle
1978-79	7	1845	R.G. Kapse	L.C. Gupta
1979-80	6	2115	S.A. Keshwani	L.C. Gupta
Total	36		5	7

* Including the Chairman and the Managing Director(s)

Source : Annual Reports of SICOM, Ltd., Bombay and CIDCO Ltd.,
Bombay and New Bombay.

Table 3.3

Tenurial Length of CIDCO's Board of Directors : 1970 - 1980

Sl. No.	Tenurial Length	Number of Directors	Names
1.	Uninterrupted 5 years	4	1. N.M. Wagle; 2. R.M. Deshmukh; 3. S.B. Bhirangi (first five years); 4. C.M. Correa (last five years)
2.	Uninterrupted 4 years	1	1. G.B. Barwale
3.	Uninterrupted 3 years	4	1. J.B. D'Souza; 2. A.A. Deshpande; 3. P.C. Nayak; 4. Y.S. Bhave
4.	Two years continuous	9	1. K.V. Desai; 2. J.C. Agarwal; 3. S.M. Kelkar; 4. K. Shivaramakrishnan; 5. P.V. Nayak; 6. B.S. Dhavle; 7. G.H. Lalwani; 8. M.S. Palnitkar 9. L.C. Gupta
5.	Two terms	3	1. M.S. Palnitkar a) 1970-71 (one year) b) 1977-78 - 1978-79 (two years) 2. L.C. Gupta a) 1975-75 (one year) b) 1978-79 - continuing 3. M. Subramanian a) 1970-71 b) 1976-77
6.	One year only	17	K.S. Sonawane; V. Srinivasan; M. Subramanian; S.Y. Ranade; S.P. Mohoni; P.G. Salvi; A.B. Kerkar; B.C. Kariapa; R.D. Bhandare; R.S. Pal; R.G. Kapse; K.G. Paranjpe; L.N. Doshi; S.A. Keshvani; D.M. Sukhtankar; D.N. Kapoor; S.H. Thacker

Note : Tenurial lengths of less than one year have been omitted from analysis.

Source : Annual Reports of SICOM Ltd., Bombay and CIDCO Ltd.,
Bombay and New Bombay.

Table 3.4

Tenures of Chairmen of CIDCO Ltd., : 1970 - 1980

Sl. No.	Name	Tenure	Length (Years)
1.	N.M. Wagle	1970-71 - 1974-75	5
2.	A.B. Kerkar	1974-75	1
3.	R.D. Bhandare	1976-77	1
4.	R.G. Kapse (MLA)	1978-79	1
5.	S.A. Keshwani	1979-80	1

Note : There was no Chairman during 1977-78.Source : Annual Reports of SICOM, Ltd., Bombay and CIDCO Ltd.,
Bombay and New Bombay.Table 3.5Tenures of Different Managing Directors of CIDCO Ltd. :
1970-1981

Sl. No.	Name	Date of Joining	Date of Leaving	Total Tenure (Months)
1.	J.B. D'Souza	24 Mar. 1970	13 Aug. 1974	50
2.	P.C. Nayak	Not speci- fied	19 May 1974	24 (approx.)
3.	K.C. Sivaramkrishnan	19 May 1974	1 Nov. 1975	18
4.	P.G. Salvi	1 Nov. 1975	7 Sept. 1976	10
5.	B.C. Kariapa	7 Sept. 1976	18 July 1977	10
6.	B.S. Dhavle	3 Aug. 1977	1 June 1979	23
7.	L.C. Gupta	1 June 1979	Continuing (in Sept. 1981)	26

Source : Annual Reports of SICOM Ltd., Bombay and CIDCO Ltd.,
Bombay and New Bombay.

Eight teams of Chairmen and Managing Directors have operated during this period. The longest to last was the first one of N.M. Wagle - J.B. D'Souza. N.M. Wagle also teamed up with P.C. Nayak, K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, and P.G. Salvi (Table 3.2). Among the Managing Directors, the longest to remain in office was J.B. D'Souza (50 months), followed by L.C. Gupta (26 months continuing), P.C. Nayak (24 months), B.S. Dhavle (23 months), K.C. Sivaramakrishnan (18 months), and P.G. Salvi, B.C. Kariapa (10 months each) (Table 3.5). Thus, barring the first and the last appointees, none of the other Managing Directors had a reasonably fair tenurial length to initiate any consequential projects and see them through.

CIDCO's organisational dualism, seen earlier in its organisational context, jurisdiction, objectives, activities and superstructure, is also seen in the structural arrangements made from time to time below the level of Board of Directors. Looking through their initiation and frequent tinkering, the dominant impression which one gets is that they were adopted more to suit the personal whims and fancies of the key actors involved at different points of time than any other thing (Charts 3.1 - 3.6). In an attempt to analyse their appropriateness to the tasks at hand I have juxtaposed the changes brought in the structural arrangements with the real motives as against the ones held out publicly.¹⁶

In May 1972 the organisation was divided into six divisions and the following officers handled the divisions (1) Technical Adviser,

¹⁶ For obvious reasons, this discussion is confined to important milestones in the institution building history of CIDCO.


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ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CIDCO LTD (MAY, 72)

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHARMAN

MANAGING DIRECTOR AND SECY GAD



ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CIDCO LTD (MAY, 72)

CHART- 3.1

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHARMAN

MANAGING DIRECTOR AND SECY, GAD

SA TO M.D.




CHART 3:2


ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CIDCO LTD. (AUGUST, 72)

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAIRMAN

MANAGING DIRECTOR & SECY, GAD


S.A. TO M.D.



IN THE CHART, D.O.M.
D.O.E.

CHART 3-3

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CIDCO LTD.
(AUGUST, 72)




NOTE - 1. THE INDIVIDUALS WITHIN ENCLOSURES ARE RESPONSIBLE TO THE TASK FORCE LEADER FOR CO-ORDINATION AND PROGRESS AND TO THE HEAD OF THE SECTION FOR QUALITY OF WORK.
 2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF TASK FORCES BETWEEN THE TA AND PE IS PRESENTLY AS SHOWN IN THE CHART, BUT IS FLEXIBLE.

**CHART 3-4
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CIDCO LTD. (DECEMBER 72)**

MANAGING DIRECTOR AND ADDL. MANAGING DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND WORKS



NOTE: PROJECT MANAGERS HAVE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WORK WITHIN THEIR TASK FORCES INDIVIDUALS WITH ENCLOSURES ARE ACCORDINGLY RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR PROJECT MANAGER FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR WORK, BUT WILL RECEIVE GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING METHODOLOGY OR APPROACH TO BE FOLLOWED FROM THE HEAD OF SECTION OF THEIR PARTICULAR DISCIPLINE.

* INCLUDES EDUCATION, MEDICAL, SOCIALWELFARE, RECREATION.

** INCLUDES PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTATION, PUBLICATIONS.

+ INCLUDES MEDICAL, DOCUMENTATION, PUBLICATIONS.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CIDCO LTD. (FEB, 72)

CHART 3.5





CHART 3.6

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CIDCO LTD. (JULY, 76)

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

* CHAIRMAN

MANAGING DIRECTOR



(2) Project Engineer, (3) Company Secretary and Law Officer, (4) State Officer Administration, (5) Officer on Special Duty (Lands), and (6) Chief Accounts and Finance Officer. However, there were some sections which were not organically linked to any divisions. Some among these such as Rehabilitation, which required immediate attention due to strong negative public opinion, were not considered important enough to form a division whereas legal and secretarial functions, which were largely handling routine duties not enjoying much prominence received a much higher place in the order of organisational designing priorities.

The relationship between the Technical Adviser (T.A.), the Planning Team and Execution Wing on the one hand and between the TA and the administration (accounts/establishment) wings on the other were not at par. The personalities which held various top level posts during this phase came from different backgrounds having diametrically opposite ideas on different tasks of CIDCO. Those, who had sneaked in from the private sector, were bent on pushing through western management techniques in organisational systems and sub-systems : those drawn from the conservative bureaucratic organisations such as the MCGB, the Revenue Department, etc. believed in following their time-tested traditional methods and practices. These differential organisational culture backgrounds made the CIDCO employees pull in different directions. In addition, there was lack of orientation in general about the special needs and priorities of a city planning and development-

oriented organisation. The static and dynamic views, thus, could not help colliding with each other very often : creativity and initiative suffered as a consequence.

The organisation chart of 1972 reveals the irrational bias in the web of relationships between such heads of divisions as the TA and Project Engineer (P.E.). Surprisingly, even after 2 years of organisational existence, the architects, the physical and social planners had not assumed any positions of significance in the organisational hierarchy. The Chief Architect (C.A.) was sandwiched between the TA and the PE reporting to and taking orders both from the Planning and Execution sides rather than occupying any worthwhile position to play a significant role in policy formulation. He was not even designated as a Head of the Section.¹⁷ To sum up, structural alignments in the organisation were a mismatch of the traditional and modern management concepts each pulling the other to balance it and not succeeding very much in the process.

The concept of multi-disciplinary Task Forces (TFs) was put to practice in CIDCO in October 1971 and as many as 11 TFs were created without limiting their number. Some of them did have quite specific jobs to be (i.e. TF Bridge was looking after construction of Panvel Creek Bridge). Some of TFs were, however, not given very precisely defined terms of reference. There were some TFs which could not fit anywhere and were given independent

¹⁷ Probably, this was due to the fact that an eminent architect who was also a member of the Planning Team was in fact functioning like a Chief Architect and Planner.

entity consequently. For no convincing reason economists and architects assisted several separate TFs (City, Industry, EDA, Materials), but were not a part of some others (Social Sciences). The engineers were assigned to all TFs without fully knowing what they were exactly expected to do there. There were also no clear cut jobs for operation research professionals except in bits and pieces. They were not involved in such important TFs as Planning and Development where their input was really very crucial. For most part, it looked that too many experts from different fields were collected in too short a time but without adequately and profitably pooling their efforts to get best results. They were under utilised. During the same period, some specific sections of the organisation experienced shortage of hands. Employment of this model resulted in double control of single professionals in the Planning and Works divisions during this period. For instance, an Economist working in TF (EDA) was responsible to the leader TF (EDA) on the one hand for his output, but, was also responsible to his Head of the Section, the Chief Economist for the quality of his work. This dual relationship arrangement obviously did not work satisfactorily. Further, some TFs were supposed to work under the PE and some others under TA, but, a certain flexibility in this regard was perhaps purposely kept which reflected upon the state of relationship existing between the incumbents holding the two posts. It is significant to note here that PE, who was an independent Head of Division in May 1972 and reported directly to M.D. just like TA, became a

sub-ordinate of TA and Planning Team just two months later with only a couple of insignificant TFs working under him, that too not exclusively.

The Planning Team was a body of eminent persons coming from different fields.¹⁸ Till June 1972 it did not figure in the organisational chart of CIDCO. The available minutes of the various Planning Team meetings indicate that it functioned like a brain storming session and took major policy as well as administrative decisions on proposals forwarded to it by the TF leaders and Heads of Sections. Since it largely consisted of part time honorary Consultants, it was really an 'ivory tower' body. The surprising aspect of this structure was that it had been given no statutory powers either by the CIDCO Board or the State government. The Planning Team was, in reality, a pack of personal friends of the CIDCO's internal trio (J.B. D'Souza, S.B. Patel and Charles Correa) and a mechanism to legitimise their own view points. Organisationally, since the TF leaders did not have a direct link with the Planning Team (except through TA), the TFs ended up in mustering support for the ideas passed on to them by these honorary Consultants from time to time. What the TF Leaders themselves wanted seldom figured on its agenda. The discussions, debates or ideas of the Planning Team very rarely percolated freely to the TF leaders or Heads of Sections. As a result, the practical, pragmatic approach of Heads of

¹⁸ Apart from the members of the Board of Directors, this included Charles Correa (Architect), Shirish B. Patel (Structural Engineer), Vijai Tendulkar (Literary Figure), Kirit Parikh (O.R. Specialist), M.S. Gore (Social Scientist), and Phiroze Medhora (Economist). Each of these members "looked after" one TF inside CIDCO.

Sections and TF leaders and the theoretical, idealistic, conceptual framework of the Planning Team could not properly match with each other. The idealistic component gained an upperhand through-out this planning phase which lasted till the end of 1973 and reflected in the Draft Development Plan.

The single most powerful office in the decision making process during the first phase was that of the Managing Director himself. Certain decisions of the then Central and the State governments on matters such as setting up of new port of Nhava-Sheva in New Bombay, government's go slow on land acquisition for the New Bombay project, the pushing of Backbay Reclamation at Nariman Point and so on significantly affected his work sphere. On his own admission, he failed to muster enough political support for this project.¹⁹ His helplessness reflected on the contradictory postures taken by the State government (i.e. of relocating economic activity from south to New Bombay and yet continuing with the Backbay Reclamation project; of quickly developing New Bombay and not speedily acquiring land). Quite obviously, there were personal and governmental compulsions involved in these contradictory postures. This interplay of push and pull forces succeeded in keeping the New Bombay project at a virtual standstill for quite sometime, though it did progress on planner's table. It was a paper planning phase for the most part. Ultimately, it became necessary both for the Government and for the CIDCO to do something more than paying lip service to the idea of New Bombay

19 Personal discussion, op. cit.

as a counter-magnet in the wake of increasing public criticism.

The decision to start first nodal development on Government owned and reclaimed land at Vashi came to be taken in this background with mounting pressure to start something on the one hand and counter-pressure from project affected people not to yield ground. This was not one of the most appropriate choices made since establishment of the first New Bombay housing estate at Vashi only helped to create the 'suburban township' rather than 'self-sufficient' character of New Bombay. This decision significantly affected the image of New Bombay project in more than one way. The proximity to Bombay helped it acquire the residential township character, the reclamation costs escalated the housing construction costs and, coupled with CIDCO's early housing policy and lack of efficient transportation, posed a capital liquidity problem which could not be solved for the next two years (till 1975). Attempts to woo the local employees to take residence within the proximity of their work place in New Bombay failed miserably. Finally, monetary pressures prevailed and the Vashi houses were thrown open for sale in the general housing market. This opened the floodgates for the 'market forces' (i.e. estate investors, racketeers) and now Vashi is not very much different from any other colonies of the MHB in its character. Thus, in spite of best intentions of planning a self-sufficient nucleus for nodal development in New Bombay, decision to locate first residential node at Vashi turned out to be a political rather than a sound, rational one.

In addition to the external pressures on CIDCO, internal strifes and conflicts of ideas and personalities at the top level constantly occurred almost from the start. In the initial period, there was a Deputy Managing Director alongwith the Managing Director. Having two men at the top with basically different attitudes and approaches soon led to ideological differences leading to frequent changes at the top. In May 1972 CIDCO had the dubious distinction of having two MDs. The second MD was initially an Additional MD but soon became MD II. The division of work was horizontal for sometime. Some departments like lands, rehabilitation were given to MD II : planning and administration remained with MD I. The organisation was vertically split. If there was a Chief Engineer and Chief Architect under MD I there was a Principal Engineer and Principal Architect under MD II and so on ad nauseam.

Between 1972 to middle of 1974 this top level discord slowly wrecked the organisation. Unity of purpose was lost, loyalty to certain persons rather than work counted more and organisation polarised to consolidate the positions of rival camps. Consequently work suffered, morale dipped low depths and atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust prevailed. The climax occurred when both the MD's, the TA, then designated as DPW, left the organisation one after another in quick succession in the middle of 1974. The Planning Team became almost defunct and that was the abrupt end of the private sector philosophy and style of functioning inside CIDCO.

What followed was a phase of status quo-ante with MDs coming in and going out of CIDCO in a quick succession. CIDCO's image in the eyes of the public as well as bureaucracy sank appreciably. The organisation, which owed itself to work on a self-sustained basis, had become a financial drag on the State government. Gradually, it was perceived to be a sinking ship which no body wanted to board. CIDCO, consequently, acquired the notoriety of becoming a punishment posting for the bureaucrats. Not many were willing to come and those who did left at the first available opportunity. Between 1975 and 1979 as many as six MDs handled CIDCO's affairs. From a position of two MDs for the organisation, CIDCO had, during 1975-76, part time MDs handling CIDCO as one of their assignments in addition to their main jobs elsewhere. It was during this phase again that CIDCO went increasingly and from 30 March 1976 totally under government control. With its entire share capital subscribed by the government, it was but natural that increasing bureaucratization and governmental control would follow. During this period MDs like P.G. Salvi successfully tried to shed off CIDCO's autonomous image by bringing in more and more government officials as deputationists inside CIDCO to really transform it into a government department.

It was during the brief phase between 1977 to 1979 that the Board of Directors of CIDCO became powerful and powers hitherto enjoyed by the MD were gradually centralised in the hands of the Board. The Board, in turn, looked upto the State government for major decisions. This naturally resulted in very slow pace of work.

The process of governmentalization reached its peak during this period. The increasing import of officials of the State government at various levels in the organisation had at the same time reached its beight and the simmering internal discontent found its expression in the union activities. The employee-employer relations, the residents' relations with CIDCO and the relations of the project affected people with CIDCO were worsening over the years but reached a finale during this period. There were agitations all round over issues like land acquisition prices, service charges, management of the estates, pricing of flats and housing schemes, revision of pay scales, and recruitment of deputationists, etc. CIDCO Board members were directly involved with some of these problems for the first time. The then MD, Mr. Dhavle, running the last lap of his service prior to retirement was more worried about audit objections and their effect on his pension than resolving these problems. In fact, the very idea of filling such an important position like that of MD of CIDCO with a Secretary level official from Government instead of a first rate professional in the field became a questionable choice. The frequent changes at the top resulted in increasingly foot-loose organisational structure.

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It was only after mid 1979 that CIDCO got an MD after a long time who believed in taking decisions and owning responsibility for them. He decided his priorities first and took decisions one after another. Major deals with big consumers like ONGC had been struck during the year 1977-78 and the financial position of

CIDCO improved appreciably when money started flowing in. The deal with ONGC brought in crores and sparked off the land owners agitation for a raise in compensation which was finally agreed to by the State government. Land was, thus, acquired at the uniform rate of Rs.15000/- per acre. This pushed up CIDCO's land prices. The general inflationary trend had also hit the land market and with CIDCO's policy of disposing land to the highest bidders brought in more developers and investors, which had hitherto operated only in Greater Bombay. This has pushed up CIDCO's land prices to levels beyond the common man's reach. CIDCO's coffers are now filling fast the moment it enters the sellers' market of land or houses.

The horizontal communication was far from perfect in CIDCO all along. The personal equations between heads of divisions were less than ideal which affected their professional cooperation to a large degree. The architects and planners on the one hand and engineers on the other could not maintain a satisfactory rapport. Some MDs undermined planners and most MDs could not appreciate the important role the social services planners can play.

Except the first and the most recent Chairman no other Chairman appears to have taken direct interest in day-to-day matters of CIDCO. The first Chairman Mr. Wagle took some important decisions on policy matters when the organisation was going through the critical period of internal conflicts between two MDs though on most matters he appeared to have sided with the particular MD. Mr. Wagle, however, did not face the problems of staff, residents and project affected people directly. Mr. Kerkar

from Indian Hotels was second Chairman and it was a common belief that his personal relations with the then Minister for Urban Development and Public Housing had enabled him to get this post. However, he was on ivory tower Chairman and a mere ceremonial head. His first meeting with the officers at Vashi was his last one and he resigned in October 1977.

Vasantdada Patil, the then Chief Minister, took a policy decision of making appointments of personalities in political field as Chairmen of various state level bodies. As a result R.D. Bhandare found a berth in CIDCO after having lost an election. Apart from helping the employees in getting their demand for bonus approved from the government he was not instrumental in any other significant decision making.

With the change of government in the state (PDF government) the practice of appointment of political personalities continued. Prof. Ram Kapse, MLA from Kalyan came to be appointed as a Chairman. Since the Minister for Urban Development, H. Advani belonged to his own party, he maintained excellent rapport with all concerned. He took the public relation job of CIDCO upon himself, toured the project area extensively, met project affected people regularly and got their problems solved in unorthodox and direct ways. His MD, on the other hand, first concentrated on employees, looked into their long standing grievances, reached agreements, settled their demands and, in general, made them happy. Having done that he wanted to make them work to their fullest capacity. He jacked up CIDCO's budget to a record of Rs.40 crores. The

annual expenditure of CIDCO had never exceeded Rs.4 crores in the past. He wanted to push it up considerably. The Minister for Urban Development, the Chairman and the MD formed a cohesive team that worked smoothly and subsequently CIDCO's performance has improved considerably.

The bus section comprising of a large number of staff had become strongly unionised and had abused its bargaining power. This MD took step to establish it as a separate subsidiary company of CIDCO, called BMRTC, and locate its separate office at Konkan Bhavan, Belapur. He also dealt with the local residents of New Bombay very tactfully and the proposal of forming a municipality for the Vashi EDA is being processed at the government level. He has been instrumental in adoption of a land pricing policy for various users at Vashi. Since he has again centralized all decision making in his hands, the pressure on the Board has been considerably reduced.

Organisational Form and Institution Building

The foregoing analysis makes it abundantly clear that the periodic organisational form of CIDCO has not been necessarily tailor-made to efficiently handle the responsibilities entrusted. Whereas the range and complexity of CIDCO's task-space has been increasing steadily as the time has passed, process mechanisms of institution building have neither been introduced nor improved upon. Thus, in the absence of institutionalized forms of institution building processes,²⁰ CIDCO's performance has been heavily dependent upon individual dynamism of one or two Managing Directors. As and when they have left, the organisation has tended to lapse into its habitual hibernation.

20 For an insightful discussion of the processes of institution building, see, in particular, Eaton (1972), Esman and Bruhns (1966), Ganesh (1979) and Parikh (1981).

CHAPTER 4

Process of Development of New Bombay

CHAPTER 4

Process of Development of New Bombay

This chapter would overview the operationalization of New Bombay's vision into a concrete, visible, and living reality during the period 1970-1981 in an effort to determine the nature and extent of success achieved in developing the city of New Bombay. This analysis would be divided into seven sections : (1) Topography, and land use before the incorporation of the area as New Bombay; (2) Proposed land use; (3) Character and concept of the city; (4) Nodal and areal development sequence; (5) Land acquisition and rehabilitation of the project affected population; (6) Marketing of land, housing and other items; and (7) Development of a revolving fund and financially self-sustained growth of New Bombay.

I

New Bombay's Topography and Land Use Before Incorporation

The total notified area of New Bombay is 343.70 sq. kms. This consisted of 95 villages from Thane and Raigarh (formerly Kulaba) districts. 29 of these villages lie in Thane Tehsil in Thane District and 28 each in Panvel and Uran Tehsils of Raigarh District. A total of 24,878 families were living in the project area at the time of notification. About 98.76 sq. kms. (28.6 per cent) of the project area although lying within its boundaries was not to be acquired as this consisted of (a) municipal land (55.96 sq. kms. or 16.2 per cent), (b) MIDC, MSEB and Defence Department land (42.21 sq. kms. or 12.2 per cent), and (c) mis-

cellaneous land like Gaothan (0.59 sq. km. or 0.2 per cent). Total land slated to be acquired for the project amounted to 29,424 ha. This consisted of three distinct categories : (a) Government land : 10,137 ha. (34.5 per cent), (b) Salt pan land of the lessees and licensees : 2,720 ha. (9.2 per cent), and (c) private agricultural land : 16,567 ha. (56.3 per cent).

Another feature of existing physical structure of New Bombay was quite sizeable area of non-useable land. It was 4,321.06 ha. or 14.7 per cent of the total land to be acquired. This consisted of (a) green zone (47.62 ha.), (b) Khajan or low lying land (2,005 ha.), (c) forest (1,508.45 ha.), and (d) scattered pieces (759.99 ha.).¹

Both natural features and administrative boundaries determine the boundaries of New Bombay. The Thane creek is on the western side : Parsik hills govern the eastern boundary in the northern portion; in the middle section the eastern boundary is co-terminus with the administrative boundaries of some of the villages between Taloja and Panvel along the foot of Adai hills. On the southern side the boundary coincides with the southern limit of village Kalundre and then runs in a south-westerly direction upto village Change along the Karanja creek, leaving the Karnala hills range outside the project area. The confluence of Thane, Karanja and Dharamtar creeks makes the south-western segment. Most of the area along the western boundary is low lying land and covered by high tide. Quite a few salt pans are located here.

¹ Figures provided by a CIDCO handout published in 1980.

Some of the peaks of the Parsik hill rise to a height of 235 meters and above and have steep slopes on the sides in between the height of 20 and 200 meters. The middle portion of New Bombay is an area dotted with a number of small hills and some parts of the hills even rise to the height of 100 meters and above, the highest peak being 133 meters. Mora and Dronagiri hills are two other steeply rising hills in the south-west segment.

The islands of Nhava-Sheva, where the new port is to come up, are separated from the other portion of the project area by low lying land. A creek deep enough for berthing large ships, separates the two islands. Most of the areas in the southern part of Thane-Belapur belt along the creek side and the area to the east of Sheva and Uran upto the firm land on the south-east and also to the east of Karanja along the Karanja creek are being used as salt pans.

The Panvel creek, on which a major bridge has already been built and opened for traffic, is in the heart region. It surrounds the Waghivali island which is mostly covered at high tide; a number of small inlets enter further inside towards Taloja on the north, Kamothe on the east, Panvel on the south-east and Dapoli on the south. Kamothe is surrounded by such small creeks on three sides. Large portions of Kharghar, Kolhekhari, Navade Khar, and Pendhar villages are covered by low areas along the creek. Kalundari and Gadhi rivers join the Panvel creek on the southern side of Panvel town. The entire New Bombay area is Deccan lava country and abounds in rock outcrops throughout.

The foregoing features of New Bombay's terrain in combination with the gaseous emission discharged locally by the chemical industries located in the Thane-Belapur road and the Taloja estates of the MIDC on the one hand and air-borne pollutants brought from the Sion-Trombay-Chembur areas of Greater Bombay by a particular wind pattern on the other were causing air and water pollution at the time of notification. Consequently, creation of liveable environment in New Bombay was likely to be a costly, cumbersome and, at times, quite painful endeavour and put a brake on efforts to establish large sized manufacturing units. Per unit cost of development of land was surely going to increase making the task of marketing it a formidable proposition. As these constraints were evident to the writers of MARG piece and the CIDCO planners, it becomes evident that the choice of New Bombay's site was a logical and convenient step in the continued pursuit of Bombay's historical methodology of growth (CIDCO : 1973 : Sections 3.01-18). The cost, human and financial, involved in pushing the methodology was inconsequential to those who propelled it because it was going to be mainly shouldered by sections other than themselves.

II

Land Use Proposed and Implemented

Analysis of land use proposed for New Bombay, the changes made in it from time to time, and actual land use implemented enables us to determine the direction in which the New Bombay developers have been piloting the city. In particular, it makes it clear

how functional character of the city has undergone changes. For my analysis, I have taken 1973, 1975, and 1981 as the three time reference points. These points have their own significance : the Draft Plan was published in 1973; it was revised after hearing objections and suggestions in 1975; and New Bombay's development tempo was given a definite shift in 1981. Table 4.1 and 4.2 contain the land use data.² Some revealing conclusions emerge from Tables 4.1 and 4.2 :

1. About 50 per cent of New Bombay area was cultivable land in 1970. It is significant that the land use proposed by the 1973 Draft Plan left the MIDC industrial areas, the Gaothans, and the Municipal areas of Panvel and Uran totally untouched. Among these, the Gaothans, where the project affected population was resident, were going to be sucked into the emergent urban system in two distinct and subtle ways : one, they were to be "developed" under the Gaothan Improvement Scheme of CIDCO where the major initiative for the so-called spatial development was that of the NTDA; second, as the city developed, the economic pressure would squeeze the residents out as the 'market forces' would tend to assume control of the gradual spatial shift from non-commercial to commercial land uses. The same fate awaited the two municipalities, perhaps even at an earlier stage than the villages since the areal development strategy used by CIDCO emphasized pepping up growth in the vicinity of already developed nodes in New Bombay. The industrial users

2 The land use percentages in the Draft Plan (1973), the Revised Plan (1975), and Multi-Sector Report (1981) documents have been worked out by CIDCO planners using different base figures. To facilitate a comparison, we have re-computed the percentages from a common base, the total project area of 343.70 sq. kms.

Table 4.1

Land Use Proposed in New Bombay

Sl. No.	Land Use ¹	1973		1975		1981	
		Area (sq. kms.)	Perce- ntage	Area (sq. kms.)	Perce- ntage	Area (sq. kms.)	Percen- tage
1.	Sewage Farming	9.00	2.62	-	-	-	-
2.	Fisheries and Allied Activities	9.00	2.62	9.00	2.62	5.00	1.45
3.	Residential	60.76	17.68	51.95	15.1	55.35	16.10
4.	Commercial	13.85	4.03	11.83	3.44	11.83	3.44
5.	Industries	39.16	11.39	53.56	15.58	54.10	15.74
5.1	Service Industries and Warehousing	11.06	3.22	9.46	2.75	10.00	2.91
5.2	Port Based	-	-	16.00	4.66	16.00	4.66
5.3	MIDC Industrial Area	28.10	8.17	28.10	8.17	28.10	8.17
6.	Public and Semi-Public Institutions	48.21	13.97	27.05*	7.87	48.61	14.14
6.1	Port	12.00	3.49	12.00	3.49	12.00	3.49
6.2	Defence	4.56	1.33	4.56	1.33	8.06	2.34
6.3	ONGC	-	-	-	-	1.50	0.44
6.4	State Reserve Police and Other Civil Defence Agencies	4.10	1.19	-	-	-	-
6.5	Others	27.55	8.06	-	-	27.05	7.87
7.	University and Educational Institutions	4.10	1.19	3.50	1.02	3.50	1.02
8.	Transport	36.05	10.49	30.86	8.98	30.86	8.98
9.	Regional Parks	72.25	21.02	81.25**23.64	79.75	23.20	
10.	Parks & Play-grounds	17.12	4.98	14.64	4.26	-	-
11.	Sports Complex	-	-	3.40	0.99	-	-
12.	Low Lying Unusable Land	34.20	9.95	40.10	11.67	40.10	11.67
	Total	343.70	100	343.70	100	343.70	100

¹ Items re-grouped and 1973, 1975 percentages re-computed using the base of total project area.

* Includes Civil Defence also.

** Includes Sewage Farming also.

Source : For 1973 : CIDCO (1973 : 43); for 1975 : CIDCO (1975) ; and for 1981 : CIDCO (1981 : 6).

Table 4.2

Comparative Land Use Patterns in Some Indian Cities

(Area in Percentage)

Sl. No.	Land Use	New Bombay			Greater Bombay	Delhi	Bangla- lore	Kanpur
		1973	1975	1981				
1.	Residential	17.68	15.10	16.10	38.53	45.46	56.30	43.70
2.	Commercial	4.03	3.44	3.44	9.15	2.46	3.20	3.97
3.	Public & Semi- Public Insti- tutions	13.97	7.87	14.14	18.40	18.75	12.00	17.80
4.	Parks and Play Grounds	4.98	4.26	-	8.92	25.10	12.30	16.02
5.	Transport	10.49	8.98	8.98	12.20	8.21	N.A.	12.38
6.	Others	48.85	60.35	57.34	12.80	N.A.	16.20	6.13

Source : For New Bombay : Table 4.1; for other cities : CIDCO
(1973 : 43-44).

with their head-offices in Bombay's CBD and for whose benefit the MIDC had first made huge investments in developing the infrastructure in New Bombay, were being left not only undisturbed but the entire spatial alignment in New Bombay was decided suiting their convenience. The peasants and the fishermen, whose forefathers had first been pushed out of fishing islands to make room for the business class in Greater Bombay, were, on the other hand, once again being deprived of their only source of livelihood. Thus, the land use proposed provided further evidence of the methodology of passing the pains of development on to the poorest class.

2. The percentage computations of proposed land use in 1973 Draft Plan (pp.43-44) and their comparison with some of the Indian cities gave a misleading picture of the reality. First, the per-

centage computations were not made from the total project area notified (i.e. 343.70 sq. kms.) but the area available for land uses defined in the structure plan after leaving out several major land allocations. By resorting to this subterfuge heavy allocation to some land uses such as industry were somewhat concealed. Second, these debatable percentages were then compared with the percentages of existing but old cities completely glossing over the fact that comparisons between totally new and planned cities and old and relatively unplanned cities were hardly appropriate. New Bombay was just beginning to take shape in 1973 whereas the then land use of the compared older cities had been the net outcome of, in some cases, centuries of growth impulses. Whereas the land use in case of New Bombay was only a resolve for planning, the same in case of other cities was an empirical reality. Third, even if one were to ignore the inappropriateness of the comparison, the fact still remained that New Bombay, a planned city, was not emerging a clear winner in the exercise on many desirable items.

3. The land use pattern in New Bombay was significantly modified in 1981 through the Multi-Sector Projects Report. This modification could be profitably seen in terms of (a) items added in 1981, (b) items removed, (c) items with reduced land allocations, (d) items with increased land allocations, and (e) items kept unchanged. The 1973-1981 journey of land use patterns in New Bombay reveals the direction in which things are moving now. Items added in 1981 include land for ONGC, which was a post-Bombay High development not seen in 1973, and port-based industries.

overlooked in 1973. The latter gets a significant 4.66 per cent land and its siting is still a matter of debate between CIDCO and the BPT. Items removed from the 1973 list include sewage farming (2.63%), State Reserve Police and civil defence institutions (1.19%) and parks and playgrounds (4.98%). While the police and civil defence agencies might still be accommodated under the 'public and semi-public institutions' category of landuse, the removal of the other two items is a serious issue in the peculiar environmental context of New Bombay. To the extent air pollution is already a major problem in New Bombay, total elimination of 'parks and playgrounds' is not going to help in creating a better living environment in New Bombay. Items reduced and increased reveal only marginal shifts but their linearity is clear enough : land reduced from essential uses such as residential, commercial, service industries, public institutions was being allocated to regional parks, defence and, of all the items, low lying lands. Items kept untouched were MIDC industrial areas and port.

4. The foregoing points become academic issues once it is noted that there is not much of a correlation between the land use proposed by CIDCO for New Bombay from time to time and its actual land use policy followed during the last ten years. It is evident that the latter has proceeded independent of the former under the pressure of various forces i.e. the central and state governments, their statutory agencies, and business interests. There are mix-ups in the actual siting of land allocations overlapping land uses. The ONGC land allocation, for example, is partly on the Nhava island and partly in the regional park located near Uran. The

former has led to a bitter fight between the ONGC and the BPT involving adequacy of land left for the port of Nhava-Sheva. The latter knocks off green areas which, with the elimination of separate allocations under 'parks and playgrounds' item, tend to make New Bombay a lopsided city from its initial phase itself.

III

Character and Concept of the City

If one were to entirely go by the rhetoric contained in the BMPRB, state government and CIDCO documents, New Bombay's character and concept emerges quite a confusing one. The city itself was suggested to restructure metropolitan growth of this area in a way that will alleviate the growing ills of the old city (CIDCO : 1973 : 15). In deciding the planning brief, in particular the mix of the economic base, it meant, as already seen, that New Bombay was not independent and self-contained city with its own identity. On the other hand, historical necessity made it a supplemental city being developed on considerations others than its own. In visualizing the future of New Bombay, both the Bombay Metropolitan Regional Plan and CIDCO envisaged it as a city of metropolitan character, consisting mainly of tertiary employment in the shape of white collar jobs. The satellite port at Nhava-Sheva and relocation of the government and quasi-government offices were considered basic inputs for the city's growth.³ To achieve a target of one million population by 1981 and two

3 Comment of the BMRDA on the Draft Development Plan for New Bombay, communicated to the Government of Maharashtra in December 1977, p.2.

million by 1991 CIDCO had made various assumptions of relocation of jobs from Greater to New Bombay and generation of about 5.4 lakh jobs in New Bombay itself in various basic and non-basic manufacturing units (Tables 4.3 - 4.5). As the Urban Growth Model (Parikh : 1973), used as a key planning input in drafting the New Bombay proposals, predicted very significantly, port was an essential growth propellor in the Bombay metropolitan area. It was more so in case of New Bombay. The Nhava-Sheva port was, however, only a possibility in 1973 and was included in the Sixth Five Year Plan only in December 1981.⁴

The 1973 Draft Development Plan for New Bombay wanted a rigid control over industrial growth in New Bombay, and, as its study on industrial location concluded (TECS : 1972) CIDCO wanted (a) a freeze on industrial employment in Greater Bombay at 1969 levels; (b) a ceiling of 2000 jobs in the employment in the chemical complex in TTC industrial area in New Bombay between 1974 and 1980 and a ban on new units; and (c) location of port-oriented industries in New Bombay. It allotted only about 600 ha. of land for Export Processing Zone. This was not accepted by the Maharashtra Government. By 1975, CIDCO was forced to modify its industrial location policy for New Bombay - and consequently the economic base of the city - and allow port-based industries on 1600 ha. Further, the State government decided in August 1977 to allow location of small scale industries and port-based industries in the unallotted land of the Trans Taloja Chemical industrial

⁴ Announcement by Minister of Transport and Shipping in the Rajya Sabha on 23 December 1981.

Table 4.3

Projected Employment Pattern in New Bombay in 1991

Sl. No.	Item	Number of Jobs
a.	Basic Manufacturing	20,000
b.	Non-basic Manufacturing	75,000
c.	Private non-manufacturing	1,50,000
d.	Public non-manufacturing	1,50,000
e.	Self employed	1,00,000
f.	Traffic handling at port	10,000
g.	Export processing zone	8,500
h.	Ship-building	10,000
i.	Ancillary units	10,000
Sub-Total (a-i)		5,43,500
j.	Gap to be filled (by relocating government and quasi-government jobs from Greater to New Bombay)	1,86,500
k.	No. of jobs in government and quasi-government bodies by 1981	8,25,000
l.	K as percentage of jobs in this sector by 1991	22.6
m.	K as percentage of jobs in this sector + non manufacturing private sector	11.3

Source : CIDCO (1973 : 36).

Table 4.4

Projected Basic and Service Jobs in New Bombay :
1981-82 - 1985-86

S.l. No.	Location	Type of Jobs	Total Jobs in 1978	Projected Jobs in 1985-86
1. TTC	Industries	28,000	47,000	
2. Taloja	Industries	5,000	22,000	
3. Panvel & Jawahar	Industries	1,000	3,000	
4. Nhava Industrial Area	Industries	1,000	10,000	
5. Uran-Navghar Area	Industries			
6. Uran-Navghar	Defence	-	1,000	
7. Kalamboli	Warehousing and Market Yard	-	15,000	
8. Turbhe	APM	300	20,000	
9. Vashi	Office-cum-DBC Industrial Jobs	500 600	10,000 1,000	
10. Belapur	Office-cum-Commer- cial	1,400	20,000	
11. Nerul	Institutions	-	3,000	
12. In other nodes	Service Industries	-	5,000	
13. Other Areas	Agriculture	27,000	13,500	
	Total Basic Jobs	64,800	1,70,500	
	Total Service Jobs	33,000 (34%)	1,13,500 (40%)	
	Total Jobs	97,800	2,84,000	

Source : CIDCO (1981 : 18-19).

Table 4.5

Projected Population in New Bombay : 1985-86*

Area	Existing Population	Projected Population in 1985-86
I. Nodes		
1. Vashi	25,000	1,00,000
2. Nerul	Nil	1,00,000
3. Belapur	4,000	70,000
4. New Panvel	Nil	1,50,000
5. Kalamboli	Nil	30,000
6. Airoli	Nil	20,000
7. New Uran	Nil	30,000
	29,000	5,00,000
II. Existing Villages	1,48,000	2,06,000
III. Existing Towns (Panvel & Uran)	50,000	64,000
IV. Other Areas (slum pockets)	30,000	40,000
Total	2,57,000	8,10,000

* Assumes a relationship between employment and population at about 35%.

Source : CIDCO (1981 : 19).

area in Bombay. Between 1977 and 1981 location of some by the major units in New Bombay has been made by the Maharashtra government.⁵ Thus, the adhoc, supplemental, and dovetailed identity of New Bombay was not only the fact in 1973 when the project began : it has been so during its ten year period of growth as well. However, the subsequent developments have tended to shift New

5 Notable among these are chemical, fertilizer and thermal power plants.

Bombay's growth pattern from 'implanted tertiary growth and severely restricted industrial growth', as the Draft Plan enunciated, to 'liberal industrial growth and substantial dependence on Greater Bombay for tertiary services'.⁶ Such a dependence on Greater Bombay was likely to perpetuate the pattern of southernly concentration of such activities in Bombay further worsening the situation, something just the contrary to the 'advertized logic' of New Bombay. It is a moot point whether post 1973 decisions have increased independent and self-contained capacity of New Bombay to develop itself.

Conceptually, the development strategy outlined by the approved New Bombay plan is substantially following the MARG piece layout. The New Bombay city structure plan is a series of nodal settlement stung along a MRT line. The spread of a node is decided by the walking distance considered reasonable from MRT stop and the total estimated populations by such considerations like scale economies determining the threshold size. On this basis, each node is expected to eventually have about one lakh population. New Bombay is expected to contain 20 such nodes in its ultimate development stage with the total city having 2 million population. The CBD located in the heart around Belapur will be multi-nucleated.

Each residential node is again organised as a series of sectors of approximately 5000 population, generally self-contained in terms of social facilities and a reasonable distance from the bus stop.

6 Comment of the BMRDA on New Bombay Draft Plan, p.5.

The pedestrian environment is achieved by linking various social elements like schools, hospitals, primary health centres, shopping, parks, and playgrounds to a cluster of houses by pedestrian spines segregated from roads serving the vehicular traffic. The New Bombay plan provides for MRT systems which have been planned through the centroids of various residential and employment nodes, in which the system of surface trains and city motorways feeds each other (Table 4.6). To cater to the travel demand, initially for giving quick access to the proposed metro-centre and thereby induce growth in the area and later for ensuring the benefits arising out of economy of agglomeration of activities in the region two rail links between the two cities are planned. One would connect Mankhurd to Panvel across the Thane creek via the new CBD at Belapur : the other would link Kalwa with Turbhe.

Despite claims of usage of 'better planning concept' leading to reduction of costs and optimization of benefits for both Bombay and New Bombay (CIDCO : 1981 : 2) the basic planning methodology used in New Bombay is certainly not all that sound. Nor the planning proposals seem to have learnt anything from Greater Bombay's past history. The structure of the city is on north-south axis which, in time to come, would reproduce the circulatory problems currently the bane of Greater Bombay. The multi-nucleated CBD located at Belapur, would not be really distributing the flow of trips since it is a single locale multi-block idea.

Since New Bombay would be mainly tertiary sector based city and CIDCO does not have a decisive say in the location of offices in

Table 4.6

Transportation Networks for New Bombay : 1973 and 1975

Type of Structure	Cost per Km. (Rs. Crores)	1973		1975	
		Length Nos.	Cost (Rs. Crores)	Length Nos.	Cost (Rs. Crores)
1. MRT, 4 Track Railway	2.4	56 kms. 134.400		56 kms. 134.400	
2. MRT, 2 Track Railway	1.4	63 kms. 88.200		22 kms. 30.800	
Total for MRT		119 kms. 222.600		78 kms. 165.200	
3. Motorways	0.25	97 kms. 24.250		95 kms. 23.750	
4. Busway	0.25	10 kms. 2.500		-	-
5. Arterials	0.20	50 kms. 10.000		55 kms. 11.000	
Total for Roads		157 kms. 36.750		150 kms. 34.750	
6. Major and Medium Bridges a) Road Bridges b) Railway Bridges		8 Nos. 32.000 5 Nos. 8.500		8 Nos. 32.000 6 Nos. 10.000	
Total for Bridges		13 Nos. 40.500		14 Nos. 42.000	
7. Major Road Intersections 1.0		12 Nos. 12.000		12 Nos. 12.000	
Total Intra-City Transport Network (1-7)			311.850		253.950
8. National Highways & State Highways	0.25	80 kms. 20.000		74 kms. 18.500	
9. Inter-City Railways (2 track)	1.4	48 kms. 67.200		48 kms. 67.200	
Total Inter-City Transport Network (8-9)		128 Kms. 87.200		122 Kms. 85.700	
10. Total Cost (1-9)			399.050		339.650

Note : Base year for cost estimates is March 1974. Cost of tunnelling in the 1973 plan was not included.

Source : CIDCO (1975).

New Bombay, its hope of putting jobs and housing in each other's vicinity and thereby reducing cost and commuting cannot be practised on a large enough a scale to make a major impact. Experiments at APMC Turbhe, CBD Belapur, and Steel and Warehousing Complex Kalamboli in New Bombay have, at best, only peripheral value and should not be given exaggerated rating as conceptual refinements. New Bombay's transport system too has been worked out keeping the overall metropolitan growth requirements in view rather than what its own planned internal alignment of city's components demand.

IV

Nodal and Areal Development Sequence

Attracting such migrants as would have otherwise gone to Greater Bombay and diversion of selected activities from there to decongest it involved creation of such an identity for New Bombay which would have operated both the push and pull factors. The CIDCO was not in a position to decisively influence the forces controlling these two. In addition, all the 20 planned nodes and areas outside them could not be, financial and other institutional capacity-wise, developed in one sweep. Consequently, the CIDCO had to evolve a strategy of sequential development of residential and work nodes and areas outside them facilitating differential flows, in and out, to different directions within BMR and beyond.

The MARG piece had specified six stages in the development of New Bombay. These were : Stage 1 : building of the Thane creek bridge for stimulating early development; Stage 2 : building of

early development area just near the bridge (Vashi); Stage 3 : industrial development along the road connecting it to Thane with the early development area providing an encouragement to this process; Stage 4 : building of the business centre and damming of the Panvel creek; Stage 5 : construction of docks near the business centre further pepping up its growth; and Stage 6 : construction of new bridges, development of Wadala and Trombay areas to facilitate greater inter-action between old and new Bombay (Correa, et al : 1966 : 42-43).

Impeded as CIDCO was, evolution of a very well defined and manageable strategy became an outright gamble, one totally dependent upon the nature and extent of support it received from the central and state governments, their key agencies, the manufacturing, trade and commercial interests, and the existing and potential population. This strategy assumed that support would be forthcoming. As would be evident a trifle later, many of these expectations went hay-wire affecting the fortunes of the project in a significant fashion.

The evolved initial strategy consisted of development of a residential node at Vashi, an agricultural produce market (APM) node nearby at Turbhe, a CBD at Belapur, an extended residential node near Panvel, the development of the Nhava-Sheva port, and development of vital physical infrastructure necessary for the minimal operation of the city structure. Siting of each node had a specific logic in the CIDCO's view. For example, Vashi, located just across the Thane creek bridge connecting the old and new cities, was expected to be a residential complex where the existing

workers in the organised sector industries at Thane-Belapur road would live. The APM was meant to accommodate the diverted vegetable and fruit markets then bursting at their seems in south Bombay. New Panvel was to cater to the housing needs of the persons working in the units of Panvel-Taloja industrial estate. The CBD at Belapur was to divert the bulgeoning growth of the tertiary sector in the Backbay Reclamation at Nariman Point. The Nhava-Sheva port was expected to relieve pressure on the overworked Bombay harbour. This was minimum package. And yet, its magnitude was staggering. The CIDCO had to phase it and, in some cases, farm out segments to concerned agencies. It is essential to note the progress made on some important projects among these during the last 10 years.⁷

Vashi node covers an area of 586 ha. Its first phase consists of eight sectors. Todate about 112 ha. have been reclaimed on which 3078 houses have been constructed and occupied. Another 2487 houses are nearing completion. A number of developed plots have been sold to the individuals and cooperative societies. The present population of Vashi is about 36000. The node has two major schools, and a 80 bed hospital functional. Additional supportive social infrastructure, and civic amenities are also available. A district business centre is likely to come up during the second phase of its development which the CIDCO is hoping to complete by 1982. The CIDCO has not only developed the area using the Dutch method of

⁷ These generally relate to projects aiming to attract potential migrants to Greater Bombay. Relocation projects are covered in the next chapter.

reclamation⁸ and constructed housing here : it also initially built the two media school and 80 bed hospital and administered them before marketing them to well-established voluntary agencies to recover their costs. The node has been an exasperating and exhilarating experience to the CIDCO at different points of time. The exasperation involved in developing almost every single item in this node - from land to social infrastructure and civic amenities - and administer them. When it came to recover its costs by marketing housing in March 1973, the CIDCO found to its horror that the targetted group was not in a position to buy the offered 842 housing units. Subsequent exercises in marketing housing and other land uses have fared relatively better. Now the node is at a point in its development that marketing does not appear to be a problem.

The CIDCO had decided that development of 400 ha. New Panvel node would be attempted largely through private efforts. As such, it offered 1000 developed plots to the public which were promptly snapped up by the estate developers and property speculators. Not much of expected development has materialized so far although over six years have elapsed thereafter. To pep up New Panvel's growth, CIDCO located the iron and steel relocation project in 1980 very near at Kalamboli. It has also now decided to take up construction itself in New Panvel to trigger the growth of new node.

During the first 10 years, the CIDCO's nodal and areal development strategy in New Bombay was using the existing industrial base

⁸ The area is below mean sea level and in the absence of protective dyke could get submerged at high tides. One requirement is to have high pressure pumps to flush out all liquids into the Thane creek.

points (with the solitary exception of CBD Belapur) as props. Its annual average expenditure on the project was Rs.4.16 crores. By January 1980 the CIDCO itself had come to the realistic conclusion that its tempo of development work in New Bombay was just not sufficient; it had to be considerably pepped up. Keeping the changed context in view, therefore, it prepared its 1980-85 five year strategy with an estimated outlay of Rs.385.83 to be spent by the CIDCO and Rs.106.42 crores to be spent by the Central Ministries of Railways and Communications. This strategy involved development of four new nodes (Airoli near Thane, Nerul between Turbhe and Belapur, Kalamboli near Panvel and Uran near existing town of Uran), expansion of existing nodes at Vashi, APM, and CBD Belapur, laying of two rail links (Mankhurd-Belapur, Kalwa-Turbhe), inter and intra-city bus system, and the Nhava-Sheva port and port based industries. There is hardly any financial commitment from the concerned agencies about the non-CIDCO component of this plan : CIDCO itself hopes to manage only 50 per cent of funds for implementing the CIDCO part of the plan, the other half hopefully coming from the State government and the World Bank.

V

Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation of the Project
Affected Population

The New Bombay Development Plan had a twenty year (1971-1991) perspective within which the CIDCO as NTDA had to develop 20 nodes where two million population had to live and a close interactional relationship between New and Greater Bombay had to emerge. Some

of its areas, as indicated earlier, were already functioning as work nodes : certain others were primarily earmarked, under the proposed land use plan, for the bulk land using institutions which were to undertake specialized development activity relatively independent of the CIDCO's schedule of activities. The CIDCO task, however, involved exercise of certain options in acquiring, developing, and disposing land throughout the length and breadth of the project area in such a fashion as to achieve the specific nodal and city structure goals and priorities. Given unlimited resources, it would have been open to acquire the entire project notified land at the earliest possible opportunity since this would have been convenient, cheaper and ideal for subsequent planning, use and disposal. The CIDCO, however, had very limited resources to begin with : in addition it was committed to develop a self-sustaining capacity financially using land as a resource.

A third complication was that land acquisition was a very slow, zig-zag and expensive process. Project affected people are not necessarily very keen to be dispossessed of their land : in this case the area was a stronghold of the Peasants and Workers' Party (PWP) with a very militant leadership. The PWP not only opposed land acquisition : it was totally against the very concept and visualization of the New Bombay project. This opposition was fanned from outside by two important set of forces. One such force consisted of powerful leaders of the ruling Congress Party from Thane and Raigarh districts some of whom occupied crucial governmental and party positions. This force had large areas of Benami lands in the New Bombay area and had a vested interest in delaying

acquisition of land since delay almost always meant payment of compensation at enhanced rates.⁹ The second set consisted of planners, academicians, journalists, political leaders and public men based in Greater Bombay. It considered development of New Bombay a wrong methodological solution to the problems primarily created by acute centralisation of manufacturing, trading and commercial activities in the BMR. The project affected people of New Bombay expressed their opposition in varied forms ranging from simple arguments to court cases to physical assault of the CIDCO officials and dumping of construction equipment and materials into the Panvel creek. In the initial period (1970-1972), the CIDCO had to deploy a large police contingent in the more volatile areas (i.e. Belapur) to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. Inevitably, this opposition caused enormous delay in the acquisition process.

A fourth factor was the inter-locutory nature of the twin processes of land acquisition and rehabilitation of the project affected people. The CIDCO was committed to spend five per cent of project budget on an elaborately worked out package of rehabilitation programmes. Acquisition of larger chunks of private agricultural land and salt pans not only involved payment of compensation¹⁰ ; it also involved expenses in rehabilitating the affected people. One theoretical option was to concentrate on government lands.

⁹ One motive force active in the interest of both opposition and ruling parties was a spate of elections held. Between 1970-1980, elections to the Assembly, Parliament, Zilla Parishad, and Gram Panchayat have been held in the area apart from some mid-term ones.

¹⁰ Actually, even the acquisition of government land was also not free. Only the per unit cost was lower and the process itself was somewhat easier and tension-free.

However, in reality this could not be practised due to two major considerations : (i) single categories of lands were not sited in large enough chunks to be sufficient to develop a node; and (ii) it was necessary to acquire land at different places in the project area to facilitate movement of other agencies into the area and to start work on projects of vital nature to the city structure as against nodal requirements. Because of the foregoing, the CIDCO was forced to adopt an ad hoc approach to the land acquisition issue in an effort to ensure better pursuit of project goals for a considerable period. This policy ambivalence reflected itself in the turbulence negotiation strategies worked out and employed by different Managing Directors.¹¹ It is only in the beginning of 1980 - a full ten years after the launching of the project - that the policy has become definitive in terms of acquisition, quantum needed for use during the next 10 years, and the residual to be denotified. By a combination of old accumulated and new set of circumstances, the 'take off' stage seems to have materialized where unfavourable forces appear to be now reversing their positions. The project affected people have, for instance, been forced to accept the quantum of compensation and the inevitability of the project; the reluctant trade and commercial interests (i.e. agricultural produce, iron and steel, etc.) are willing to

¹¹ These could be grouped as follows : (1) D'Souza : carrot and stick strategy of firmness with a comprehensive rehabilitation package; (2) Nayak : political strategy of winning over the hard core at select places through intensive personal contacts and intermediary interventions; (3) Salvi : encashing ritual affinity with enhanced rate of compensation; (4) Dhawle : higher rates of compensation at the expense of the entire range of rehabilitation programmes; (5) Gupta : linking up land acquisition with land use and denotification of land not needed during the next 10 years.

purchase plots, shops, housing in New Bombay : Nhava-Sheva port idea has been approved in principle; and land outside the nodes is being bought by major land users to yield large enough funds for the CIDCO to undertake an accelerated programme of New Bombay's development.¹²

Data contained in Tables 4.7 to 4.12 give some indication of the magnitude of the task spread in land acquisition and rehabilitation and the extent of progress made by the CIDCO. On their face value some of the figures such as the percentage of project land acquired (about 22), percentage of acquired land used (about 21) and percentage of project land expected to be denotified (about 36) tend to give a very misleading picture of the tasks accomplished. However, these should be juxtaposed with matching figures such as percentage of private land in the project area (about 56 : to reveal the fierceness of opposition and obstacles put in land acquisition), amount of compensation paid (Rs.6.39 crores), rate of per acre compensation (pegged at Rs.15000 per acre since 1979), comprehensive range of rehabilitation programmes undertaken (training, placement, loans, health and educational programmes, etc.) and amount spent on rehabilitation (Rs.1.63 crores) to correct this distortion. To this should also be added the consideration that projects of this nature have a long gestation period where in the initial period quite large parts of capital become locked forcing a slow down of the tempo of project activities.

12 The telling effects of Greater Bombay's 8.2 million present population on quality of urban life have also begun to sink on crucial decisions makers.

Table 4.7

Notified Lands and Their Acquisition in New Bombay
as on 31 August 1980

Particulars	Area (in ha.)			
	Thane	Panvel	Uran	Total
<u>Land Notified</u>				
1. Government land	4599	3853	1685	10137
2. Private agricultural land	2214	9666	4688	16567
3. Salt pan land	878	14	1828	2720
Total	7691	13532	8201	29424
<u>Land Acquired</u>				
1. Government land	3057.68	857.97	85.39	4001.04
2. Private agricultural land				
2.1 By urgency clause	0.18	30.85	183.04	214.07
2.2 By declaration of awards	658.33	850.50	-	1508.82
2.3 By voluntary surrender	55.60	607.45	11.08	674.14
Sub-Total (2)	714.10	1488.81	194.12	2397.03
Total	3771.78	2346.78	279.51	6398.07

Source : CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

Table 4.8

Land Utilized by CIDCO As on 31 August 1980

Particulars	Area (in ha.)			
	Thane	Panvel	Uran	Total
<u>Land Utilized so far</u>				
1. Private land	344.05	344.01	170.08	848.09
2. Government land	480.02	22.65	12.28	514.95
Total	824.07	356.66	182.31	1363.04
<u>Land Likely to be Utilized in Near Future</u>				
1. Private land	240.99	292.03	-	533.02
2. Government land	180.53	0.20	0.22	180.95
Total	421.52	292.23	0.22	713.97
<u>Area Proposed to be Used within Next Ten Years (inclus- ive of land already acquired)</u>				
1. Area (ha.)	227	4037	4149	10460
2. Number of villages	25	22	20	67
<u>Area Proposed for Denotifi- cation Being not Required Within Next Ten Years</u>				
1. Area (ha.)	815	5645	4149	10609
2. Number of villages	21	34	23	78

Source : CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

Table 4.9

Land Acquisition and Use Ratios

Particulars	Percentage
1. Total agricultural land as percentage of total project land	56.3
2. Total land acquired as percentage of total project land	21.7
3. Total government land acquired as percentage of total government land	39.5
4. Total private land acquired as percentage of total private land	14.5
5. Private land utilized as percentage of private land acquired	35.4
6. Government land utilized as percentage of government land acquired	12.9
7. Total land utilized as percentage of total land acquired	21.3
8. Area proposed for development in next ten years	35.5
9. Land proposed to be denotified as percentage of total project land	36.1

Table 4.10

Rehabilitation Task as on 31 August 1980

Particulars	Thane	Panvel	Uran	Total
1. Families affected	8037	9817	7024	24878
2. Families from whom land actually acquired	1843	1457	857	4157
3. Families (out of 2 above) allowed to cultivate	809	857	13	1679
4. Families whose land submerged	3	302	-	305
5. Families dispossessed actually				
a) Partly	750	180	752	1692
b) Wholly	281	108	92	481
6. Rehabilitation not required for families dispossessed				
a) Already in service	178	39	241	458
b) Engaged in business	251	42	38	331
c) Residing outside project area	174	19	77	270
d) Old age	22	-	3	25
7. Remaining families to whom benefits need to be given	406	198	485	1089
8. Families (from 7 above) to whom benefits given				
a) Placement	297	106	308	711
b) Training	33	27	44	104
c) Other benefits	13	1	10	24
9. Families to whom benefits need to be given	63	64	123	250

Source : CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

Table 4.11

Progress of Rehabilitation Schemes as on 31 August 1980

Particulars	Thane	Panvel	Uran	Total
1. Boys trained				
a) CIDCO TTCs	613	669	821	2203
b) Through other agencies	59	511	194	764
2. Placement				
a) Ist category jobs				711
b) II, III and IV category jobs				2814
Total				3527
3. Placement areas				
a) Within New Bombay	1109	867	773	2749
b) Outside project area	95	318	365	778
Total	1204	1185	1138	3527
4. Shop loans scheme				
a) Persons	6	39	42	87
b) Amount (Rs.)	11400	56300	56850	124600
5. Social amenities (road, water supply, community centre, latrines, cattle ground, washing plate, bus stands, T.V. set) (Rs. lakhs spent)	8.56	1.78	2.90	13.24
6. Primary education (grants-in-aid : Rs. lakhs)	2.57	3.90	2.80	9.27
7. Secondary education (expenditure in Rs. lakhs)	0.97	0.52	1.70	3.19
8. College education (expenditure in Rs. lakhs)	0.94	15.29	5.44	21.67
9. Health and nutrition scheme (in Rs. lakhs)	-	-	-	1.02

Source : CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

Table 4.12

Expenses on Land Compensation and Rehabilitation
as on 31 August 1980

1. Total amount paid as compensation	:	Rs.6.39 crores
2. Rate sanctioned		
a) Non-agricultural rates	:	from Rs.1 to 12 per M ² in Thane and Panvel
b) Agricultural rates	:	from Rs.1000 to 7500 per acre in Panvel and Uran
c) Ex-gratia	:	to make up the total amount at the rate of Rs.15000 per acre
3. Rehabilitation expenses incurred (Rs. lakhs)		
a) Salaries of staff in rehabilitation section		23.85
b) Salaries of training staff		25.28
c) Rehabilitation schemes		114.07
Total		163.20

Marketing Effort in New Bombay

Marketing history of New Bombay, contained in Table 4.13, reveals the motives, and methodology of CIDCO's goal realization better than some of the claims made in the annual and periodical reports, and publicity material. For, it is through them that the myths can be separated from the practised realities.¹³ Major conclusions emerging from Table 4.13 are :

1. Historically, CIDCO appears to have followed three distinct approaches to the development of housing, commercial items, and land for marketing purposes in New Bombay at three distinct stages in its history so far. These were mainly finalized by the CIDCO Managing Directors Mr. D'Souza, Mr.Dhavle and Mr. Gupta respectively. Mr. D'Souza's approach was to launch something quickly in Vashi EDA so that development in New Bombay was triggered even when the Draft New Bombay Plan was under preparation. In this approach, housing, social services, and shopping, etc. at Vashi and even APMC Turbhe were first developed without conducting any serious demand survey and these were sought to be disposed off as finished products to only a strictly defined target group. As an initial experiment, this approach landed CIDCO in serious economic trouble with most of its funds locked in one node and the target group(s)

13 It is significant that CIDCO has not published the results of its marketing effort in any revealing manner. On the other hand, the entire marketing data is treated confidential and was officially not available for this study. In a way this was a help since the data was then obtained from and cross checked with several sources which made its reliability a strong point.

Table 4.13

Marketing History of New Bombay Project

Place and Offered Item, Area, Eligibility and Other Response
Time Number and Prices (Rs.) Conditions and Method of Sale

1

2

3

4

VASHI

Sector I Shops; 23-26 M², 52 units;
June 1973 Not specified

Open to all but user for each shop; owners to form a cooperative to transfer the land; outright payment. No upset price; bids invited; multiple bids allowed; sale to highest bidder

125

Sector I Tenements; B, C, E June 1973 type; 800 units (A & D types not offered); 14,000 - 40,000

For employees of units in trans-Thane industrial belt, APM, units to be located in APM or MIDC area, and employees of CIDCO, MAFCO; first come first served registration; BARC and Chembur area.

draw of lots for allotment; not needed due to poor response

Sectors 6, Row houses; 45-104 M²,
7 Types I to VI;
1975 34,000 - 86,600

Except RH VI, hire purchase facility available; also on outright basis; to all; completion promised 1976; draw of lots for allotment and first come first served registration.

Table 4.13 (contd.)

	1	2	3	4
Sector 8 Dec. 1975	Bungalow plots; 200-500 M ² ; 51 units; 150/ 200 per M ² depending on size	Priority to project affected people and those working in New Bombay; others could apply; plots by 1976 February; first come first served	Very poor	
Sector 2 March 1976	Site & Service; 3.16-25 38 M ² Type I to IV; 3000-7600	For EWS (below Rs. 350 p.m.); hire purchase (20 years payment with interest at 5.5%) + outright; preference to project affected; 10 years' stay in Bombay/New Bombay necessary; possession in March 1977; first come first served; allotment by lots.	Scramble; bogus self-employed, residence certificates produced; 'Benami' bookings; within 1 year of allotment proposals for first floor and some even built them unauthorised. Most such houses are ground plus plots gone to Sindhis, Punjabis, and sold later.	
Sector 6 Jan. 1977	Tenements B ¹ Type 22 M ² 88 units; 13,500-14,500	Preference to those residing in New Bombay for last 10 years; outright as well as hire purchase; first come first served.	Taken mostly by the BARC employees due to loan facility by their institution.	
Sectors 4, Jan. 1977	Shops; 9.54-30.17 M ² ; 40 units; not specified	Reservation of shops for handicapped (2); scheduled high price as business castes (4); and project affected (6); sealed tenders	Did not fetch a very high price as business for the shops was not much.	
Sector 8 May 1977	Bungalow plots; 200-400 M ² ; 150-200 M ² minimum upset price	Put in market to get the feel; upwards bids invited; lots if necessary	Fetched very good prices	

contd....

Table 4.13 (contd.)

	1	2	3	4
127				
Sector I June 1977	Tenements; 13-16-46 M ² ; A for EWS, B-2, and 3 for Very good A, B-2, B-3, C-1, C-2, C-2A, C-2B, RH I; 6600- 35600	LIG, C-1, C-2A, C-2B and RH-1 for MIG; outright as well as hire purchase, open to all; interest at 5%, to 10½%; first come first served basis.		
Sector 18 Oct. 1978	Houses; 2F Types 60 M ² + 12.80 M ² balcony + 6 M ² terrace in some; 67,500- 70,000	Outright basis, Rs.5000 on Very good application, rest in 3 monthly instalments before possession; houses by May 1978; first come first served basis		
Sector 18 Oct. 1978	Coop. Housing Society Plots; 1080 M ² ; Bids	Open to all, subject to proof of 10 years domicile in Bombay/New Bombay; FSI : 1.2; by bidding	Moderately good	
Sector 6 Oct. 1978	Shops; 29 M ² , 24 units 24 units of shops 1 M ² , Restraurant of 92 M ² ; bids	User specified; one bidder Moderate one shop only, tender documents non-transferable; quotation from individuals, firms, coops, trusts, cos allowed, 15 years stay in Maharashtra essential (due to pressure of Shiv Sena); highest bidder to get.		
Sector 8 Sept. 1979	Bunglow plots (seaside); Open to all; highest 400 M ² ; 2 units; bids bidder	Fetched Rs.700 M ² and more		
Sector 8 March 1980	Bunglow plots, 200 M ² ; bids	Usable for residence and Good customary home occupations (medical, clinics, dispensary, advocate office) but office area only 20 M ² ; highest bidder		

contd....

Table 4.13 (contd.)

	1	2	3	4
Sector 8 May 1980	Bungalow plots; 452 for corner plots; 356 for adjoining plots	FSI of 1; Rs.5000 as EMD with application, balance in two instalments on allotment; 50% profit to CIDCO if plot resold; first come first served	Good	
Sectors 3, 4 1980	Plots for pooled housing; 500-900 M ² , 85 M ²	FSI of 1.2; permissible tenements per plot given; usual residential users allowed (as in serial No. 14); open to all; 20% of lease premium as EMD, bala- nce in three instalments from allotment; first come first served (but some obviously got the informa- tion much in advance and produced previously dated DD to claim the deals)	This became a scandal	
District Business Centre Area June 1981	Plots; 12 commercial 32 residential 12 residential + shopp- ing 8 residential 64 units total; 600 M ² , 680 M ² , 700 M ² , 650 M ² .	FSI of 2; EMD of Rs.1 lakh; first come first served	Big builders of Bombay (Raheja, Chedda) entered in a big way; alleged favouritism; a Committee of the state legislature appointed to probe it said that CIDCO officials were over enthusiastic and future deals should be by tenders	
Sector 8 Sept. 1981	Plots, 400 M ² ; not fixed	Open to all; if bid is attractive to all bidders asked if they are interes- ted to purchase plots at that price in Sector 8; open bids to test the mar- ket for possible price; draw of lots for allotment	Good	

Table 4.13 (contd.)

1	2	3	4
<u>APM Turbhe & Nearby Areas</u>			
Turbhe Dec. 1979	Service Industry Plots 960 M ² 25- 600 M ² ; bids	Open to all; by sealed tender to the highest bidder	Not very good but fair
(1 km. east of Vashi)			
Aug. 1977			
A.P.M.C. May 1980	Shops; 56 M ² , upset price 90,000	Industries specified; power requirement mentioned, open to all; scaled offers invited; draw of lots if more than one offer for same plot	Very good; generally remain to be sold and would be advertised again
129			
A.P.M.C. June 1980	Commercial plots; User specified (lodging, boarding ing and boarding Rs. 25,000; 50% payment within one (1450 M ²), 2 per month of allotment and 50% within trol (900 M ²), 2 one month thereafter; sealed weigh bridge offers, highest bidder for each (660 M ²); not specified)	Final price to be determined after finalization of tender and obtaining demand; to be ready by June 1981; letter from associations of which applicant member and area of present shop in Greater Bombay (to ensure genuine shifting); Rs. 10,000 on application, Rs. 10,000 each on 30-11-1981 and balance Rs. 60,000 before repossession; bank loan facility of 60 monthly instalments interest only if loan facility confirmed; sealed tenders	Good; done after parleys with the associations of various vegetable product markets in Bombay (and after the traders had lost their case in the court;
		Fair	
			contd....

Table 4.13 (contd.)

1	2	3	4
General Hou. Semi-Schemes			
Taloja, Shirvane Darvane April 1976	Not specified; not given		
Airoli, Nerul, mboli, New Panvel, New Uran Aug. 1976	Housing; not speci- fied; not worked out Housing; not availa- ble	HUNCO scheme conditions; survey to assess the de- mand; frame HUNCO scheme, if workable	Industrial housing scheme industries did not buy the with HUNCO assistance for idea the industrial units to create housing estates for their employees and to give them on rental basis; HUNCO loan 70% with 11.5% interest and rebate of 7 years; CIDCO only a go between HUNCO and the potential industrial units participating in it.
NERUL March 1977	Undeveloped plots; M ² not specified; 15 M ² per plot	EWS, LIG, MIG, HIG; regi- stration money with 6% interest till sanction of scheme by HUNCO, adjust as buyer's contribution there-after; preference to workers in Greater Bombay/New Bombay for 10 years; bookingment any time scheme with inter- est while you wait; allot- ment by lots	Scheme finally not approved as inflation increased the prices; CIDCO offered to construct on changed rates on lot of agitation; matter still pending with govern- ment by lots

Table 4.13 (contd.)

		1	2	3	4
Nerul April 1981	Housing : LLG (14 M ²), One house for one appli- MIG I ₂ (21 M ²), MIG II cant, outright or hire (31 M ²), MIG (52 M ²); purchase, should not own 18000, 26500, 46500, a house in New Bombay, 86000 but booking by Co's allowed; preference to those employed or likely to be employed in New Bombay; loan facility; Bombay; loan facility; demand survey				Best ever response; 11000 applied; and 28000 booklets sold; bogus bookings also made; response because of reasonable prices, absence of such offer now in Bombay of such offer now in Bombay due to shortage of Housing Boards work
NEW PANVEL					
New Panvel Dec. 1975	Plots; 21073, 96- 1500 M ² ; units; 54 M ²		Payment facility in 12 monthly instalments; first come first served	Only 340 were sold	
New Panvel 1978	Plots; (Left overs from 1975 scheme) 2 96-1500 M ² ; 160 M ²	User residence, customary home occupations; 20% with application; balance in 12 monthly instalments at 12% interest on balance; to construct within 2 years; first come first served	Moderate; problem of not getting building material, higher cost of construction		
New Panvel Dec. 1979	Plots for residential buildings; 1000- 1380 M ² ; 90 M ²	For coops., registered or prepared to be registered; preference to those working in New Bombay; FSI of 1; Bookings; draw of lots	Lukewarm		
New Panvel 1980	Regular Housing Scheme; N.A.; N.A.	Open to all; booking and COOL then draw of lots			

contd. . . .

Table 4.13 (contd.)

	1	2	3	4
KALAMBOLI				
Kalamboli April 1980	Plots for traders; 250-1000 M ² , total 2 area 80 Ha.; 130 M ² upset premium	Housing; EWS (11 M ²), 44 M ² , LIG (17 M ²), MIG (i) (22.50 M ²), MIG (ii) (31.45 M ²), HIG (54 M ²), F Type (91 M ²); Total units 4000; 8000, 18,000, 28,500, 46,500, 47,000, 140,000	Priority to the tra- ders of Greater Bombay wanting to shift; pay- ment in 4 equal instal- ments (upto March 1981); tenders; finalization to determine actual lease premium	Sale after a good deal of information, talks and lobbying by CIDCO; good
Kalamboli June 1980		User specified (lodging, boarding; petrol pump, weighbridge etc. 275 ha.) warehouses (iron & steel, metals, other items), truck terminal (for 50 trucks; 8.8 ha.); EMD Rs.25,000; 50% within 30 days of acceptance of land; balance after ano- ther 30 days; open to firms, trusts, Co's sealed tenders, last date 20-8-1981	Large plots taken by Cotton Corporation, SAIL, TISCO, FCI, and other steel wholesalers; very good and but achieved after considerable lobby- ing and informal rounds of discussion by CIDCO	Moderate

contd....

Table 4.13 (contd.)

1	2	3	4
Kalamboli July 1981	Truck terminal; 20- 100 M ² ; 200 M ²	60 years lease on built up premises for transit godowns, garages, spare- parts, restaurants, off- ice blocks; full price in four instalments; pre- ference to those in the same business today;	Good
		coops, firms, Co's; bookings; draw of lots if bids exceed those offered	
CBD BELAPUR			
Sectors 1 and 2 Feb. 1978	Housing; 16-76 M ² , 858 units; 8000- 63000	Government employees resi- ding in Greater and New Bombay for the last 10 years; outright as well as hire purchase; bookings as houses get constructed; promised by May 1978 : lots for allotment	Lukewarm due to lack of <u>transport</u> , interest; Govt. coaxed to buy; police department purchased some; ONGC purchased some units in 1980-81
Belapur Jan. 1980	Housing; 22.5 to 51.75 M ² ; MIG I, II, came and HIG; 21700-55000	Open to all; sale as they came	Lukewarm
Sector I 1980	Holiday resort com- plex; not indicated	Open to all; sealed tender sold to highest bidder	
Sector 9 1980	Commercial Area Plots; 214500 and 7063 M ² ; upset pri- ce orally told	Hotel/Motel (one plot) and Not sold 3 for offices; open to all bids lesser than upset price not to be accepted; sealed tenders to highest bidder	

contd.....

Table 4.13 (contd.)

	1	2	3	4
Belapur April 1981	R&W Houses; M ₂ Type II, IV; 1,02,000, tentative	61-90 Registration fee Rs.10000 and M ₂ tw ₂ units; 400 M ₂ upset price	Rs.15,000; 25% within 3 months of communication of final price; balance 75% in three equal monthly instalments; preference to workers in New Bombay; lots if number of bids is larger than the number offered	Lukewarm
Section 11 1981	Commercial plots; each plot of 4000 M ₂ tw ₂ units; 400 M ₂ upset price	Open to persons, firms, coops, trusts, companies; EMD Rs.1 lakh; FSI of 2; tender to be finalized by 14-1-1982 and tenderers to keep the offer till then; 50% payment within 30 days of bid acceptance, balance in next 30 days; user specified (office and ground floor shops, showroom, banks, restaurants); sealed tender	Not known yet	
Social Service Items Vashi 1977	Institutions with established reputation; offers invited through advertisement; 7 yearly instalments at 9% interest on the outstanding balance; deal indicated; 19 lakhs; 2.5 lakhs; 8 lakhs	Given to Jijabai Pasti-sthan headed then by Mrs. S. Patil (wife of then C.M., Mr. V.D. Patil)		
Vashi Sect- or I July 1977	Comprehensive school (Bldgs., land, equipment); not indicated; 27 lakhs	Institutions with reputation; offers invited; sale on deferred payment in 20 yearly instalments at 8% interest, protection of CIDCO salary scales; grant for meeting difference between permitted and CIDCO scales; deal finalization personal discussions	Clinched	

Table 4.13 (contd.)

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1	2	3	4
Vashi Sector School (bldg., land); not indicated; 14 lakhs	Advertisement; 15 yearly instalments; 12% interest on outstanding; land on nominal lease rent of Re.1 per year; deal finalization through discussions	Open to educational institutions	Given to Rayat Sikhasan as against Archbishop of Bombay
9 1977	9 college; 2 acres 50 M ²	deal arrived at 60% of the residential land price in Vashi	League
Turbhe	School (bldg., land); 9 lakhs	15 yearly instalments; discussions; 1500 M ² land free, 2500 M @ Rs.10 M	Given to India Culture League
Vashi 1980	Plots for religious purposes; 500-1500 M ² ; two units; not indicated	Religious organisations to establish places of worship; 50% of residential prices at that time; discussion with religious organisations of different communities	Good
	Plots for burial figur units; 10 M ²	For different communities; discussions with religious organisations	Good
CBD Belapur 1980	School; one unit; Advertisements, 15 years' repayment with 6% interest on outstanding; discussions and negotiations	Good	Good
New Panvel 1980	School; one unit; -do- 10 lakhs	-do-	-do-
CBD Belapur 1980	School Plots; not specified	50% of reserve price to educational institutions	-do-

Source : Well-informed category of individuals drawn from project affected people, buying segments, and the concerned organisations. There is, however, some room for inaccuracy since the information is not given officially. Bulk sales of undeveloped land are not included.

not responding very enthusiastically to its marketing inducements. After waiting for quite some time, Mr. D'Souza's co-Managing Director, Mr. Nayak, in an effort to bail out CIDCO from further economic trouble, sold them to non-targetted group(s). Mr. Dhavle's approach was rather novel since he believed in developing nothing at all and selling only the undeveloped plots. This strategy also did not click. Mr. Gupta, the present Managing Director, has sized up the marketing problem rather from commercial point of view and has dovetailed development in New Bombay with the demands of the segments marked for relocation from Greater to New Bombay. In his approach, generally plots in the areas being developed have first been sold to the buyers : housing and other infrastructure development has followed thereafter. This approach has been successful although situational factors have also added to its success.

2. Sequentially, marketing of undeveloped land, developed land, housing, shopping and commercial built up facilities, and social services units has followed ad hoc, constantly changing terms and conditions from time to time. It is here that the conduct of a government owned company must be viewed differently from that of the private sector one. CIDCO's track record emerges far from very clean when we find that from the very beginning the disposal of commercial items - from plots to constructed facilities - has been managed in such a manner as to be more beneficial to the commercial sharks from the building industry based in Greater Bombay. Apart from public resentment, Government enquiries have

not given CIDCO entirely a clean chit. Disposal of the built up social services units (schools, medical centres, etc.) along with their equipment, personnel etc. was a historical feat and to that extent pioneering.¹⁴ However, it seems that better available agencies were overlooked because of political pressures applied on the CIDCO management and whereas most well known agencies were not successful in securing even a single offer, there were not so significant others which clinched more than one. Disposal of large plots to public agencies and statutory bodies (i.e. the MSEB, the BPT, the ONGC, etc.) was decided more by the State and Central Governments than the CIDCO planners who had to change their land use plans to accommodate such allotments. Of course, these have yielded considerable revenues to the CIDCO and also were likely to pep up the growth of the city. CIDCO, as a public limited company and as NTDA, appears to have now reached a point where planners have been forced to take a back seat with the 'market-forces' calling the tune in whatever it does.

VII

Development of Revolving Fund and Self-Sustained City Growth

As indicated earlier, one reason why the Maharashtra Government agreed to develop New Bombay in preference to the Bombay Development plan proposals was the expected ability of the NTDA to use

14 There is also the negative side of this feat. Wherever the purchasing voluntary agencies have no competition - and this is the case in all such cases so far -, they have exploited their monopoly position to extract money from the user segments through a variety of subterfuges.

land as a resource making city development a commercial and self-sustained proposition. The general idea was to acquire land at cheap rates, develop it, sell at a profit and generate surplus to make a revolving fund. This was also the reason why this task was entrusted to the CIDCO Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of the state-owned SICOM Ltd. until March 1976 and an independent company thereafter and registered under the Companies Act from its very inception.¹⁵ The New Bombay Draft Development Plan only confirmed this by stating that New Bombay was expected to be a self-supporting exercise on the DDA model (CIDCO : 1973 : 13; 116).

As a part of the overall understanding between the CIDCO and the state government, the later was expected to provide a substantial loan to the former in the form of share capital to enable it to start its operations in New Bombay. The CIDCO was also expected initially to raise loans from the open market for which the state government or its agencies would stand guarantee. Since only the government was empowered to acquire land in the project area and land acquisition involved administrative costs apart from payment of compensation, the state government was to undertake this task with the CIDCO paying back the entire costs of acquisition. The statutory terms, finalized in 1972,¹⁶ empowered the CIDCO to (a) dispose off land in New Bombay after its development; and (b) appropriate the proceeds to the expenses incurred on development

15 A provision in the Maharashtra Town Planning Act 1966 says that new town development agencies should be given money by the government as advances to be recovered later.

16 Government Resolution, General Administration Department, CID- 2072-U dated 24 January 1972.

including administrative expenses plus agency remuneration.¹⁷

The balance was to be transferred to the government.

Vagueness about financial costs of New Bombay, as seen earlier, had been started by the MARG piece. The GR defining the relationship between the CIDCO and the state government added further dimensions to it : for, if surplus generated was expected to be transferred back to the government how was the revolving fund, through which the CIDCO was going to build the entire New Bombay, getting established? The pregnant meaning of the GR becomes fairly obvious when the history of the CIDCO's capital structure, contained in Table 4.14, is examined critically. Paid-up capital, in the form of share capital, secured and unsecured loans comprise three important components of the CIDCO's capital structure. The paid-up capital was Rs.10 lakhs in 1970-71 : it was increased to Rs.100 lakhs in 1971-72 to Rs.200 lakhs in 1975-76 to Rs.270 lakhs in 1976-77 and to Rs.395 lakhs in 1977-78. SICOM has subscribed it hundred per cent. The proportion of this component was about 60 per cent in the first year and has fluctuated between a low of 4.4 to a high of 9.7 per cent thereafter. Secured loans have been entirely coming from the commercial banks and have never been higher than 4.5 per cent. In some years, in fact, they have been less than one per cent. Among the unsecured loans, borrowing from the market through issue of debentures, redeemable in periods varying between 12-15 years, have been resorted to three times so far (a) 7½ per cent debentures issued for Rs.1208.17 lakhs in

¹⁷ Kept at Rs.3 lakhs for the year 1971 to be increased each year by Rs.1 lakh subject to a maximum of Rs.5 lakhs for any year.

Table 4.14
Capital Structure of CIDCO Ltd.

Financial Year	Paid-up Capital	Borrowings (Rs. in Lakhs)				Total	
		Secured Banks		Unsecured			
		Debentures	Holding Company	State Govt.	HUDCO		
1970-71	10	-	-	16.60	-	16.60	
1971-72	100	24.25	1208.17	215	-	1571.49	
1972-73	100	1.06	1208.17	215	-	1614.32	
1973-74	100	96.45	1593.17	215	-	2132.98	
1974-75	100	39.98	1593.17	215	-	2279.88	
1975-76	200	28.81	1593.17	215	125	2869.72	
1976-77	270	101.90	1978.17	215	125	3778.23	
1977-78	395	6.69	1978.17	215	125	4084.86	
1978-79	395	24.26	1978.17	215	200	4439.39	
1979-80	395	52.21	1978.17	215	270	4779.46	

Source : Annual Reports of SICOM Ltd., Bombay and CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

1971-72 and redeemable in 1983-86; (b) 7½ per cent debentures issued for Rs.385 lakhs in 1973-74 redeemable in 1986-89; and (c) 10½ per cent debentures issued for Rs.385 lakhs in 1976-77 redeemable in 1988. These have often accounted for as much as 76.9 per cent and, thus, formed the bulk of CIDCO's capital structure. In percentage terms, their proportion has been declining (from a high of 76.9 in 1971-72 to 41.4 in 1979-80) because of expansion of the size of capital structure itself, although these have been increasing in absolute terms (from Rs.1208.17 lakhs in 1971-72 to Rs.1978.17 lakhs in 1976-77). The SICOM has also provided a soft loan of Rs.215 lakhs at 6 per cent interest in 1971-72 and the state government extended one loan of Rs.125 lakhs in 1975-76 another of Rs.75 lakhs in 1978-79 and a third of Rs.70 lakhs in

Table 4.15

Expenditure on and Receipts of New Bombay Project

(Rs. in Lakhs)

Particulars	Upto 1978-79	Incurred During 1979-80	Upto 1979-80
EXPENDITURE			
1. Land and Area Development			
A. VASHI			
i. Physical Infrastructure	490.72	79.14	569.86
ii. Social Infrastructure	70.46	5.30	75.76
iii. Commercial Complex	32.85	15.10	47.95
iv. APM	-	12.86	12.86
Sub-Total	594.04	112.40	706.43
B. CBD BELAPUR			
i. Physical Infrastructure	57.36	29.10	86.46
ii. Social Infrastructure	11.72	0.52	12.24
iii. Commercial Complex	9.59	1.19	10.79
Sub-Total	78.67	30.81	109.48
C. PANVEL			
i. Physical Infrastructure	21.29	19.13	40.42
ii. Social Infrastructure	-	1.86	1.86
iii. Commercial Complex	-	0.36	0.36
Sub-Total	21.29	21.35	42.64
D. KALAMBOLI WAREHOUSING	0.16	56.17	56.34
E. GHANSOLI	0.06	-	0.06
F. URAN	11.90	11.28	23.18
Total (A to F)	706.14	232.01	938.14
2. Housing			
A. VASHI	670.17	67.27	737.44
B. CBD BELAPUR	81.05	28.63	109.68
C. PANVEL	0.07	2.07	2.15
Total	751.28	97.98	849.26

contd....

Table 4.15 (contd.)

Particulars	Upto 1978-79	Incurred During 1979-80	Upto 1979-80
3. City Scale Development	345.88	12.84	358.73
4. Transportation	232.58	49.26	281.85
5. Rehabilitation	95.43	12.40	107.83
6. Studies, Surveys, Seminars	27.64	0.46	28.09
7. Loss on Hovercraft A/c	38.71	2.58	41.29
8. Loss on Bus A/c	0.51	31.30	31.81
9. Provision for Doubtful Advances	4.12	-	4.12
10. Expenses Transferred on New Bombay A/c	1291.23	231.25	1522.48
Total (1 to 10)	3493.53	670.09	4163.61

RECEIPTS
(Disposal on Behalf of State
Government)

1. Sale of Tenements, Shops, etc.

A. VASHI			
i. Flats	630.69	172.10	802.79
ii. Shops	33.99	8.64	42.63
iii. Hospital	19.52	-	19.52
iv. School (in Sector I)	27.18	-	27.18
v. School (in Sector II)	14.00	-	14.00
Sub-Total	725.37	180.75	906.12

B. CBD BELAPUR

i. Flats and Tenement	54.39	-	54.39
ii. School Building	-	14.00	14.00
Sub-Total	54.39	14.00	68.39

contd....

Table 4.15 (contd.)

Particulars	Upto 1978-79	Incurred During 1979-80	Upto 1979-80
<hr/>			
2. Sale of plots			
i. Vashi	146.80	15.71	162.50
ii. APM	-	140.75	140.75
iii. CBD Belapur	-	12.76	12.76
iv. Nhava-Sheva	1.50	6.14	7.64
v. Kalamboli	-	96.48	96.48
vi. Panvel	-	80.00	80.00
vii. Uran	-	498.50	498.50
viii. Gaothan Expansion Plots	-	1.84	1.84
Sub-Total	148.29	852.17	1000.46
<hr/>			
3. Service Charges	35.89	17.71	53.60
4. Miscellaneous Receipts	63.76	21.45	85.22
5. Recovery of Overheads from BMRDA	-	6.12	6.12
6. Agency Charges for APMC Work	-	6.19	6.19
7. Sale of Medical Equipment	6.70	-	6.70
8. Net Bus Earnings	18.24	-	18.24
9. Depreciation on Buses	68.50	22.73	91.23
10. Depreciation on Hovermarine	11.18	-	11.18
Total (1 to 10)	1132.32	1121.13	2253.45
Amount Unrealized	2361.20	451.04	1910.16

Source : Annual Report 1979-80, CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

Note : Figures rounded.

Table 4.16

Annual Profit/Loss by CIDCO Ltd.

(Rs. in Lakhs)

Financial Year	Profit (+) or Loss (-)
1970-71	3.38 (-)
1971-72	2.60 (-)
1972-73	2.08 (-)
1973-74	3.27 (-)
1974-75	4.01 (-)
1975-76	1.93 (-)
1976-77	1.58 (-)
1977-78	2.28 (-)
1978-79	0.36 (-)
1979-80	1.47 (+)

Source : Annual Reports of SICOM Ltd., Bombay and CIDCO Ltd., Bombay and New Bombay.

1979-80. The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) has provided loans since 1975-76 which have been varying between 6.6 to 14.7 per cent of the CIDCO's total capital structure. Thus, even after expiry of 10 years the CIDCO has been relying on the scarce governmental finances rather heavily much against its pro-claimed aim of self-sustained development.

An analysis of the working financial results of the CIDCO as reflected in the expenditure and receipts on the one hand (Table 4.15) and annual profit/loss incurred (Table 4.16) on the other makes it clear that the operationalisation of land as a resource in New Bombay has been a very agonizing experience. At the end of first nine years (1970-1979), the receipts had been roughly one third : two-thirds of the investment made remained unrealized.

The situation appeared to have turned for the better thereafter since at the end of 10th year (1979-80), the receipts increased to 54 per cent. However, this somewhat better liquidity, as is evident from Table 4.15, was achieved almost entirely due to significant sale of undeveloped land lying outside the nodes being developed by the CIDCO to the bulk users.¹⁸ More importantly, the CIDCO has been incurring annual losses in the first 9 years and has registered a notional profit in the tenth year. Any hope of developing a significant looking revolving fund to sustain an accelerated tempo of developmental work in New Bombay lie unrealized. Very candidly, the CIDCO itself has now left this non-realizable pursuit and its current thinking is to go in for large-sized soft loans from a large number of agencies (i.e. IDA, central and state governments, medium and short-term lending institutions) and floating of sub-sidiary companies looking after specific civic amenities (i.e. Bombay Metropolitan Road Transport Corporation Ltd.) and with facility to independently seek finances for themselves.¹⁹

18 This was no coincidence. On the other hand, this was the principal advice given by the CIDCO's financial consultants M/s Ajgaonkar & Company through a report submitted in 1978. It is not exactly robbing Peter to benefit Paul but it comes pretty close to it.

19 A detailed view could be had from Multi Sector Urban Development projects for New Bombay, (Bombay, CIDCO Ltd., 1980). Of the total outlay of Rs.399.90 crores envisaged for its 1981-85 plans the CIDCO expects Rs.189.58 crores (47%) from the IDA, Rs.43.56 crores and Rs.54.17 crores (14%) from the buyers of housing and social infrastructure. The CIDCO itself would contribute only Rs.72.43 crores (18.1%). It is quite another thing that the EMRDA, which appraised this report for recommending it to the state government clearly felt that IDA funds would not be available and that CIDCO lacked organisational capability to undertake works at an annual average expenditure of Rs.80 crores.

CHAPTER 5

Relocating Development in Bombay and BMR

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Relocating Development in Bombay and BMR

Greater Bombay's growth has been marked by periodical attempts to re-align and restructure it spatially, within the city and with outside areas located in the BMR. This chapter would specifically examine how these have helped or hindered the post 1971 efforts to siphon off development from Greater to New Bombay and other sites. This examination shall cover : (1) Bandra-Kurla Complex; (2) Execution of 1964 Bombay Development Plan and its revision; (3) BMRDA's Programmes in the BMR; (4) The Kerkar Group's attempt to integrate BMR into a single city in the garb of a solution of housing problem in Greater Bombay; (5) Nhava-Sheva Port Project; and (6) Relocation Projects undertaken by CIDCO in New Bombay.

I

Bandra-Kurla Complex

Before being formalized as a specific notified area for development by the Government of Maharashtra, Bandra-Kurla complex was identified as an area having potential for development by the Modak-Meyer Report (1948) and the Barve Group (1958). The Barve Group had put development of Bandra-Kurla in its triple package to relieve pressure on the island city, with the Backbay Reclamation serving as site for low income housing (to reduce commuting of tertiary sector employees), the Sion-Wadala area for truck terminal (to remove clogging of commodity flows) and Bandra-Kurla for new centre of commercial activity (to reduce pressure on the CBD in

South Bombay). The Development Plan of 1964 also proposed it as a commercial complex. The Bandra-Kurla Complex scheme was formalized in 1973¹ when nearly 210 ha of land was identified in the village of Kolekalyan and CIDCO was appointed as the Special Town Planning Authority (STPA) under Section 40 of the MRTPA 1966 to plan and develop the area.

It was not that the area had been devoid of any development prior to its notification. On the other hand, several official agencies had been operating in the area without any integrated plan and synchronization of their activities. Individual parties were also active since the early fifties. In 1940 nearly 800 ha of open land was available in the area. During the subsequent period, three notable developments in the area were the construction of the Maharashtra Housing Board (MHB) Colony, the Government Colony (at Bandra) and the University Campus at Kalina. The area along the Bombay-Agra Road was also sporadically built up. The bulk of the land here belonged to the state government and the MHB. In the located Seventies, the Municipal Slaughter House, /near the Bandra railway station was shifted and some area occupied by slums was resumed through eviction. The adjoining MHB land of Mahim west was also reclaimed. These developments were, more or less, in contiguous patch of lands. On the east side, near Kurla the CIDCO reclaimed about 20 ha of land. The south side, containing the sprawling Dharavi slum went on expanding. The slum also contained a large number of tanneries and leather units which discharged their

1 Government Notification UD & PHD No. RPB-1173-RPC dated 2 June 1973.

pollutant waste into the creek. The state government has allotted an area of 35 ha here, immediately to the east of the Western railway tracks, for the proposed bird sanctuary. Thus, the developments in different parts of Bandra-Kurla area were fragmentary, for different purposes, uneven and were undertaken without considering their overall impact on the land use and environment in and around. The CIDCO, which was its STPA between 1971-1977 period, also did not take much interest in the project as, in its view, development here affected its prospects of relocation projects in New Bombay. Finally, the area was transferred to the BMRDA in March 1977.²

The present notified area of extended Bandra-Kurla complex comprises of roughly 1262 ha of lands, some parts of which are developed fully or partially and certain others remain to be developed. The area, as a study of Central Water and Power Research Station (CWPRS), Khadakvasla suggests, presents considerable hydraulic and pollution problems which would require, among other things, shifting of existing tanning and curing units in and around Dharavi, and extensive channelization of the creek, Mahim river and Vakola Nala also involving the reinforcement of piers of existing road and rail bridges in the area. The state government have already decided to shift the tanneries and leather units out of this area.³

The following are the broad objectives of the BMRDA planned Bandra - Kurla scheme :

2 Government Notification No. BKR-1177/262-UD-5 dated 7 March 1977.

3 These units do not belong to the big industrial families and are in the informal, small and medium scale manufacturing sectors. Bigger units, located for example in Lal Baug and Parel areas and causing as much or even greater pollution in the heart of the city, have been spared by the Government.

1. Exploit the opportunity of restructuring the city's pattern of development by attracting as large number of jobs as possible from South Bombay;
2. Provide space for social, cultural and shopping facilities which are deficient in the area;
3. Improve environmental conditions in the area through channelization of the creeks and reserving green areas;
4. Provide for a parcel of residential land for serving as a transit camp to facilitate re-development of southern side of Dharavi; and
5. Develop the area on the basis of self-generating schemes in phases that would reduce financial burden on the BMRDA (BMRDA : 1977 : Chapter III).

These objectives have a marked similarity with the ones set-out for the New Bombay project earlier in 1970 and the first and fifth among them - crucial and consequential - lack in concrete link-up between goal articulation and methodology of their realization.

The BMRDA thinking in planning and complex has been influenced, on the one hand, by the existing constraints - slums, creeks, pollution, existing structures, traffic and other flows passing through the area - and, on the other, by the potentialities which could be dovetailed with the 'planning brief' given by the state government. Keeping these in view, the BMRDA considered western most part of the area ideal for residential use, and the areas between and near MRT focal points (Bandra, Kurla, Sion) for commercial purposes.

The land use and transportation plan proposed by the BMRDA for the complex divides it into (i) Direction Action Area (DAA); (ii) The Influence Area (IA); and (iii) The Flow Streams (FS). The DAA consists of 370 ha. in Blocks A to I. This is of two types : open and developable and other where sizeable development has already taken place (Table 5.1). Out of this chunk, about 283 ha. is reclaimable. The IA consists of 777 ha. and comprises the following : (1) The University, (2) Government Colony, (3) MHB Colony, (4) Proposed Railway Carshed Area, (5) Existing Industrial Estate along the CST Road, (6) Partly developed area to the east of Western Railway near Khar, (7) Belt on the north of CST Road, and (8) Others. The FS accounts for 115 ha. : of this the Mahim creek claims 100 and the Vakola Nala 15 ha. This has to be channelized on the lines proposed by the CWPR, Khadakvasla.

Table 5.1

Direct Action Area in Bandra-Kurla Complex

Sl. Block No.	Block Specifics	Area (in ha.)	
		Gross	Net Reclai-mable
1. A	Mahim Reclamation of MHB	36	36
2. B & C	MCGB and MHB together	9	9
3. D	G9 of MHB	10	10
4. D-1	Railway Land near G9	16	16
5. E	Near Drive-in-Theatre	25	16
6. F	341 by Vakola Nala	24* + 3	12
7. G	CIDCO Notified Area	115 {	130
8. G-1	-do-	20 }	
9. H	MCGB and Government Land near Dharavi	10* + 78	54
10. I	Reserved for Bird Sanctuary	24*	-
Total		370	283

* Unreclaimed

Source : BMRDA (1977 : Chapter IV).

The proposals made include usage of available linkage elements like water front and road or railway routes which skirt or pass through the area. The use, however, varies. Water fronts have mostly been used for residential, the road/rail links near the MRT for commercial uses and the shopping, godown, retail services along the major arterial routes. Large chunks of unclaimed open spaces have been provided for to maintain ecological quality. The areas near Bandra railway station are to be developed as integrated intensive commercial centres whereas the patch near the Bandra-Kurla rail link is to be mainly used for accommodating offices, wholesale commerce and godowns preferably those shifting from south Bombay. The lands in the western most part along the Mahim bay are to be used predominantly for residential purposes along with necessary social infrastructure. Total land proposed for residential purposes is 55 ha. about 9 ha out of which is earmarked for redevelopment of Dharavi area. Commercial use would account for roughly 63 ha. The remaining amount of reclaimed and unclaimed land would go for other uses.

The Bandra-Kurla complex plan of the BMRDA does not provide the detailed outlays. However, considering the present ecology of the area, and the nature of development proposed it is more than obvious that the investment needed to develop it as a 'meaningful whole' contributing significantly to its defined goals would be considerable. The BMRDA like many of its counter-part planning agencies does not have such order of funds at its disposal. Apart from the financial and engineering capability, the BMRDA, MCGB, and CIDCO planners all concede off record that they are not at all

sure about the actual land which would be eventually available after reclamation and channelization. There is also the competition between Bandra-Kurla and Backbay, Bandra-Kurla and New Bombay, Bandra-Kurla and other sites proposed for commercial development in the revised Development Plan for Greater Bombay (presently under finalization), and Bandra-Kurla and other sites in the BMR for relocation of the tertiary sector from south Bombay. It is not very certain whether Bandra-Kurla offers decided advantages where trade and offices would like to go very willingly. Presently, the area is considered to be the cancer of city and unless Dharavi slum is erased from the scene - which is neither advocated nor seems possible -, the capability of the area, even when developed along the lines BMRDA proposes, would remain very much doubtful. The constantly changing stance of the Maharashtra Government, as reflected in its periodic and ad hoc decisions to allot chunks of lands to different agencies in the area, is another imponderable which would shape the fate of the area. The latest proposal of the Kerkar Group Report is to turn the entire Bandra-Kurla complex into a green area. As the revised Development Plan of Greater Bombay gets finalized, the state government, the MCGB, and the BMRDA would have another opportunity to decide whether some further refinements in planning the area are needed. In the meanwhile, only schemes such as the Drive-in-Theatre would get implemented by the BMRDA and the sweet talk of internal restructuring of Greater Bombay through Bandra-Kurla would continue to be heard in urban planning forums and plan documents.

II

Execution of 1964 Bombay Development Plan and Tentative
Strategy of Its Revised Version : 1980 - 2000

The Development Plan for Greater Bombay, prepared in 1964 and sanctioned finally in 1967 by the State government, was estimated to cost, at 1964 prices, approximately Rs.700 crores (Table 5.2). The major items of expenditure in this Plan were public housing (Rs.229.54 crores : 32.85 per cent), water supply and sewerage (Rs.195.65 crores : 28 per cent), and industrial estates (Rs.107.38 crores : 15.30 per cent). As indicated earlier, the State government had neither accepted the plea of the MCGB to levy development cess, et al nor sanctioned bulk funds to execute this Plan. The MCGB still executed it, albeit with full advance realization that it was not likely to achieve its set objectives. The actual expenditure incurred during the 14 year period (1964-1978) on its

Table 5.2

Itemized Outlay of the 1964 Development Plan of Greater Bombay

Sector	Cost (Rs. in Crores)			% to Total Cost
	Acquisi- tion	Develop- ment	Total	
1. Educational	7.10	27.59	34.69	4.94
2. Medical & Public Health	6.63	13.44	20.07	2.90
3. Recreational	30.58	5.37	35.95	5.14
4. Markets	3.88	9.23	13.11	1.87
5. Communication	20.14	30.18	50.32	7.20
6. Public Housing	32.75	196.79	229.54	32.85
7. Industrial Estates	12.34	95.04	107.38	15.30
8. Water Supply & Sewerage	8.07	187.58	195.65	28.00
9. Miscellaneous	4.88	7.03	11.91	1.70
Total	126.47	572.05	698.62	100.00

Source : Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay : 1981 : 7.

execution (Table 5.3) comes to roughly Rs. 266.93 crores (about 38 per cent of the total cost). A closer scrutiny of the pattern of execution reveals that only a few schemes pertaining to mainly two item-heads, namely (a) water supply and sewerage, and (b) transport and communications have been executed. About Rs. 175.08 crores (90 per cent of the estimated cost of this item) constituting about 65.6 per cent of the total expenditure incurred is on water supply and sewerage projects. Rs. 42.22 crores (about 85 per cent of the estimated cost on this item) were spent on transport and communications accounting for about 16 per cent of the total expenditure.

Table 5.3

Actual Expenditure Incurred in Executing the 1964 Development Plan of Greater Bombay

Sector	Expenditure (Rs. in cro- res)	% to Total Ex- penditure
1. Primary Education	11.33	4.25
2. Free Reading Rooms, Libraries and Municipal High Schools	0.16	0.06
3. Public Health, Medical Relief and Medical Education	13.43	5.03
4. Recreational Open Spaces	2.49	0.93
5. Markets and Slaughter Houses	9.49	3.56
6. Roads, S.W. Drains and Street Lighting	42.72	16.01
7. Public Housing	Details not available	
8. Industrial Estates, Plants and Machinery	0.28	0.10
9. Water Works and Sewerage	165.00	61.82
10. Street Cleansing & Conservancy Services	10.08	3.78
11. Slum Services & Village Amenities	1.85	0.69
12. Buildings & Land Acquisition	8.98	3.36
Total	266.93	100.00

Source : Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay : 1981 : 8.

The expenditure on other items is too low.⁴ Even the total physical achievement on the overall expenditure of Rs.266.93 crores is not equivalent of its percentage share in the planned outlay (i.e. 38) because of cost escalation.

The explanation offered by the MCGB on the unsatisfactory implementation follows the usual line. According to the MCGB, the Plan could not be implemented properly because of (a) lack of finances, (b) cost escalation of land acquisition (due to the modified requirement under the MRTPA 1966 to pay compensation at market rate prevalent on the day of notification), (c) non-recovery of betterment levy from the beneficiaries, (d) policy of providing alternate accommodation to the occupants dishoused during course of implementation of the Plan, and (e) non-availability of sites for developing amenities due to repair (and consequent new lease of life). Apart from lack of finances, none of the other identified problems of Plan implementation can possibly be considered very reasonable or even cogent. Removal of some of these 'problems' through policy reversal would be highly coercive and politically very unpopular choice which the elected representatives in the MCGB could hardly be expected to endorse much as the revised Plan writers would like them to.

The unsatisfactory and uneven execution of the 1964 Development Plan had made its revision an urgent imperative. It was also

4 It is significant that no details are available about expenditure incurred on public housing which constituted 32.85 per cent (Rs.229.54 crores) of the planned outlay. Details would have certainly found a place had there been anything significant to report. Probably, the best bet was not to report any thing at all.

obligatory on the part of the MCGB to undertake such revisions as required under Section 38 of the MRTPA 1966. The Corporation, therefore, resolved on 23 December 1976 to make such a revision.⁵ The exercise is still underway. However, by January 1982 the base document (MCGB : 1981) defining the policy, approach, and broad strategy was ready for the approval of the MCGB after which it was expected to go before the Maharashtra government for its sanction.

The revised Development Plan conceives a linear growth structure corridor plan with a series of medium size new towns around the metropolis forming ring towns, and a new counter magnet of metropolitan size in the shape of New Bombay across Thane creek. Of the two scenarios visualized (i.e. mono-centric and poly-nucleated), the poly-nucleated one is expected by the planners to be operative in the next twenty years. The broad assumptions under this scenario are : (a) accentuation of industrial dispersal and no substantial new additions to the industrial labour force in the island city, (b) operation of Nhava-Sheva port, after 1986, as a major growth input for New Bombay, (c) emergence of the BMRDA as an effective controlling institutional mechanism for preventing new office growth in island city, (d)attraction of offices directly related to Greater Bombay to the alternate commercial complex at Bandra-Kurla, (e) diversion of major office and commercial jobs (of regional, state of national significance) to New Bombay, and (f) emergence of a distinguished CBD in New Bombay after 1986. The projected population of the BMR by 2001 is expected to be 15.63 millions of which

5 Resolution 854 of 23 December 1976 of the MCGB and gazetted by the Maharashtra Government on 13 January 1977.

9.19 millions are expected to be within Greater Bombay. The BMR has been divided into 15 divisions (4 within Greater Bombay) to spatially distribute the future population and employment. The distribution of incremental population and jobs for the period 1971-2001 in the four MCGB divisions (Table 5.4) assumes only marginal growth for the salsette island and identifies other zones as growth centres.

Table 5.4

Incremental Population and Jobs (1971-2001) in Different Divisions of Greater Bombay

Zone	Wards	Incremental Population (in '000)	Incremental Jobs (in '000)		
			Manufacturing	Non-Manufacturing	Total
1.1	A, B, C	87	-	70	70
1.2	D to G	261	35	90	125
1.3	Suburbs	1829	40	335	375
1.4	Extended Suburbs	1043	39	150	189

Source : Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay : 1981 : 22.

Among the 24 listed objectives of the Revised Plan, the prominent ones are : restrict Bombay's population at 9.19 millions by 2001, evolve a poly-nucleated structure for the city, shift non-conforming industries based on performance characteristics, declare certain areas as urban renewal areas (URAs), and optimise mass transportation system. These objectives are sought to be realized through pursuit of a range of urban development policies culminating in a structure plan which divides the city in to four broad use zones (i.e. residential, industrial, commercial and no development). About 777 ha. in the city and 5070 ha. in the suburbs and extended

suburbs have been designated for public purposes. Out of this, only 3067 ha. are meant for obligatory purposes to be developed by the MCGB.

The total cost involved in implementing the revised Development Plan is Rs.1947 crores (Table 5.5). The highest percentage of outlay is once again earmarked for public housing (41.05 : Rs.799 crores). Public utilities, medical and recreational items claim 17.9, 14.6 and 11.33 per cent respectively. Comparing the pattern of 1964 and 1980 Plan outlays it emerges that the Revised Plan makes some significant departures from the earlier one. Items which claimed lion's share of actual expenditure incurred in the 1964 Plan have received relatively lesser allocation in 1980 : industrial estates has not, in fact, received enough allocation to merit independent listing. A larger part of the outlay (over 40 per cent) is on social services this time as against public utilities in the 1964 Plan.

Table 5.5

Proposed Outlay of the Revised Development Plan for
Greater Bombay

Sector	Cost (Rs. In Crores)			% to Total Cost
	Acquisition	Development	Total	
1. Education	30.00	105.00	135	6.94
2. Medical	54.50	229.50	284	14.60
3. Public Utility	40.00	308.00	348	17.90
4. Markets	19.00	76.00	95	4.86
5. Communication	6.50	6.50	13	0.66
6. Recreational Open Space	221.00	Nil	221	11.33
7. Public Housing	281.00	518.00	799	41.05
8. Others	10.50	41.50	52	2.60
Total			1947	100.00

Source : Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay : 1981 : 44.

To execute the revised Plan, the MCGB would need finances of the order of roughly Rs.100 crores per annum during the next 20 years. An examination of its past financial record indicates that it can manage to set aside funds between Rs.20 and 22 crores for this purpose and that would leave a whooping gap between the Plan requirements and the capacity of the MCGB to raise resources. To further reduce the cost of the Plan without sacrificing any of the proposals it is suggested that the encumbrance of the MCGB to provide alternate housing to those dishoused as a result of Plan execution be reduced to 25-35 per cent of housing cost. This would bring down the size of the Plan to Rs.1388 crores. Other suggestions for raising resources for the Plan execution run along the lines of 1964 Plan.

The revised Plan is a useful document for the planners. However, it does not seem to have learnt much either from the 1964 Plan or its actual execution or even the changed realities which prevail in the eighties. Its objectives cannot be realized by the MCGB since it lacks jurisdictional, financial and administrative capacities to execute the projects the Plan would entail. One major area of confusion relates to the relocation proposals, almost all of them simultaneously involving, among others, the MCGB, the BMRDA, and the CIDCO. The relocated activity would go where (i.e. Bandra-Kurla, other areas in Greater Bombay, Kalyan Complex, New Bombay) and how is not at all clear. The reaction of the State government on the revised Plan cannot be possibly different than shown to the 1964 one. In such a situation, the capacity of the MCGB to finance the execution and the priorities decided in their sequence of implementation would alone decide how this attempt to restructure BMR would fare in the next twenty years.

III

The BMRDA and Its Programmes in the BMR

Even since the Government of Maharashtra accepted the proposal of New Bombay in 1970, the MCGB had nursed a grievance of being left out in the scheme of options being decided by the CIDCO and the State government. This resentment was further increased when the task of developing Bandra-Kurla, lying in the mid riff of the city and within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCGB, was handed over to CIDCO for planning and development overlooking the claims of the Corporation. Certain steps connected with the development in New Bombay (i.e. the bus systems, hovermarine, etc.) affecting mutual interests of the two institutions also added to the rivalry between them. The preparation of the New Bombay Draft Plan by CIDCO was also managed without adequate consultation and discussion and with the Corporation officials/non-officials and as such, different agencies engaged in the task of developing Greater Bombay or parts of BMR in one way or the other quite often ended up in pursuing contradictory programmes. The need of an agency coordinating planning, development, and growth of the entire BMR was realized around 1974. The initiative to establish such an authority for the BMR was, however, taken by the then Central Minister of State, Works and Housing in early 1974 when he visited Bombay. The State government was not very favourably disposed toward the idea. It, however, agreed to establish the BMRDA because it hoped to get financial allocations for urban development from the Rs. 250 crores outlay indicated under the 'Integrated Urban Development' schemes and World Bank support for financing the transport loan of the BEST.

Existence of BMRDA was a pre-requisite for receipt of funds from both these sources. The State government prepared a draft bill on the BMRDA in May 1974. The BPCC, under Rajni Patel prepared local political climate for its acceptance first by commissioning a study of Delhi, Madras and Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authorities and following it up by organising a seminar which endorsed setting up of the BMRDA. The passage of BMRDA Act, 1974 and establishment of the Authority in 1975 was, therefore, culmination of efforts from different quarters to integrate the planning and regulation of development in the entire BMR.

The BMRDA is a large federative body exercising jurisdiction over 3666 sq. kms. of area, 19 urban centres and 943 villages. In its composition, it is substantially representative and elective. The defined primary role of the BMRDA is that of planning, coordinating, project formulation, promotion and monitoring and generally to ensure the rapid and orderly development of the BMR in accordance with the Regional Plan. It can also execute schemes but only at the direction of or with the permission of the State government and that too if no other suitable agency is available or willing to do so. Clearly, therefore, execution of projects and schemes is a secondary function of the BMRDA.⁶

Between 1975, when the BMRDA was established, and 1978, for which data were available, the BMRDA had undertaken the following assignments :

6 BMRDA : Annual Report 1977-78, (Bombay : 1979 : 2).

A. Planning and Coordination : (i) Preparation of plans for Alibaug and Pen areas added to the BMR to make the Regional Plan upto date; (ii) Policy paper on Optimal Regional Structure (ORS) emphasizing decentralization of growth from Bombay to other growth centres in the BMR; (iii) Policy paper on Regional Urban Housing Policy emphasizing need for augmenting supply of land through decentralization of jobs, promotion of incremental housing and coordination of the work of agencies engaged in the housing field; (iv) Appraisal and approval of 1973 New Bombay Draft Plan; (v) Preparation of plan for Bandra-Kurla and its phased execution through the offices of the MCGB; (vi) Exercising control on development of new offices, godowns or buildings with FSI higher than 1.33 in Greater Bombay through Development Control Rules;⁷ (vii) Surveys and studies in respect of onion and potato, foodgrains, textile, and iron and steel markets and action to shift them to other areas; (viii) Studies related with traffic management in different parts of BMR; (ix) Feasibility studies for Tollway bridge across Dharamtar Creek, truck terminal at Wadala, and East Island Tollway project for funding by different agencies; (x) Association with the revision of the Development Plan being done by the MCGB, and the Metropolitan Transport Railway Project; and (xi) Preparation of Regional Investment Plan for the BMR for different years.

B. Project Formulation : (i) World Bank aided project for Water supply and sewerage for the BMR outside Greater Bombay; (ii) World

⁷ About one-third of the applications rejected by the BMRDA under these were over-ruled by the State government during 1977-78.

Bank aided Bombay Urban Transport project; and (iii) Thane Creek-Ulhas River-Bassein Creek Water Way Project.

C. Execution of Projects : Area development projects in (i) Bandra-Kurla; (ii) Khopoli (32 ha.); (iii) Panchpakhadi (Thane : 40 ha.); (iv) Chitalsar-Manpada (Thane : 26 ha.); (v) Ambarnath (17 ha.); (vi) Dombivli (124 ha.); (vii) Kalwa (80 ha.), (viii) Pen (13 ha.); (ix) Powai (140 ha.); and (x) Bhiwandi (36 ha.). However, excepting minor progress on Bandra-Kurla, and Panchpakhadi, not much of progress was made on other projects.

D. Development Assistance : Assistance from the donor/loaning agencies (i.e. World Bank/IDA) and Central Government under the IUD schemes to the time of about Rs.10 crores channelized to different projects of the MCGB, CIDCO and BMRDA.

In 1975 when the BMRDA was set up, the municipal bodies had expressed their apprehension that the steel frame of BMRDA was being superimposed on them in the name of expected central assistance. The assistance itself would not be very substantial whereas the independence of the municipal bodies would be greatly curtailed. About seven years of BMRDA's existence has generally proved these misgivings correct. As the confusion regarding the decisions pertaining to the Backbay, West Island Freeway, Sewri-Sheva Bridge link, Bandra-Kurla, APM Turbhe and Nhava-Sheva, etc. indicate, the BMRDA has neither succeeded in coordinating the work of different agencies in the BMR nor itself accomplished much through its own activities. As the Maharashtra government's decision not agreeing to relocation of all wholesale vegetable markets to New Bombay suggests, the Authority has, in fact, been used, in some cases, as a useful conduit for defeating the very objective for which it was established.

IV

Kerkar Group Report : Integration of BMR in to a Single City

In chapter two, I have already traced the genesis of constitution of the Kerkar Group. The analysis here is confined to its key recommendations :

1. Appointed specifically to deal with the problem of slums and dilapidated houses in the island city (not even in the suburbs and extended suburbs), the Group disregarded its terms of references, and recommended conversion of the entire BMR into a grandiose Bombay Metropolitan City (BMC). The BMC not only includes old and new Bombay but also Pen and Alibaug in the south, Karjat and Kalwa in the east, and Bassein and Bhiwandi (across the Bassein creek) in the north. Even Bassein creek has been crossed.
2. The BMC would be an integrated city region with uniform civic amenities, transport, and communications under an Apex Body headed by the Chief Minister. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay has, so far, not succeeded in achieving this uniformity in Greater Bombay, with the island, suburbs and extended suburbs roughly approximating to the ritual status accorded to the Brahmins, backward castes and the scheduled caste in the Hindu hierarchy.
3. The Group has recommended Urban Renewal Areas (URAs) and Slum Renewal Areas (SRAs) where the entire emphasis, between the lines, is on the removal of their overwhelming majorities to alien (and surely outer) areas on 'human considerations' with the vacated land, taken possession for development, passing on to the private developers. If these operations are linked with the counter-part High Power Action Group on Slum Clearance which got into action during the

raging monsoon in July 1981, and which obtained a conditional clearance for its work from the Supreme Court on October 22, 1981 the implications become pretty obvious. This city was built for the rich business class and others had to make room for them to keep it that way.

4. Such grandiose plan needs staggering investment and true enough the Kerkar Group's plan (Tables 5.6 - 5.9) involves an outlay only of Rs.6600 crores excluding the cost of land and physical and social infrastructure which the Group wants at uniform standard throughout the BMC and yet has left unquantified. This investment has to be spread over a period of 12 years beginning 1981. Roughly Rs.3400 crores are supposed to be coughed up by the state and central governments (averaging Rs.283.3 crores per year) and the remaining Rs.2200 crores by the World Bank.⁸ The terms on which the private sector is to make housing available to the dwellers of slums and dilapidated houses have not been indicated. The Government is expected to raise Rs.800 crores by releasing the vacant urban land frozen under the MULC Act on which the private building sharks would obviously mint any sum upwards of Rs.8000 crores.

⁸ As indicated by a seasoned commentator as J.B.D'Souza, this expectation clearly glosses over the previous experience of getting assistance from the internal (municipal, state and central governments) and external (World Bank, IDA, etc.) sources. For an informed and incisive critique of Kerkar Group Report, see for example, D'Souza (1981).

Table 5.6

Accelerated Housing Programme Proposed by the Kerkar Group

Year	Urban Renewal SHU	Slum Redevelop- ment SHU	Others* SHU	Total SHU
1	2	3	4	5
1981-82	25,000	20,000	100,000	145,000
1982-83	35,000	20,000	110,000	165,000
1983-84	50,000	30,000	120,000	200,000
1984-85	60,000	50,000	130,000	240,000
1985-86	60,000	50,000	140,000	250,000
1986-87	60,000	50,000	150,000	260,000
1987-88	60,000	55,000	160,000	275,000
1988-89	60,000	60,000	170,000	290,000
1989-90	60,000	65,000	180,000	305,000
1990-91	60,000	70,000	200,000	330,000
1991-92	60,000	75,000	220,000	355,000
1992-93	60,000	80,000	240,000	380,000
Constant thereafter	Constant		Increasing 20,000 SHU's per year thereafter	

Of the projected demand in column (4) :

- a. 20% will be units of 1 SHU or less and in the government sector, with a predominance of serviced sites (0.5 SHU).
- b. 5% will be employee housing.
- c. 50% will be of between 2 to 2.5 SHU predominantly in the cooperative housing sector.
- d. 25% will be housing of higher SHU.

In terms of number of tenements, this would work out to 40%, 5%, 45% and 10% for (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively.

Source : Government of Maharashtra : 1981 : Chapter IV.

Table 5.7

Building Material Requirements for the Housing Programme
Suggested by the Kerkar Group

Year	Cement	Steel (M.T.)
1981-82	580,000	72,500
1982-83	660,000	82,500
1983-84	800,000	100,000
1984-85	960,000	120,000
1985-86	1,000,000	Over 125,000
1986-87	1,040,000	130,000
1987-88	1,100,000	137,500
1988-89	1,160,000	145,000
1989-90	1,220,000	152,500
1990-91	1,320,000	165,000
1991-92	1,420,000	177,500
1992-93	1,520,000	190,000

Note : Computed @ of 0.5 MT/SHU.

Source : Government of Maharashtra : 1981 : Chapter IV.

Table 5.8

Financial Outlay for Slums and Dilapidated Buildings
Projected by the Kerkar Group

Year	Rs. Crores (1981 Prices)	Rs. Crores at Cost Increasing 10 per cent Each Year
1981-82	90	90
1982-83	110	121
1983-84	160	192
1984-85	220	286
1985-86	220	308
1986-87	220	330
1987-88	230	368
1988-89	240	408
1989-90	250	450
1990-91	260	494
1991-92	270	540
1992-93	280	588
Total	2550	4175

Source : Government of Maharashtra : 1981 : Chapter IV.

Table 5.9

Resource Mobilization for AHP Suggested by the
Kerkar Group : 1981-82 to 1992-93

	Area	Rate to be Charged	Total/ Rs. crores
A. Land Ceiling			
1. Value of construction under Section 21(1)	28 m. sft.	Rs.200/sft.	560.00
2. Lands to be exempted under Section 21(1)	2220 ha.	Rs. 50/sq.m.	110.00
3. Land to be exempted under Section 22	400 ha.	Rs.200/sq.m.	80.00
4. Lands to be exempted under Section 20	312 ha.	Rs.100/sq.m.	31.20
B. Sale/Development of Lands and Housing	1000 acres	Rs.500/sq.yds.	242.00
C. State Government Construction			1200.00
			<u>2223.20</u>
		say	<u>2200.00</u>
<u>Add :</u>			
D. Central Government/Agency Loans/Grants			2200.00
E. World Bank			2200.00
Total			<u>6600.00</u>

Source : Government of Maharashtra : 1981 : Chapter IV.

Kerkar Group Report was, as D'Souza very aptly puts it (1981 : 14) a periodical stunt and quite a few of its "revolutionary" recommendations would find a well deserved place in the deeper layers of dust in the state achieves. However, it is not that it would altogether fail in achieving some of the real objectives set out for it by the forces which made its constitution possible. There is considerably truth in D'Souza's apprehension that the Maharashtra government is more likely to embark on slum clearance in the name of making available alternative housing to the slum dwellers and residents in the dilapidated buildings in Greater Bombay, and allot such vacated land ultimately to the estate building sharks through the same mechanism as has operated in the case of Backbay Reclamation.

The character of BMRDA was made so unwieldy and loaded in favour of the elected representatives through considerable political maneuvering that the experts in it were reduced to the status of secondary importance. Even then, the BMRDA has not been very much appreciated by the business, trade, and manufacturing class and viewed it as a mechanism causing - not solving - them considerable problems. They would like a more pliable body, like the Apex Body suggested by the Kerkar Group, to be put on the top for deciding all vital issues in the BMR. Since the suggestion suits the convenience of the political executives beautifully it is likely to find favour.

Nhava-Sheva Port Project

The Nhava-Sheva Port (NSP) project was mooted first in 1961 but around the time New Bombay project was initiated it had become a major consideration in favour of the new city. The processing of this proposal involving, among others, the Bombay Port Trust (BPT), the Maharashtra Government, the Central Government especially its Ministries of Shipping and Transport (MST), Commerce, Industries, Food and Agriculture and the Planning Commission, has had a very chequered history. The proposal was caught in the war of attrition between the MST and Planning Commission on the one hand and on the other between the BPT and the private shipping trade lobby helped and fuelled by the multinationals (interested in marketing sophisticated port handling technology) and smuggling interests. I would briefly analyse how the proposal could receive 'in principle' sanction only in May 1980, a full 19 years after its birth, vitally affecting the progress of the New Bombay project.

A fuller account of the processing of NSP proposal can only be provided by referring to the chronology of events contained in the documents of the BPT, MST and the Planning Commission. To economize, however, I have reconstructed it relying mainly on the Report of the Working Group on Nhava-Sheva (Government of India : 1980) and supplemented it with discussions with the officials of these agencies.

The idea of to have an ancillary port of Nhava-Sheva first occurred to U.N. expert (on port expansion schemes) Mr. F. Posthuma in 1961 who suggested preparation of a Master Plan for the new port. The task of preparing such a Master Plan was entrusted by the BPT to their consulting engineers M/s Bertline Partners (India). The Master Plan was made ready in 1971. The Working Group on Ports, set up by the MST to prepare the proposals for the Fifth Five Year Plan, also recommended in 1973 construction of the NSP. The Planning Commission called a meeting (of the concerned agencies, state and central governments) to consider these sets of proposals. The meeting felt that (a) the financial and economic justification for the proposal needed to be examined in detail, and (b) traffic projections needed to be formulated on a more realistic basis. In pursuance of this decision, three Working Groups (a) Working Group on Coal Traffic, (b) Working Group on Fertilizer Traffic, and (c) Working Group on Environment were set up in the Planning Commission in Setpember 1973 to study different aspects of the NSP proposal. While these WGs were deliberating their burden, annual plan proposals of the MST for the year 1975-76 were discussed at a meeting held in the Planning Commission in December 1974 and a provision of Rs.3 crores was agreed to for the NSP for the year 1975-76. This amount, however, remained unspent since no decision had been taken on the project. The three WGs submitted their reports in August 1975. Their traffic projections for NSP were estimated at 5.2 M.T. out of which 2.6 M.T. consisted of coal and the balance 2.6 M.T. in other commodities. One major limitation of the recommendation made by these WGs was that their traffic projections were made only for NSP. A composite projection involving both BPT and NSP was not made.

The MST prepared a draft plan on the basis of the WG proposals which was appraised by the Planning Commission in 1976. In Planning Commission's view, the traffic projections made by the WGs were very much on the high side and 'needed further scrutiny' having regard to the change in the situation particularly because of the oil finds at Bombay High. An inter-ministerial meeting, held in September 1976, decided not to accept these traffic projections and to make further studies in view of the fact that the coal traffic of 2.6 M.T., projected by the WGs, was not going to materialize. The proposal of the MST was, therefore, returned by the Planning Commission.

Nothing significant moved until February 1978 when, in an effort to reactivate the dormant issue, the MST wrote to the Planning Commission requesting it to constitute a new Working Group to (a) revise the traffic projections for NSP and (b) to work out detailed appraisal of the project in broader framework taking into account the benefits and costs to the economy as a whole.⁹ The Planning Commission took another five months to constitute the WG on NSP on June 8, 1978. This third WG on NSP was asked (a) to work out the traffic projections for next 10-15 years (keeping in view the capacity of the Bombay port and the need for relocation of port activities in the overall context of optimizing the land use in the Bombay Region), (b) examine the feasibility and economies of the alternative of expanding existing

9 The exasperation, frustration, anger and contempt of the user ministry, MST, is very much evident in the verbiage of the request. This request itself was made after considerable political pressure was exerted by the Maharashtra government.

facilities at BPT (by modernization of equipment or adding to the capacities of existing installations) to meet the requirements of projected traffic, (c) examine the feasibility and economics of the alternative of diverting traffic to other existing ports in order to reduce congestion at the BPT, and (d) make recommendations on a social cost benefit study to be conducted for the NSP by the BPT.

Both the BPT and Maharashtra government at local level and the MST at the Centre were, however, apprehensive that the Planning Commission was likely to indulge in its usual delaying tactics (WGs - meetings to discuss them - objections - WGs - meetings - objections - and so on). The MST had, therefore, proceeded to move decisively in the matter by independently setting up a Committee (Mehta Committee) in August 1978 (a) to study the problems of congestion at BPT, and (b) to recommend measures for diversion of import/export cargo from the BPT to other ports. Unlike the Planning Commission WG on NSP which was still engaged in its deliberations, the Mehta Committee promptly submitted its report in November 1978. It is significant to note that the Report of the WG on NSP does not give details of the Mehta Committee although it does say that the same have been taken into account while preparing it.

The Report of the WG on NSP was finally completed in May 1980, a full two years and three months after its constitution and, finally, the Planning Commission could persuade itself to accord 'in principle' sanction to the project. The endorsement of the NSP idea by the Planning Commission is based on the examination of (a) the capacity of the BPT and its utilization, (b) scope for expansion, (c) scope for diversion of traffic to other ports, (d) traffic projections,

and (e) alternatives open in handling projected traffic (Tables 5.10 - 5.14). It is not significantly different from the reasoning given on earlier occasions by the other WGs since 1961. The cost of the NSP, originally estimated at Rs.58 crores, has, according to the detailed project report presented to the Government of India in January 1982, now scaled to Rs.580 crores.¹⁰ The 500 year old Bombay port with a limited draft and capacity to handle large-sized ships has been, in the absence any relief, forced to operate at 90 per cent of capacity utilization as against recommended 60-70. Desilting operations have almost been totally disrupted. Congestion at the port and, consequent waiting time for the ships mid-stream, has, according to the MST, caused a dead loss of Rs.128.22 crores to the shipping lines between 1962-63 and 1977-78. The New Bombay project, which was to get a major boost through the NSP, and port based activities, suffered a great deal due to its absence. All this could have been avoided had the policy makers taken an urgent view of the problems of the BPT and decided the issue in one or two years instead of the nineteen they eventually took.

10 According to an announcement made by the Minister of Shipping and Transport in the Parliament in February 1982, the NSP has been included in the Sixth Five Year Plan and the construction work is to begin in early 1983.

Table 5.10

Share of the Bombay Port in the Total Traffic at all the Major Indian Ports (Excluding POL, Iron Ore and Coal)

Year	Total Traffic at All Major Ports	Share of Bombay Port	(Million Tonnes)
			Percentage Share of Bombay Port
1965-66	21.62	8.13	37.6
1966-67	24.06	8.23	34.2
1967-68	23.62	8.11	34.3
1968-69	21.29	7.58	35.6
1969-70	17.68	6.50	36.8
1970-71	17.04	6.12	35.9
1971-72	17.84	6.51	36.5
1972-73	16.54	6.33	38.3
1973-74	17.95	7.22	40.2
1974-75	21.02	7.72	36.7
1975-76	21.60	8.15	37.7
1976-77	22.19	8.47	38.2
1977-78	17.78	7.05	39.6

Source : Government of India : 1980 : 33.

Table 5.11

Estimates of Capacities of Major Indian Ports and Projection
of Traffic for 1982-83

Ports	P.O.L.	Iron	Ore	Coal	Fertilizers	(Million Tonnes) Other Cargo
Bombay	14.50 * (12.90)	-	-	-	**	6.00*** (8.36)
Kandla	3.00 to 3.50 (1.40)	-	-	-	0.90 (1.45)	1.15 (0.66)
Mormugao	1.50 (0.80)	14.00 (13.40)	-	-	** (0.10)	0.35 (0.59)
Cochin	3.50 (3.70)	-	0.20	0.30 (0.60)	-	1.45 (1.00)
Calcutta X	4.00 (3.30)	4.00 (1.50)	5.00 (3.90)	1.80 (1.54)	-	4.46 (3.84)
Haldia X	-	3.00 to 4.00 (3.50)	-	-	** (0.06)	3.35 (1.83) ***
Paradeep	-	-	-	-	0.30 (1.41)	2.43 (1.75)
Vishakhapatnam	2.00 to 2.50 (2.15)	8.00 (8.10)	-	-	0.60 (1.04)	2.40 (1.20)
Madras	4.00 (3.80)	8.00 (5.00)	-	-	** (0.33)	2.00 (0.45)
Tuticorin	1.00 to 1.50 (2.15)	-	2.25 to 2.50 (1.90)	-	** (0.17)	0.55 (0.63)
Mangalore	1.00 to 1.50 (0.33)	7.50 (7.50)	-	-	3.90 (8.18)	21.14 (20.29)
Total	34.50 to 36.50 (28.89)	44.50 to 45.50 (39.00)	7.45 to 7.70 (5.80)	-	-	-

Note : Figures in brackets relate to traffic projections.

* Excluding crude oil handled at Salaya Off-Shore terminal.

** At these ports, the general cargo berths are used for fertilizers handling. No separate capacity for fertilizers alone is available.

*** In terms of general cargo.

Source : Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India
and quoted by Government of India : 1980 : 28.

Table 5.12

Pattern of Inland Movement of Overseas Cargo Handled at
Bombay Port in 1977-78

('000 Tonnes)

Name of States	Import	Export	Total
1. Maharashtra	1196 (35.67)	1846 (68.37)	3042 (50.48)
1.1 Greater Bombay	931 (27.67)	729 (27.40)	1660 (27.60)
1.2 Rest of Maharashtra	265 (7.87)	1117 (41.97)	1382 (22.88)
2. Delhi	165 (16.80)	82 (3.08)	647 (10.74)
3. Gujarat	261 (7.76)	136 (5.22)	397 (6.61)
4. Madhya Pradesh	241 (7.18)	125 (4.69)	366 (6.08)
5. West Bengal	298 (8.87)	61 (2.29)	359 (5.96)
6. Punjab	228 (16.79)	91 (3.42)	319 (5.30)
7. Uttar Pradesh	222 (6.58)	40 (1.50)	262 (4.35)
8. Andhra Pradesh	101 (3.00)	109 (4.09)	210 (3.49)
9. Haryana	92 (2.74)	29 (1.09)	121 (2.01)
10. Karnataka	75 (2.24)	28 (1.05)	103 (1.71)
11. Tamil Nadu	28 (0.84)	16 (0.62)	44 (0.17)
12. Rajasthan	10 (0.29)	21 (0.18)	31 (0.52)
13. Others	46 (1.37)	76 (2.67)	122 (2.03)
Total	3363 (100.00)	2660 (100.00)	6023 (100.00)

The figures in brackets indicate the percentage of the total.

Source : Government of India : 1980 : 25.

Table 5.13

Past Trends and Future Projections of Commodity-wise Traffic for Bombay (Excluding POL)

Items	(Million Tonnes)									
	Actual Traffic	Estimated Traffic	Projected Traffic	1974- 1975	1975- 1976	1976- 1977	1977- 1978	1978- 1979	1982- 1983	1987- 1988
Imports										
Foodgrains	1.88	2.15	1.49	0.10	0.02	0.45*	0.30*	*		
Finished Fertilizer and Raw Materials	1.31	1.27	1.00	0.99	1.06	1.30	1.22	-	1.30	1.45
Vegetable Oil	0.03	0.04	0.23	0.85	0.68	0.30	0.18	0.12		
Clinkers	0.11	0.10	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17		
Container Traffic	2.44	1.90	1.78	2.21	3.14	0.68*	1.18	1.55		
Other Traffic						3.00	3.25	3.80		
Total (Imports)	5.77	5.46	4.67	4.28	5.06	6.48	7.58	-	9.22	8.08
Exports										
Foodgrains	-	-	-	0.12	0.13	0.15*	0.30*	0.60*		
Oil Cakes	0.26	0.42	0.78	0.35	0.30	0.50	0.75	0.75		
Sugar	0.25	0.49	0.25	0.02	0.09	0.37	0.50	0.63		
Vegetable Oil	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.06		
Container Traffic	1.40	1.71	2.66	2.25	1.99	0.68**	1.35	2.00		
Other Traffic						2.05	2.45	3.30		
Total (Exports)	1.95	2.69	3.80	2.76	2.57	3.78	5.39	7.34		
Total Traffic	7.72	8.15	8.47	7.05	7.63	10.24	12.97	-	16.56	13.47

* These estimates of import-export have been adopted on the assumption that one berth with a handling capacity of 6 lakh tonnes per year will be reserved for import-export of foodgrains; the break-up between import-export may change depending upon state of indigenous production.

** The Department of Commerce gave an estimate of 1.368 lakh containers for 1982-83. Break-up of tonnage between import and export has been worked out on 50:50 basis and assuming a load of 10 tonnes per container.

Source : Government of India : 1980 : 6-7.

Table 5.14

Evaluation of Dead Loss to the Shipping Companies Due to
Waiting Time at Bombay Port

Year	Ship Days Lost for Want of Berth			Daily Standing Charges (Rs. '000)			Dead Loss (Rs. Crores)			Total (Rs. Crores)
	Bulk Carr- ier	General Cargo	Total	Bulk Carr- ier	General Cargo	Cargo	Bulk Carr- ier	General Cargo	Cargo	
1962-63	788	2191	2979	5.8	5.0		0.45	1.09		1.54
1963-64	550	1689	2239	6.1	5.2		0.33	0.87		1.20
1964-65	1448	3468	4916	6.4	5.4		0.92	1.87		2.79
1965-66	766	1991	2757	6.8	5.7		0.52	1.13		1.65
1966-67	3224	2331	5555	7.9	6.5		2.54	1.51		4.05
1967-68	1948	3345	5293	9.2	7.4		1.78	2.47		4.25
1968-69	1779	1100	2879	10.9	8.5		1.93	0.93		2.86
1969-70	934	1415	2449	12.9	9.8		1.20	1.38		2.58
1970-71	3	187	190	15.1	11.4		-	0.21		0.21
1971-72	255	776	1032	16.09	13.0		0.43	1.00		1.43
1972-73	412	1169	1581	18.7	14.7		0.76	1.72		2.48
1973-74	2325	4450	6775	20.7	16.6		1.08	7.38		8.46
1974-75	2540	2683	5223	22.9	18.6		5.69	4.99		10.68
1975-76	2075	542	2617	25.1	20.8		5.21	0.68		5.84
1976-77	495	1224	1719	26.6	24.0		1.31	2.93		4.24
1977-78	437	8910	9347	28.2	27.2		1.22	24.23		25.45
Total							25.37	54.34	79.71*	

* The present value of the estimate of Rs.79.71 crores is reckoned at Rs.128.22 crores.

Source : Estimates provided by the Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Government of India and quoted by Government of India : 1980 : 36.

Relocation Projects of CIDCO in New Bombay

APM Turbhe, CBD Belapur and the Iron and Steel Market and Warehousing Complex Kalamboli are three principal relocation projects being executed by CIDCO in New Bombay. The target groups for each of these are different. The APM Turbhe was intended to relocate wholesale agricultural markets presently in south Bombay; the CBD Belapur was to divert the office sector from the Nariman Point area; and the Kalamboli complex would relocate iron and steel yards from Darukhana and Duncan Road. The first two projects were initiated almost along with the EDA Vashi in 1971 : the last one was taken up in 1980 after a painful analysis of lukewarm response to relocation efforts at the first two places.

APM Turbhe is a huge and ambitious 115 ha. area and would be developed in several stages. Sequentially, three important developments have taken place under this project : (a) the MAFCO storage and warehousing complex, (b) the onion and potato market; and (c) the vegetable and jaggery, etc. market. The MAFCO complex area was developed by CIDCO on its behalf in 1972. The complex has cold storage and warehousing facilities for its own products and, to that extent, it was not helpful to the general relocation efforts of CIDCO. The onion and potato market part of the APM Turbhe was built by CIDCO itself on 15 ha. area at a cost of Rs.3 crores without first ascertaining the demand for the same from the Bombay wholesalers in these commodities. CIDCO first created cold storage facilities of about 12,000 M.T. and built shops, godowns, a truck terminal and housing and servicing space for the benefit

of potential clientele¹¹ and then went to the wholesale trade to persuade them to shift. The wholeslaers, however, refused to cooperate. After its initial informal efforts had failed, CIDCO approached the state government to de-recognize the existing wholesale markets in south Bombay excercizing powers under the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Markets Act, in an effort to force them to move to APM Turbhe. The traders carried the issue from the lowest to highest courts between 1975-1979 and finally lost it. They then resumed their dialogue with the CIDCO and agreed to shift. But by August 1980, only the onion and potato markets had shifted to APM Turbhe and other vegetable traders had carried their fight at the political level through intense lobbying with the government, headed by A.R. Antulay, and the BMRDA. As a result of these, the Maharashtra government decided in 1980 that all the vegetable wholesale markets cannot be shifted to New Bombay since the overwhelming quantum of these perishable items are consumed in Greater Bombay. The government preferred their relocation, on the advice of the BMRDA, to Bandra-Kurla complex.¹²

Chastised by the earlier experience, the CIDCO launched a survey of commodity markets in Greater Bombay to find out the present

11 A railway siding linking Kalwa, on the Central Railway, to Turbhe has also been planned but has yet not been built.

12 The Bandra-Kurla area was later suggested to be kept as a green belt by the Kerkar Group in August 1981. Thus, what actually happened as a result of the lobbying was that the wholesalers succeeded in staying put where they were. Their belated response to CIDCO's efforts at relocation after August 1981 is due to the sober realization that New Bombay offers better choice and opportunities now than Bandra-Kurla later. Now CIDCO is willing to give housing and other services near the relocation projects which others may not.

turnover, pattern of trade in and out flows, directional flow pattern, places of origin and destination of products, and mode of transport, etc. (Tables 5.15 - 5.17). It followed it up by carrying out demand surveys to plan commodity relocation projects in New Bombay suiting the requirements, and convenience of the trade interests rather than making them shift to facilities developed without their consultation (Table 5.18). The second phase of APM Turbhe and the Kalamboli complex have been designed on the basis of this methodology in which the trade has also made part payment in advance. In 1981 CIDCO was in the process of developing a 34 ha. complex for the sugar, jaggery, spices, oil and oilseeds, fruits and poultry trade in APM Turbhe and 'expected to shift' roughly 20,000 jobs and 1.2 million tonnes of annual such traffic to New Bombay.

Table 5.15

The In and Outflow Pattern of Agricultural Produce Markets
in Bombay City

Area Occupied (ha.)	Total Daily Arrival val	Total Annual Arrival	Movement by rail	Total Number of Handcart Daily	No. of Trips Daily	Average Waiting Time of Vehicles (minutes)
A. Produce Inflow						
Onion & Potato	1.00	1300	3.90	1.40	215	524
Grains, Sugar, Jaggery, Condiments, Spices, etc.	17.65	8900	26.70	7.00	1780	2000
Total	18.65	10200	30.60	8.40	1995	2524
B. Produce Outflow						
Onion & Potato	73	10	17	55	43	2
Grains, Sugar, Jaggery Spices, Condiments, etc.	55	15	30	81	9	-
						10

Source : L.C. Gupta : 1981 : 22.

Table 5.16

Estimates of Total Cost of Transport and Truck Hours to Effect a Given Daily Movement in 1976 and 1981 (For One Way Trip)

From 1976 to	Island City			Western Subs.			Eastern Subs.			Thane			Total	
	Total Truck Hours	Cost of Transp- ort (Rs)												
Duncan Road	30	375	24	341	25	338	16	248	95	1302				
Vashi	29	403	20	323	13	215	5	95	67	1036				
<u>1981</u>														
Duncan Road	32	400	40	569	42	563	22	330	136	1862				
Vashi	30*	430	33	539	21	358	7	126	91	1453				

* It is assumed that the inter-city trucks (having 10 tonne capacity) coming to Turbhe Wholesale Market will be used for carrying onion and potato to the island city. For other movements 6 tonne capacity trucks will be utilised.

Note : 1. Total inflows in 1976 and 1981 are assumed at 900 and 1200 tonnes respectively and percentage consumption are as under:

	<u>1976 (%)</u>	<u>1981 (%)</u>
Island City	50	40
Suburbs	40	50
Thane-Kalyan	10	10

2. The above table is based on actual one way distance, travel time and cost (as in 1977 prices) as worked out from Duncan Road and Turbhe to four representative retail points.

Source : L.C. Gupta : 1981 : 23.

Table 5.17

Total Inflow of Iron and Steel and Its Movement by Rail and Road in Greater Bombay

	Total Inflow (Lakh Tonnes)	Movement	
		By Rail	By Road
Stockyards	11.60	11.60	-
Trade	4.27	3.77	0.50
Total	15.87	15.37	0.50

Source : L.C. Gupta : 1981 : 24.

Table 5.18

Demand Registered for Shop-cum-Godowns and Open Developed
Plots in New Bombay

1. Agricultural Produce Markets at Turbhe

Total Demand for Con- structed Shops	Total No. of Shops constructed	Demand Extra Storage for Const- ructed Plots	Extra Storage Plots	Demand Provided in the Plan	Demand from Edible Oil Mer- chants	Actual No. of Plots	Area marked for Edible Oils (Ha.)
I. Phase (Onion and Potato Mar- ket)	140	238*	-	5980	-	-	
II. Phase (Grain, Sugar Jaggery, Con- diments, Spices, etc.)	1720	2220**	300	310	54	62	8.5

2. Iron and Steel Market at Kalamboli

Plot Size (Sq. Mts.)	Total Demand for Plots	As Provided in the Plan	Remarks	Area Ear- marked for Truck Ter- minal (Ha.)
125	318	318	Total area provid- ed for 1529 plots	
250	618	618	is almost 85 ha.	
460	373	373	The plan provides additional 40 ha.	8.8
900	220	220	more for future expansion.	
Total	1529	1529		

* One module size of 650 sq. ft. of built up area.

** Two module sizes are proposed for construction :

- i. 1227 sq. ft. of built up area.
- ii. 1420 sq. ft. of built up area.

Source : L.C. Gupta : 1981 : 25.

The Kalamboli complex has been designed to relocate the wholesale market in iron and steel presently occupying 14 ha. in civil and 26.5 ha. in dockyard areas of Bombay respectively. Total annual inflow of iron and steel in Greater Bombay is 1.6 million tonnes. Only 51 per cent of this is sold in Greater Bombay. With increased restrictions on construction activity in the island city, even this percentage is likely to go down in future. On the other hand, construction activity would pick up considerably in New Bombay with the start of Nhava-Sheva port. The Kalamboli complex would act as the focal point for this. It is a 250 ha. warehousing-cum-marketing complex close to the New Panvel node and is being developed at a cost of Rs.5 crores. CIDCO expects to divert of 15,000 jobs from Greater to New Bombay. About 1500 plots have already been purchased by the Iron and Steel Merchants' Association. Major steel producers i.e., SAIL, TISCO, and IISCO have also acquired large sized plots for locating their stock yards here.

The CBD at Belapur has not gone very far so far. Its first phase was expected to develop 347 ha. where the office complexes had to come up. Today, only a solitary government complex, the Konkan Bhuvan, with an employee strength of 1300 is functional, although housing accommodation and other social facilities have been provided in the area. Plots for office complex for the banks, insurance and private companies have been earmarked with the liberal FSI of two. The voluntary response from the tertiary sector has been dismal. It is here that the decisive role had to be played by the Maharashtra Government. It was morally committed to shift critical central functions to arrest Bombay's growth and help relocation efforts of

the CIDCO. Successive governments - Naik, Chavan, Patil, Pawar, Antulay - have, however, actively promoted the Backbay project. The building of the Assembly complex at Nariman Point has, in fact, only emboldened the private estate sharks. The Maharashtra government under Mr. Antulay embarked upon a much more ambitious plan of recasting of Greater Bombay's economy and quality of life. This plan which started with the piece-meal airing of single projects such as the West-Island Freeway (involving a Dubai firm), Gateway-Uran and Sewri-Sheva bridges (with JRD Tata associated with both in one capacity or the other), shifting of State government offices including Mantranalaya to the mainland, and regulation of the flow of migrants to the city, etc. It finally crystalized and climaxed with the Kerkar Group's recommendations integrating a major part of the EMR to make a grand Bombay Metropolitan City. In this ruthless attempt, reshaping and restructuring generally involved groups such as pavement and slum dwellers and dilapidated areas : private manufacturing, trade, business and office sectors were not to be brought under any genuine pressure to move out of convenient locations in Greater Bombay.

CHAPTER 6

City and Urban Planning : Experience and Directions

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City and Urban Planning : Experience and Directions

This chapter attempts to place the specific urban development experience of Bombay, New Bombay, and the BMR in the broader context of general Indian pattern of urbanisation observed during different phases of its history, and, then, identify the flaws in the urban development theory, and practice to draw appropriate lessons. The analysis is organised in three sections. The first one overviews the pattern of urban development policies followed in India since the pre-historical period; the second identifies the specific flaws in the urban planning theory and practice; the third identifies the factors responsible for the non-realization of self-sustained growth of New Bombay and lists the lessons for future urban planning exercises.

I

Historical Pattern of Urban Development Policies Pursued in India

For my analysis here, I have divided the history of urban development in India into five major periods (i.e. the pre-historic, the Aryan, the medieval, the British and post-independence) and attempted to cull out similarities of policies and practices followed.²

1 Space constraint has forced a very capsuled analysis.

2 Analysis draws heavily from Bhattacharya (1979).

The Pre-Historical Period

This period is generally concerned with the Indus empire and the culture of Mohenjodaro, Harappa and Lothal, so graphically described by the historians. Majority of the towns and cities of this period except the three major ones were nothing more than villages with visible lowering of civic and economic standards. Apart from the big three most others had grown as ports, trading centres and fortresses. Industry was major function of leading urban centres and majority of them met their own needs. Population mix of the urban settlements varied depending upon their size (Bhattacharya : 1979 : 42-43).

This urban culture had originality of its own and it seems that the rulers of the era employed architects drawn from distant lands. The town lay-outs indicated strict enforcement of town planning principles. Although the lay-out and architecture of the urban culture reflected its independent character, there was lack of public monuments displaying vainglory of military conquests. The metal industry was uniform throughout the period and art and trading articles were authentic expressions of individual style (Bhattacharya : 1979 : 43-47). The town/city systems, however, reflected the complete control of the rulers over the urban structural form indicating the fact that town planning during this period was totally a state controlled activity.

Aryan Period

Before the Aryan invasion the pre-historic urban culture had decayed. However, the Aryans were not as urban-minded as the Harappans and historians have, in fact called them as the 'city

'destroyers'. The Aryans were not very experienced in the art of city building and built their settlements near the rivers as they continued their colonization. Urban development during this period followed this sequence : clearance of forests - agriculture - building of town/city - trade - industrial development. In building the urban settlements, the Aryans kept defence as their chief concern and did not enforce strict architectural discipline in the urban form. Although great writers of this era (i.e. Kautilya) talked of graded order of cities where the land use conformed to social positions, it remained largely a prescription. Descriptions of Hiuen Tsang indicate that nature of urbanisation and character of urban structure had changed significantly under the Aryans (Bhattacharya : 1979 : 52-113).

Medieval Period

During the Moughal rule urbanisation had, barring a few exceptions, become more diffused and owed little to the direct initiative of the rulers although periodically it received their caring protection. Height of urban development was reached during this period with industrial and commercial opulence contributing to the sound urban foundation. Towns developed were confined to river valley zones and the urban centres located on trade routes enjoyed greater rate of prosperity. Capital cities dominated generating growth impulses and the non-capital cities operating as commercial or industrial centres acted as the subsidiaries (Bhattacharya : 1979 : 171-206). It was during this period that distinct social areas representing different religious/cultural streams sprung up in the urban centres.

The British Period.

The entry of the Europeans in India and rise of European settlements brought in a totally new element in the pattern of urban development in India changing in the process the subsequent course of urbanization in the country. The arrival first of the Portugheese, then the Dutch, the British and lastly the French in India marked the efforts of merchantmen to establish their monopoly over trade. Hostility of others made the Portuguese decide the path of "armed monopoly" and securing permanent foothold on the Indian coast for "armed commerce". The establishment of European 'factories' of agency houses with permanent settlements as European colonies was its climax. These forged a direct contact between the city and foreign traders. From there followed the effort of the British to built their empire.

The British built the three Presidency towns at new places and had a free hand to make them exact replica of European towns. Traders were invited to cities like Bombay and got attracted to others such as Calcutta and Madras. The physical growth of the cities carried with them the racial discrimination in the form of European and native quarters. The comprador sections found themselves between the two. Important implications of British policy of colonization were reversal of growth impulses (from the coastal areas to the heartland as against heart regions to coastal areas previously), impetus to newer towns and stagnation of the older ones, grafting of a 'civil lines' areas in smaller towns (as an insulated administrative quarter) and subordination of the internal growth needs of all settlements to the dictates of the British imperialism. The trade and manufacturing sectors, which were once so flourishing

in the urban settlements before the British came on the scene, declined as a consequence. Internal structure of the Indian urban settlements underwent a great social-economic-cultural change.

The response of the British to the problem of Indians urban settlements was selective and reflected itself in the passage of Town Planning Act (in Bombay) and establishment of sanitary commissions and ITs. Building regulations and alterations in structural and circulatory lay-outs of the towns followed. The work of the ITs remained unimpressive for a variety of reasons and building regulations generally adhered to only in a limited areas. Servicing infrastructure constantly lagged behind the requirements.

Post-Independence Period

Between 1947 and 1954 hardly any significant change occurred in free India's urban development policies. Urban community development projects started in 1954 and subsequently the task of preparation of European model Master Plans gathered momentum among the Indian town planners. Housing and slum clearance were emphasized in the First and Second Five Year Plan documents. It was only in 1963 that a somewhat statutory strategy of attending urban problems was evolved. This strategy envisaged : (i) establishment of urban bodies in all urban areas where they were non-existent; (ii) enhancing the status of urban bodies; and (iii) permitting further physical sprawl of bigger units. Third Five Year Plan had advocated a two pronged strategy of Master Plans for all important towns, new towns developing in the aftermath of industrialization, survey of river valley projects on the one hand and integration of different develop-

ment programmes and training and town planning legislation on the other. At the initiative of the Planning Commission a series of Master Plans were prepared by a number of agencies specifying the planners vision, circulatory network, a land use plan, and a regulatory mechanism. Execution of these Master Plans could not make any significant headway due to a variety of reasons.

Analytically, it appears that the Indian policy planners have generally been more preoccupied with the task of containing the excessive growth of the metro-centres. As I have already indicated in case of Bombay, this found its expression in physical expansion of these centres through provisions of necessary infrastructure by a plethora of agencies. Simultaneously promotion of satellite towns and strengthening of smaller and medium towns has also been talked about. While the first one has been persuad with a certain degree of seriousness and resource support, as one could see on the peripheries of first, second, and third level cities in India, the second and third options have largely remained pious hopes.

The aftermath of Third Five Year Plan has seen emergence of a number of Development Authorities (region, city, function based) and programmatic thrust of urban development has also undergone a sea change (from slum clearance to slum improvement; from a single source housing to a package of housing options; improving of circulating infrastructure to its redesign; from operation of town planning regulation in parts of cities to total planning of new areas; from periodic expansions of metro-centres to a better distribution of economic structure in metro-regions, and so on). However, whereas urbanisation in an integral part of the overall

process of development, Indian urbanisation policies continue to treat it in isolation with economic and social policies. As Mohan (1981, A) puts it, Indian urbanisation policies are unconscious, partial, uncoordinated and negative and their impact has been substantially diluted due to unintended spatial bias of policies pursued in several other sectors.

II

Flaws in Traditional Urban Planning Theory

In the backdrop of historical urban development experience some built-in flaws in the practiced traditional urban planning theory can now be examined. This is essential if we want to use urbanisation as a process and urban planning as a conscious device to promote development which ensures equality. This section concerns itself only with the major flaws.

One of the fundamentals in the traditional theory is the hierarchy of functions. This hierarchy is operationally linked with the commercial values of the places resulting in location of all higher order functions in what are described as the CBDs. Theoretically, it is argued that clustering of all higher order functions in the single place is cost effective (i.e. time, money, convenience). However, the methodology used to measure cost effectiveness is always biased, and half baked : it concerns itself with the effectiveness of this system to the top bracket in the government, business, indeed almost every sphere. It ignores what happens in the process to those who service this class - those who constitute a staggering majority. Clustering of higher order functions is very costly and inconvenient to 99 per cent and more of the population.

Why should centralization of higher order functions which starts a chain of trouble for the others then be attempted at all? Logic and rationality do not decide such crucial dimensions : power-economic and political- does. An inevitable consequence of this rule has been, as I have pointed out earlier, the tendency to force the poor, helpless people to come to the so-called "central places" to avail of the services and facilities. The facilities themselves do not go to them. What is being emphasized is the master-servant relationship involved in this system. The masters here do not leave much choice to the "servant" regarding facilities; they are made to adjust to what the masters want them to avail of at places which are not convenient to them.

Traditional urban planning theory assumes the utilization of total available land separately for different functions in certain proportions. It does not provide for trade-off between various functions even though it is fairly well known that the different areas of the same city develop at different speeds and when the city reaches a certain size the appreciation in the commercial values of land brings tremendous amount of pressure to change defined land uses. It so happens that the most severely affected plots in such cases are those earmarked for poor people and/or for social services and emenities. If the commercial interests fail to appropriate such plots, they change the land use of certain other plots designated for some other function.

It is difficult to imagine that these theorists are so naive as to totally ignore these possibilities. The fact is that this calculated theoretical divorce from reality provides a decided advantage to the elitist class which stands to gain through changes which

subsequently take place in a city's development history. It is precisely for this reason that those who control urban development do not initiate steps which may put an effective halt to a city's growth beyond a point.

Traditional urban planning theory treats city planning mainly as an exercise in physical planning. As a result the human, social and economic aspects get relatively ignored and cause untold misery to the urban population. It is in this context that the formation of slums, natural development of industrial suburbs, spontaneous development of commercial centres on the one hand, and slum clearance, fostered industrial development and artificial commercial centres on the other, are viewed.³ In the planning of a new city or in the recasting of an old one, this tendency forces choices which emphasize the visual aspect and tend to ignore aspects which affect the wherewithal, the body, heart and the soul of the majority. Steadily more money seems to be available for the former than the latter. In a country where roughly half the population lives below the poverty line this is tragic. And yet, it is forgotten and ignored with ridiculous ease.

Traditional urban planning theory has developed the practice of providing a single identity to a city. It goes without saying that a city cannot hope to remain so after a certain stage and has to acquire several identities at a later stage. While it is fine to give a certain flavour to urbanization in a city in its initial phase, over-emphasis creates a lot of problems for subsequent

³ Delhi's recent and not so recent experience with these natural and artificial processes may be recalled here.

periods. These problems are not necessarily spatial alone : they could well be socio-cultural. In behavioural terms, these have caused incalculable damage to the economic and political systems.

III

Factors Responsible for Non-realization of Self-sustained Growth of New Bombay

The conclusions which emerge from the preceding two chapters call for tentative identification of factors which resulted in the non-realisation of self-sustained growth of New Bombay. It is easy enough to put the entire blame on the CIDCO Ltd. without referring to the context, conceptual and methodological choices made and role played by numerous other agencies in the operationalisation process. From my analysis of facts, figures, and motives, the following important factors emerge :

1. Conceptually, the visualisation of New Bombay assumed a congruence between development finance and regional planning strategies. In reality, the two strategies are, unless tactically reconciled incongruent : the former following the market forces and the latter attempting to reshape them. Operation of the development finance strategy produces best possible results when it is confined to the remunerative commercial projects, as for example attempted by the DDA in Delhi, where the revolutions of the money invested are in quicker cycles, gestation period short, project margins higher and sale potential very attractive. In other words, it is generally used for localised development; all major city structure, and/or regional infrastructures are financed either through an independent source/agency or they are not a prerequisite for local development

at all. Having addressed itself to the more ambitious task of developing a total city of two million population in 20 years the CIDCO hardly had much choice left but to develop a few nodes and large scale city structure projects entirely on its own steam in New Bombay. This was bad enough. In later years, it was persuaded to embark on several other projects in scattered locales (i.e. Bandra-Kurla, New Aurangabad, New Nasik, Nanded, Tarapur, Maisamal and New Nagpur). One of its projects had a short gestation and some projects, especially of the city structure in New Bombay, had an indefinite and indeterminate period of allocation and realisation of costs incurred on them. It was given funds by the State government and state owned SICOM only for the New Bombay Project. It invested its own scarce funds in all other projects. Thus, investment followed, dispersed approach and organisational capability was diluted. Liquidity was, consequently, the biggest casualty in the process.

2. Several contextual factors have contributed to cost maximization and profit minimization (or even elimination). A city develops - and develops fast - if it has an independent and sound economic base. New Bombay had only derived status : its name and concept reflected this identity, several other pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding. First, as I have pointed earlier, a large area inside New Bombay was already siphoned off by the MIDC. As a result, the CIDCO had considerably reduced scope for generating quick profits through sale of industrial plots. Second, environmental considerations made the CIDCO lay the policy guideline of not allowing location of large-sized industrial units in New Bombay. Third, peculiar topography and terrain made cost of reclamation and

development scale dizzy heights. Quite often these costs had to be allocated to different nodes thereby increasing the unit cost of the land uses and, in turn, making it harder to market. Fourth, the inter-relationship between different central functions, presently overcentralised in the southern most tip of Greater Bombay, was far too strong as to be successfully wooed by presence of only better quality of life in New Bombay : shifting of central functions of the quality and force as are operative in Bombay's CBD had to be a 'bunched' or 'basket' operation to succeed. As ruefully admitted by D'Souza,⁴ this was clearly a herculean political task left with the CIDCO : the political forces, once expected to facilitate it, actually worked overtime to substantially increase its magnitude. CBD interests seldom move on their own and have not done so in Bombay.

3. Persuit of contradictory policies by the Maharashtra government, mid-stream intervention roles played by the MCGB and the BMRDA, and lackadaisical turbulence negotiation strategy followed by the BPT (for the Nhava-Sheva port) all added to the CIDCO's financial misery. By deciding to build New Bombay, the Maharashtra government had made one policy choice, namely, to build a 'counter-magent' across the harbour. This decision required matching, and politically speaking, hard options to relocate Assembly, the Secretariat and all important State government offices to New Bombay, completely stop the Backbay project, and exert sustained pressure on the tertiary sector to move on to the New Bombay CBD at Belapur. It did nothing of the kind. On the other hand, it continued to

⁴ Personal discussion, op. cit.

expand the Backbay project and put specific brakes on the decongestion efforts of the CIDCO (such as shifting of vegetable and fruit markets, etc.).

While New Bombay was being built, growth of Greater Bombay continued unabated. The MCGB with the encouragement and help of Maharashtra government has been slowly though surely implementing many of the Wilbur Smith proposals. The BMRDA, ever since it came on the scene in 1975, had embarked on the development and regulation of the entire BMR including Bandra-Kurla, Greater and New Bombay. Its efforts, thus, involve development of the interactional profile between Greater Bombay and its satellite small towns in the region on the one hand, and New Bombay on the other. At the theoretical level and in the ultimate analysis this forms part of an integrated plan of developing the total BMR. In the short and medium run, however, the CIDCO's plan of attracting migrants and decongesting Greater Bombay was and is taking a big beating because of these efforts.

The Nhava-Sheva Port project was a key component of New Bombay 'growth and viability'. Turbulence pertaining to this project, identified earlier, was not very imaginatively negotiated by the BPT. First, it allowed the Planning Commission to digress and dilute the main issue of the option, namely, the chronic need to decongest and relieve pressure on the Bombay harbour.⁵ Second, its political handling of the case with the State and the Central governments was hardly up to the mark with the result that the urgency

⁵ The discussion instead shifted to future growth of traffic at Bombay harbour. This made the debaters gloss over the difficulties being experienced in handling the listed quantity of traffic at Bombay port.

and importance which needed to be accorded to the project at political level was not obtained. Third, while the whole country was aware of the site of proposed Nhava-Sheva port it remains a mystery how the ONGC succeeded in getting allocations of substantial amount of land on the Nhava island that too much against the wishes of the CIDCO.⁶ This setback too could have been - in fact, it can still be - converted into an opportunity in the national interest to work out a DPR of Nhava-Sheva⁷ attempting an integrated port and ONGC shore facilities project. Instead, it is fighting a losing battle with the ONGC, the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals on the one hand, and the CIDCO on the other. Inevitably, the sanction, installation of the port and port-based industries in New Bombay is getting jeopardized. New Bombay suffers in turn.

4. Organisational structure of CIDCO, its internal climate, processes and systems led it to follow some methodologies which posed considerably problems, and increased its cost. Organisationally, CIDCO has been an enigma. It was a company registered under the Companies Act, working as a NTDA for New Bombay (and STPA for many other towns later), planning, developing, marketing, and administering New Bombay. During 1971-74 when most crucial decision were taken committing the organisation to irrevocable series of options, it employed parallel and at times conflicting systems, (i.e., establishment and personnel sections; time accounting and PERT

⁶ CIDCO was forced by the state government to allot land to the ONGC at Nhava island. The Draft New Bombay plan approved by the State government had reserved both the islands for the port.

⁷ This was prepared by M/s Howc India Private Ltd., a consulting firm with tie-up arrangements with the Canadian and American consulting companies.

management information systems; discipline based and task based groups; inside groups controlled and managed by outside consultants; general overstaffing in the midst of selective scarcity of specialised talent; heavy percentage of aged 'on-loan' employees in key sections of establishment, rehabilitation, finance from very conservative institutions in a creative organisation mostly manned by the new entrants). While there was considerable openness in the planning wing horizontally, it was almost totally absent vertically. As such, quite often the CIDCO professionals ended up in finding conceptual, methodological and financial justifications for ideas coming from top.⁸ These decisions had their financial implications and got reflected in the per unit cost of the marketed land in New Bombay.

The CIDCO felt that its 'financial arrangements' provided a means of tapping private capital and using it for a purpose. It also felt that 'all development costs, including costs of providing improved urban and social amenities are to be met by realising funds through disposal of land (CIDCO : 1973 : 8). The methodology adopted was to acquire land, at cheap rates, develop it (physical and other infrastructure, etc.) and sell to generate funds enough to repay its borrowed capital and develop a revolving fund. In its enthusiasm, it also decided to sell constructed housing at cost with a system of cross subsidies. Only commercial developments were to be disposed using commercial mechanism to generate surpluses to be used, among other things for providing improved social infrastructure (Ibid : 13). The costing and pricing of developed land inside and outside the nodes has, however, worked against the interests of the

⁸ One might be hard put to find justification for Donquixotic experiments such as the prefabricated housing in Vashi and operation of hovermarine.

buyers of the former. This is due to the fact that apart from cost of land acquisition, development and construction, these have also got allocated costs (of the city structure, interest servicing, administration) added to them. Loading of all the costs on the buyers keeps a larger number of them out from purchasing them reducing the marketability of the products. The bulk buyers of land outside the nodes are getting away with comparatively lighter lease fee.⁹ Since only a part of the cost of city structure development is being allocated to the few nodes being developed, its larger part remains locked up. The CIDCO's experience of marketing social infrastructure, (i.e., schools, hospitals, etc.) also indicates that the buying agencies insist on deferred payment at concessional rates of interest.¹⁰ To sum up, CIDCO's liquidity position has not been very impressive although it has picked up admirably during the last two financial years.

New Bombay : Lessons From the Experiment

Launching of New Bombay was a big gamble in developing a major counter-magnet city in the frightful shadow and influence of a major metropolis. Ten years after that event, what does its rich and varied experience through trial and error approach offer to the planners and policy-makers? Although this country and its leadership has seldom displayed the habit of learning from past

9 The system of allocating costs to large plots followed by CIDCO is such that the larger plots would be required to pay lesser per unit allocated cost.

10 This is also accompanied by their tendency to collect unauthorised subscriptions under various pretexts and subterfuges.

history, I am extracting a few important lessons from New Bombay experiment for what they are worth :

1. Phenomenal growth of metropolis and acute centralisation of central functions in its CBD cannot be possibly avoided in a stratified capitalist society. Since these two processes continue unabated and the city keeps on expanding vertically and horizontally, circulation and quality of life become major problems which affect the poor, the weakest, the unorganised segments most adversely. Renewal and restructuring exercises are ideologically so planned as to make the same segments bear their pains, (i.e. demolition, resettlement, land acquisition, etc.); the monopoly and non-monopoly capitalist class and their associates which have multiplied the felt problems almost always escape this trauma and destabilization. If a new city is being built nearby, as was the case in New Bombay, the poor of that area are deprived of their land and means of livelihood and the cost of developing the city is mainly borne by the initial settlers. The very segments, which exploited the potential of existing metropolis to the hilt and contributed in no small measure to its unmanageable problems, again succeed in obtaining the best possible terms in the new city under various pretexts. To avoid this double disadvantage to the poor and double benefit to the wealthy, twin city planning has to be an exercise in shock therapy for the business, trade, manufacturing, and tertiary sectors first. Only then the twin processes of new city development and old city restructuring could be properly dovetailed. In any case, the relocation and restructuring decisions would have to be a bunching exercise and accompanied by a package of incentives and dis-incentives. The need for very high level of political courage could hardly be overemphasised.

2. Since bigger cities continue to grow despite much talked about deterioration in the quality of urban life, it is obvious that they continue to retain potential for further exploitation. Men like D'Souza now concede that embarking on New Bombay was not one of the very wise steps.¹¹ Perhaps, much better results could have been achieved by strengthening the satellite towns in the BMR including development of the Uran, Panvel and perhaps Vashi. It would be a wiser policy to plan larger number of smaller urban settlements in metro-regions with highly assertive growth impulses than further expanding a very highly congested centre. The strategy would also be advantageous to make mid-stream changes less costly exercises in such cases.

3. Development of total cities of the nature, complexity and extent seen in New Bombay cannot be managed through the use of land as a resource in the manner attempted by CIDCO. Obviously, some kind of compartmentalisation involving differentiation between nodal and non-nodal development, commercial and non-commercial development, nodal and city structure development and physical, social and civic infrastructure development would have to be made for raising the finances of such outlays and in marketing. While overall city structure and nodal planning must remain the sole responsibility of one single agency, subsidiary organisations, working under its umbrella, must be established to develop all these and to obtain soft-loans and advances from the governments, their agencies, financial and term-lending institutions and the market. The centralized planning agency should frame and employ turbulent negotiation

¹¹ Personal discussion, op.cit.

strategies involving itself with : (1) governments and governmental policy-laying, fund-donor agencies; (2) institutions expected to establish crucial components of city plan; and (3) project affected people, relocation target groups and political parties.

4. Twin-cities have generally not succeeded. One of the two - usually the older one - has almost always kept the other in the background and subsequent interventions from various directions have not allowed a distinct identity to emerge for the latter. Therefore an independant economic base - manufacturing or office sector base - must be provided for the envisaged city to save such exercises from utter failure.

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